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Preface 
 
 
Yearbook I was an attempt to reflect the presentations and discussions of registered PhD 
students in the School between 2004/5 and 2006/7. During these years I introduced several 
series of seminars in which I tried to establish an intellectual framework which would make 
dialogue meaningful between students carrying out research on diverse topics under the 
supervision of staff with a range of different disciplinary specialisms.  My introduction to 
Yearbook I -  “For a socio-genetic understanding of trans-disciplinary research” - reflected the 
way in which I had tried to frame the discussions.  I took the operation of the Centre de 
Sociologie Européenne, Paris, under the direction of Pierre Bourdieu, as my model.  My 
interpretation of Bourdieu’s philosophy of social science and its consequential methodology 
was that Bourdieu maintained a sceptical position about the explanatory validity of the social 
sciences.  I particularly argued this case in an article of 2003 (Robbins, 2003, reprinted in 
Robbins, 2006, 149-178) in which I examined Bourdieu’s critique of Weber.  I claimed that 
Bourdieu’s use of Weberian thinking in his own analyses of Algerian tribes in Sociologie de 
l’Algérie (Bourdieu, 1958) was provisional and that his reading of Husserl led him to become 
particularly conscious of the limits of rational explanation and to begin to conceive of his 
adoption of sociological discourse as an instrument for the achievement of eidetic reduction, 
securing access to the pre-predicative basis of our concept formation.  (This interpretation of 
Bourdieu’s work has been latent in the consideration of the trans-cultural transfer of social 
science concepts which has taken place in the Group for the Study of International Social 
Science since 20021). 
 
Another way to describe Bourdieu’s scepticism, however, is by reference to the work of Hume 
(which Bourdieu once said that he had ‘devoured’ when on holiday in Scotland as a student).  
Bourdieu’s commitment to the primacy of ‘affective’ relations, by comparison with which 
conceptualisations are constitutive of artificial distinctions, could be said to continue the 
tradition of Humean scepticism which acknowledges the practical, everyday meaning provided 
by sentiment and habit when reason is impotent (such as the confidence that the sun will rise 
tomorrow).  Similarly, it might also be said that Bourdieu showed sympathy with the 
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations in his disinclination to speak what cannot be 
spoken.  (See Bourdieu’s “Thinking about Limits” (Bourdieu, 1992) for his discussion of the 
limits of social scientific understanding and see his Méditations pascaliennes (Bourdieu, 1997), 
translated as Pascalian Meditations (Bourdieu, 1997) for a full expression of Bourdieu’s interest 
                                         
1 For a cumulative report of the discussions of the Group between 2002 and the present, go to 
http://www.uel.ac.uk/ssmcs/research/intern_soc_sci_study.htm 
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in the ‘orders’ of knowledge and for his use of reference to Pascal to delimit the boundaries of 
affectivity and cognition). 
 
Yearbook I explored the possibility, therefore, that the foundation of the research community 
in any institution at any time is to be identified in terms of the affective relations of the cohort 
of researchers rather than in terms of any impersonal attachment to the logic of disciplinary or 
interdisciplinary understandings.  It so happened that the six contributors (who volunteered 
that their papers should be included in the Yearbook) found themselves registered as PhD 
students in SSMaCS in UEL at short term moments in social trajectories which involved trans-
national social migration.  Two students were of German, two of Turkish, one of Italian, and 
one of Ugandan origin.  In a final ‘table ronde’ these contributors, therefore, sought to reflect 
on the consequences of their social migrations for their generation of the research enquiries 
which they were pursuing within a British Higher Education Institution. 
 
Yearbook II continued the debate by acknowledging that the approach pursued in Yearbook I 
might be excessively reductive, denying too much the autonomy of intellectual disciplines.  The 
attention of the seminars shifted explicitly to consideration of the recent social history of the 
disciplines covered by the School, with particular reference to the institutional contexts within 
which these disciplines have developed and been disseminated.  The introduction highlighted 
two historical case-studies.  It examined, firstly, the impact of the work of Karl Mannheim in 
England, in respect of his adaptation of ideas generated in Hungary and Germany between the 
wars to the post-World War II situation in the UK; in respect of his, related, shift from the 
philosophical analysis of knowledge and culture to the analysis of social administration and the 
prescription of welfare policies; and in respect of his, related, move from the London School of 
Economics to the Institute of Education, London.  It examined, secondly, the emergence of 
Cultural Studies both from the institutional context of adult education (for the early work of 
Hoggart and Williams) and from the legacy of the discourse  of literary criticism towards an 
analysis of culture which might be independent of prior discipline frameworks, whether literary, 
sociological, or anthropological, and, instead, generate analyses sui generis of a variety of 
cultural forms, including the media.  Contributors were asked specifically to reflect on their 
work in terms of its relationship to instituted explanatory discourses, and five of the seven PhD 
student contributors participated in a concluding discussion.  One concluded that although she 
enjoyed “some freedom from ‘instituted’ disciplines”, she was “obviously shaped by my 
institutional environment.  At UEL I have become gradually more engaged  with the field of 
cultural studies.” 
 
Although Yearbook II sought to acknowledge that the knowledge construction effected in PhD 
research is more than a function of the ‘individual’ interests of researchers and of their social 
trajectories, it nevertheless continued an agenda inherited from Bourdieu in that it gave 
disciplines only a limited autonomy in that it examined them as themselves social 
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constructions or, in other words, as only the ‘arbitrary’ (historically contingent) embodiments 
of the interests and social trajectories of earlier generations.  To understand the world 
sociologically, for instance, is to understand it in ways not possible for people before the mid-
19th Century just as dramatically as it is the case that visually to see the world perspectivally is 
to see it in a way which only became established in the 14th Century in Western Europe. (See 
Panofsky, 1997, and Bourdieu on Panofsky in “Sur le pouvoir symbolique”, 1977, translated as  
“On Symbolic Power” in Bourdieu, 1991, 163-170). 
 
Commencing at the end of August, 2007, I have been in receipt of an ESRC grant:  “The work of 
Jean-Claude Passeron, 1960-present:  a case-study analysis of the development of a 
philosophy of social science”  (Ref:  RES-000-22-2494).  Three consequences of this research 
work are reflected in this Yearbook.  The project has explored the differences in the thinking of 
Bourdieu and Passeron which were suppressed in their co-authored work of the 1960s (Les 
héritiers, Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964; Le métier de sociologue, Bourdieu, Chamboredon & 
Passeron, 1968; and La Reproduction, Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) but which were clearly 
articulated subsequently.  Primarily, Passeron insisted that there is no precise correlation or 
causal connection between social and cultural domination.  The analysis of the cultures of 
research practice, therefore, must concentrate, for Passeron, on an analysis of the language 
used by researchers as an instrument of enquiry rather than, as for Bourdieu, on the social 
position-taking of researchers (Yearbook I) or the social status of disciplines and the 
institutions in which they are practised (Yearbook II).  The first effect of the project, 
consequently, is to introduce the possibility that the diversity of research practice in the School 
should be explored in terms of the language of enquiry and communication adopted by its 
researchers.  Just as Passeron questioned Bourdieu’s view that the interests of researchers are 
functions of their social trajectories, emphasizing, instead, their use of language as an 
instrument of investigation, so he also questioned Bourdieu’s view that the distinctions 
between disciplines are socially constructed, emphasizing, instead, their distinctive discourses.  
The second effect of the project, therefore, is that this Yearbook attempts to explore the 
implications of the logics of the disciplines deployed by researchers without ‘reducing’ these 
logics to the sociology of their conditions of production.  Although Bourdieu and Passeron 
explored different ways of resolving what they thought to be the impasse in the philosophy of 
the social sciences which was the legacy of the 19th Century – between positivist and 
hermeneutic traditions of thought, they were both interested in the trans-national transfer of 
social science concepts.  Before their thinking diverged radically, they co-authored “La 
comparabilité des systèmes d’enseignement” (Bourdieu & Passeron, in Castel & Passseron, 
1967, 21-58).  Subsequently, Bourdieu became interested in conceptual transfer as correlative 
with social mobility (see Bourdieu, 1989) whilst the work of Passeron has influenced the 
development of ‘histoire croisée’ which is more concerned with the transfer of ideas.  This 
Yearbook sustains this interest in that it deliberately represents work produced within English 
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and French institutional contexts.  It invites cross-cultural comparison of research undertaken 
within different intellectual traditions. 
 
This Yearbook is based on two Workshops – held on May 15th and June 12th, 2008 – which were 
organised with internal funding provided by the University’s Graduate School.  The formal 
report on the use of the funding is at Annex A.  The first workshop focussed on the process of 
‘writing’ in the social sciences.  There was an introductory discussion of Howard S. Becker’s 
Writing for Social Scientists.  How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article (1986, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press), followed by an attempt to carry out some of the practices 
on which his book had been based – encouraging students critically to examine in small groups 
their use of language in sample pieces which they had brought to the workshop.  A link 
between the two workshops was to hand in that Jean-Claude Passeron wrote an introduction to 
the French translation of Becker’s book, published in 2004, which he entitled:  “Ecrire, réécrire 
et ‘dire vrai’ en sociologie” [writing, re-writing and ‘telling the truth’ in sociology].  Becker’s 
book had been written as a practical guide to assist students.  It is predicated on certain 
assumptions about the nature of social scientific explanation, notably those associated with the 
second ‘Chicago School of Sociology’ of the 1960s.  Passeron’s introduction highlights these 
philosophical assumptions and tries to argue that the use of language is integral to any 
empirical investigation as much as to the communication of research findings.  There is a 
necessary sensitivity to linguistic meanings both in respect of the logic of scientific discovery 
and the rhetoric of scientific dissemination.  There was an understandable reluctance on the 
part of students to allow the publication of drafts and re-drafts of their work in progress as 
indicative of the substantive implications of linguistic modifications.  Instead, the Yearbook 
tries to focus on some linguistic aspects of research work produced in different linguistic 
cultures, as suggested by the juxtaposition of papers presented in the June workshop by three 
SSMaCS PhD students and one doctoral student registered in SHADyC (Sociologie, Histoire, 
Anthropologie des Dynamiques Culturelles) – the research group of the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales founded in Marseille by Jean-Claude Passeron in 1992. Part 1 of 
the Yearbook offers a framework for considering the four contributions published in Part 2.  
Chapter 1 offers a brief account of the intellectual and institutional background to this research 
group, as prelude to a response (chapter 2) from a current doctoral student in SHADyC, 
discussing the extent to which the founding intentions of SHADyC are maintained in current 
research practice.  It then provides, as chapter 3,  a translation, prepared by Rachel Gomme, of 
Passeron’s “Ecrire, réécrire et ‘dire vrai’ en sociologie”, with an introduction (chapter 4) which 
situates the text in relation to the account given in the opening chapter.  Part 2 reproduces the 
four student papers given at the June Workshop.  Part 3 offers some concluding reflections on 
the differences which arise in research practice from the adoption of terminology which has 
culture-specific linguistic connotations. 
 
 
References 
 7
 
Bourdieu, P. 1958 Sociologie de l'Algérie, Paris, PUF. – translated as Bourdieu, 1962. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1962 The Algerians, Boston, Beacon Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1989, “Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale des idées”, 
Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte/Cahiers d’histoire des littératures romanes, 
14, 1-2, 1-10.  – translated in Shusterman, R., ed., 1999,  220-228. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1991 Language & Symbolic Power, Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1992, “Thinking about Limits”, Theory, Culture and Society, 9, 37-49. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1997, Méditations pascaliennes, Paris, Ed. du Seuil. – translated as Bourdieu, P., 
2000. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 2000, Pascalian Meditations, Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1968  Le métier de sociologue, Paris, 
Mouton-Bordas. – translated as Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1991 The Craft of Sociology, New 
York, Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Bourdieu, P.,  & Passeron, J.-C., 1964 Les héritiers, les étudiants et la culture, Paris, Ed de 
Minuit. – translated as Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979 
 
Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C., 1970  La Reproduction.  Eléments pour une théorie du système 
d’enseignement,  Paris, Ed de Minuit. – translated as Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1977 Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 
London-Beverley Hills, Sage Publications. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1979 The Inheritors, French Students and Their Relation to 
Culture, Chicago-London, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Castel, R., & Passeron, J.-C, 1967, Education, développement et démocratie, Paris-La Haye, Ed. 
Mouton. 
 
Panofsky, E., 1997 [1927] Perspective as Symbolic Form, New York, Zone Books. 
 
Robbins, D.M., 2003,  "Sociology and Philosophy in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu, 1965-75", 
Journal of Classical Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 299-328. 
 
Robbins, D.M., 2006, On Bourdieu, Education and Society, Oxford, Bardwell Press. 
 
Shusterman, R., ed., 1999, Bourdieu.  A Critical Reader, Oxford, Blackwell. 
 
 
 
 
Derek Robbins, May 2009  
 8
  9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part l 
  10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  11
Chapter 1 
 
The recent historical antecedents of contemporary 
interdisciplinary research practice in SHADyC and SSMaCS 
 
Derek Robbins 
 
The publication in 1970 of La Reproduction.  Eléments pour une théorie du système 
d’enseignement (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) was the result of more than half a decade of 
further reflection on the research which had been undertaken within the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne, Paris, in the early 1960s by a team of researchers under the supervision of 
Bourdieu and Passeron and which had led to the publication in 1964 of Les Héritiers (Bourdieu 
& Passeron, 1964). (The Centre de Sociologie Européenne had been established in 1960 by 
Raymond Aron who had been appointed to the Chair of Sociology at the Sorbonne in 1955.  
Aron appointed Passeron to be his research assistant and Bourdieu to be secretary to his 
research group). Separately and together, Bourdieu and Passeron had written articles which had 
anticipated, and participated in, the events of May, 1968, in which student unrest at university 
conditions, expressed in association with more widespread trade union unrest, had been 
instrumental in removing de Gaulle from power.  In association with Jean-Claude 
Chamboredon, Bourdieu and Passeron published, in 1968, Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968), which was intended as the first volume of a handbook to 
assist young researchers to articulate their projects and to carry them out practically.  Only this 
volume on ‘epistemological preliminaries’ was published and the planned sequel - an 
introduction to the use of practical research instruments - never materialised.   
 
In 1976 Richard Nice, who was then a member of staff in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham (which had been directed since the end of the 1960s by 
Stuart Hall in succession to Richard Hoggart who had founded it in 1962), translated La 
Reproduction into English as :  Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1977).  The translation was published with an introductory Foreword written by Tom 
Bottomore, who was then (from 1969 to 1985) Professor of Sociology at the ‘new’ University of 
Sussex.  Bottomore had been Reader in Sociology at the London School of Economics from 
1952 to 1964 and, from 1953 to 1959, he was secretary of the International Sociological 
Association.  In this period he had, in collaboration with his wife, published in 1957, as 
German Sociology (Aron, 1957),  a translation of Raymond Aron’s early La sociologie allemande 
contemporaine (Aron, 1935), and he was already well known as an editor and translator of 
Marx’s work.  Bottomore’s Foreword, therefore, fostered the view for English-speaking readers 
that La Reproduction was the product of a cohesive, internationally significant research centre, 
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managed by Bourdieu under the aegis of Aron.  Bottomore took the opportunity to celebrate 
the evidence that he found in the text of a ‘continuous interplay between theory and research’ 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, xiv), suggesting that the usual division between ‘thinkers’ and 
‘researchers’ can “only be transcended effectively by this kind of long-term involvement in the 
exploration of a particular broad domain of social life, by a group of researchers who acquire 
to some extent the qualities of a ‘school’ of thought” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, xiv-xv) 
manifest in “the books that Bourdieu and his colleagues have published, but especially in the 
recently established journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales which seems to convey 
even in its title the notion of a continuing process of theoretical-empirical investigation.” 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, xv). 
 
The true situation was rather different.  The Centre de Sociologie Européenne had a precarious 
institutional existence. It operated until 1968 out of the house – 10, rue Monsieur le Prince – in 
which Aron had his office, transferring for four years to the rue Turenne before finding a 
permanent home in 1972 in the newly established Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.  Projects 
attracted loose associations of aspiring young academics/researchers, usually normaliens, 
rather than any establishment.  In 1966, Passeron went to the University of Nantes, where he 
founded the Sociology department.  After the May events of 1968, there was a rift between 
Aron and Bourdieu, recollected acrimoniously in Aron’s Mémoires (Aron, 1983).  At first there 
was a secessionary group, focussing on education and culture but, after Aron’s appointment to 
a Chair at the Collège de France in 1970, Bourdieu became Director of the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne in toto.  By that time, Passeron had returned from Nantes, becoming one of the 
first appointees to the staff of  the experimental ‘centre universitaire’ established at Vincennes 
by a governmental, inter-ministerial decree of December 7th, 1968, intended as a direct 
response to the problems of the university system that had been exposed by the events earlier 
in the year.  The ‘loi d’orientation’ which had been introduced following the May events 
expected that universities ought to become ‘pluridisciplinary and combine as much as possible 
arts and literary studies with science and technology whilst maintaining a dominant vocational 
orientation’.  The inter-ministerial decree argued that there would be difficulty in re-orienting 
existing institutions in this way and recommended that an experimental university centre 
should be established at Vincennes to focus on the relations between arts and literary studies 
and especially adapted scientific and technical instruction.  This centre would complement the 
already existing Centre Dauphine in Paris which focused on economics, mathematics, 
linguistics and business studies, and the already existing Centre at Marseille-Luminy which 
concentrated on the natural sciences.  The decree predicted that the Centre would offer a range 
of pluridisciplinary options and that each option would be ‘polyvalent’.  It gave two examples 
of the kind of polyvalence which would be expected: 
 
“Thus the Sociology department, as well as the normal instruction in sociology, will 
obligatorily include instruction in mathematics, applied economics, and legal science;  
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the department devoted to the arts will include, beyond traditional instruction, specific 
openness to contemporary activities.” 
 
The intention of these proposed innovations was that the two-year undergraduate ‘first cycle’ 
would be oriented towards the world of work and no longer, as was traditionally the case, a 
bridge between academic secondary education and the preparation of the ‘second cycle’ for 
teaching or research careers.  The inter-ministerial decree recognised that the realisation of 
these expectations would require original pedagogic methods and it specified four possibilities, 
recommending a continuous academic year, the suppression of traditional examinations, 
extensive recourse to professors involved in the outside world, and the organisation of the 
students into small groups.  For the first few years of its existence, the Centre received an 
annual ‘exceptional’ dispensation to admit students who did not possess the baccalauréat but 
could demonstrate equivalent learning.  The inter-ministerial decree argued that these 
innovations would be introduced for a short while experimentally at Vincennes and would then 
be introduced into the mainstream national university system.  (For the full text of the decree 
and for other key documents, see Debeauvais, 1976, 15-18) 
 
It is important to remember that this was the context in which Passeron worked as Head of the 
Sociology Department from 1968 until 1977.  It is also worth remembering that this was the 
context in which, for varying lengths of time in the same period, Foucault, Deleuze, and 
Lyotard, amongst others, also worked.  As far as Passeron’s work is concerned, the context 
entailed the challenge to operationalise the findings of Les Héritiers and La Reproduction so as 
to offer pluridisciplinary instruction to non-traditional entrants in a way which would prepare 
them for employment in the modern world.  It is not surprising that two of his key interests 
were to become, firstly, the nature of the relationship between learned and popular culture 
and, secondly, the nature of disciplinary distinctions in the context of pluridisciplinary action.  
Whilst Passeron was immersed in the daily struggle at Vincennes, Bourdieu began to articulate 
a philosophy of the social sciences, consolidating the differentiation from Passeron which had 
been latent within Le métier de sociologue.  From his early representation of his understanding 
of the findings of La Reproduction, given as a paper at a conference of the British Sociological 
Association in Durham in April, 1970 (“Reproduction culturelle et reproduction sociale”, 
Bourdieu, 1971) through to La distinction.  Critique sociale du jugement, (Bourdieu, 1979), 
Bourdieu developed the view that cognitive dispositions and aesthetic tastes are objective 
correlatives of social position-taking.  Differences between cultures are to be understood 
sociologically as are adherence to different disciplinary language games.  Bourdieu’s position 
came to be known as one of ‘reflexive sociology’; in as much as he was prepared to express 
skepticism in relation to his own sociological explanations by acknowledging the extent to 
which they were the products of his own social trajectory. 
 
Passeron wrote relatively little during the 1970s, but his ‘presentation’ of his translation of 
Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (Hoggart, 1957) as La culture du pauvre (Hoggart, 1970) was 
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already indicative of his interest in how to analyse popular culture scientifically without 
patronising it, whilst his ‘presentation’ of a translation from the German of three early papers 
by Joseph Schumpeter under the title of Impérialisme et classes sociales (Schumpeter, 1972) 
showed an interest in the boundaries between sociological and economic explanation both in 
their academic and ideological implications.  These newly translated texts, all “centred on the 
relations between the social history of the dominant classes and their different fractions, the 
capitalist system of production and the centralised state”, as Passeron puts it in his 
‘presentation’, “owe their theoretical importance to the position which they occupy between 
historical sociology and the history of economics” (Schumpeter, 1972, 10) – to a kind of 
pluridisciplinarity. 
 
There are some affinities between the experimental ‘centre universitaire’ at Vincennes (which 
formally became the University of Paris VIII in January, 1971, and subsequently, in 1980, was 
physically removed to St. Denis where it is now usually known as the Université de Vincennes à 
Saint-Denis) and North-East London Polytechnic which was formally established in January, 
1970, as one of the 30 new polytechnics established by the Labour government.  Whereas the 
French government claimed to initiate an experiment which might be run out across the whole 
system, the British government restricted its desire to introduce a comparable responsiveness 
both to the demands of previously disadvantaged students and to the needs of employers to 
the encouragement of a system of higher education institutions operating in parallel with 
traditional universities, in ‘binary’ opposition to them.  North-East London Polytechnic was 
committed from inception to an ‘open admission’ policy so as to ensure that it would be a 
‘people’s university’ (the sub-title of the book entitled The New Polytechnics which had been 
published by Eric Robinson who was to become the institution’s Deputy Director – Robinson, 
1967).  There was no explicit commitment to ‘pluridisciplinarity’.  There was a commitment to 
the transmission of ‘applied’ knowledge, and departments, such as those of Applied Economics 
and Applied Philosophy, were founded, but these tended to create ‘single subject’ degrees with 
vocational emphases.  It was the introduction of a two-year Diploma of Higher Education 
course in 1974 which was most indicative of an attempt to emphasize ‘polyvalence’, 
interpreted as the transmission of generally transferable skills, and to encourage work in 
groups as well as individual study which might be independent of the parameters established 
by structured academic disciplines.  I wrote an account of this educational experiment, 
published in 1988 as The Rise of Independent Study (Robbins, 1988), and revisited the 
experience in the first part of my On Bourdieu, Education and Society (Robbins, 2006), but, for 
this introductory chapter, my intention is only to offer some comments on the institutional 
context in North-East London Polytechnic within which the teaching of Sociology, History, 
Anthropology, and Cultural Studies developed so as to set this context alongside the one which 
enabled Passeron to found SHADyC (Sociologie, Histoire, Anthropologie des Dynamiques 
Culturelles) in Marseille in 1992. 
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North-East London Polytechnic was a combination of three institutions, located in three 
boroughs in North-East London, which had existed independently as colleges of technology, 
offering instruction in the arts and sciences as well as technology.  Some of the teaching had 
been to lead to the award of University of London external degrees.  Two of the constituent 
colleges had possessed departments of Sociology.  These were merged and re-located on one 
site.  The college which ‘lost’ Sociology had a Department of Arts and Modern Languages in a 
Faculty of Arts.  The third college had Departments of Art & Design and Architecture.  The 
Sociology department quickly dispensed with University of London legitimation and secured 
central approval (from the Council for National Academic Awards) to run a degree in Sociology, 
which had vocational routes leading, for instance, to Social work employment.  Staff in arts and 
the humanities tried to launch two CNAA degrees, one in Communication Studies, deploying 
teachers of Literature, Linguistics, History and Philosophy, and the other in French Area 
Studies, deploying teachers of French and, again, of History and Philosophy.  The sociological 
orientation of both attempts was a response to the ideological need, imposed by the 
institution, to reject a scholastic orientation in favour of a disposition to equip students for 
contemporary social and cultural life.  The degree in Communication studies was never 
approved and the French Area Studies degree was short-lived.  As the 1970s advanced, the gap 
in provision (and employment for teaching staff) was filled by the proposal of a degree in 
Cultural Studies, which received approval in 1980.  It was essentially the creation of the 
Sociology Department but it provided a framework within which sociologists, historians, and 
literary critics could collaborate.  The development of Cultural Studies at North-East London 
Polytechnic benefited from the situation at the University of Birmingham.  Stuart Hall ceased to 
be director of the  Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1979, moving to become 
Professor of Sociology at the Open University, and there was a sense in which precarious staff 
at Birmingham saw a more promising future for themselves at North-East London Polytechnic.  
In short, and this needs to be argued and substantiated in much more detail than is possible 
here, the development of a teaching degree called Cultural Studies absorbed teachers of 
History and of Literature into a common conceptual orientation which was underpinned by a 
tacit sociology of culture.  It attracted staff and students because it endeavoured to be 
concerned with working-class culture and with working-class or oral history, in an institution 
which was still true to its original intention to be a ‘popular’ university. 
 
‘Cultural Studies’ at North-East London Polytechnic flourished in the 1980s.  The underlying 
sociological disposition gave the course its coherence without there seeming to be any need to 
define the distinctive epistemological characteristics either of historical or literary analysis or of 
the relationship between sociological research and the cultural practices which were the objects 
of that research.  Jean-Claude Passeron left Vincennes in 1977 and, in doing so, moved away 
from intense involvement in the implementation of the pedagogical innovations prescribed in 
the original inter-ministerial decree.  It is, perhaps, not unfair to suggest that Passeron 
pursued the thinking that had been sustained practically in relation to undergraduate students 
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at Vincennes instead, now, in relation to his own research projects and his supervision of 
research students.  From 1977 to 1981, Passeron was on secondment to the Centre National de 
la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).  He established a research group – Groupe inter-universitaire 
de documentation et d’enquêtes sociologiques (G.I.D.E.S.) – and, in 1982, became a Director of 
Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).  During this period, he 
prepared a doctoral thesis at the University of Nantes which was published there in 1980 as Les 
Mots de la Sociologie.  It was typical that this thesis constituted a series of essays which arose 
from research seminars prepared for research students.  Passeron saw the text as a completion 
of the unfinished project which had been only partially represented in the publication of Le 
métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968).  Passeron’s intention was to 
show that sociological research does not operate with pre-existing conceptual systems but, 
instead, constitutes its own particular discourse as it engages with phenomena in enquiry.  He 
contrasts this emphasis with the approach adopted by Laplanche and Pontalis (sponsored by 
the supervisor of his own diplome d’études supérieurs, Daniel Lagache) in their Vocabulaire de 
la psychanalyse (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967), which, in turn, had been modelled on 
Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (Lalande, 1960).  As Passeron put 
it: 
 
“The example of Lalande is enough to show what are the limits and difficulties of an 
attempt which aims to restore a package of historically determined concepts to their 
original semantic field” (Passeron, 1980, 162). 
 
He discusses the way in which Martial Guéroult had been able to establish the a priori ‘ordre 
des raisons’ in Descartes’ conceptual system (see Guéroult, 1953).  Passeron insists that a 
comparable ‘ordre des raisons sociologiques’ can only fully define concepts through the 
organising function which they fulfill in a system of research activities.  Such an order “does 
not lend itself as economically to formulation in discourse as does the order of philosophical 
reasoning which only ever organises discourses: …” (Passeron, 1980, 165).  In other words, 
Passeron was arguing that sociological language acquires its meaning in interaction with the 
practical social situations which it seeks to analyse, whereas philosophical language is self-
referential.  It was this conviction which was to shape the development of Passeron’s thinking, 
both in respect of the relationship between sociological and everyday language and in respect 
of the grounds of differentiation between academic disciplines. 
 
Passeron completed Les mots de la sociologie shortly after Bourdieu published La distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1979).  La distinction was a book which angered many of Bourdieu’s former 
collaborators.  In particular, Claude Grignon argued that Bourdieu denigrated working-class or 
popular culture by seeking to analyse it scientifically in terms of values belonging to dominant 
culture.  There was also the sense that Bourdieu had socially betrayed dominated culture by 
accepting the Chair of sociology at the Collège de France in 1981/2.  Passeron’s position was 
rather that Bourdieu had allowed himself to develop an a priori explanatory system of concepts 
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– ‘habitus’, ‘field, ‘cultural capital’ – which he then applied to diverse social situations instead 
of allowing each new situation to generate new conceptual instruments.  Bourdieu’s ‘order of 
reasons’ had become statically philosophical rather than dynamically sociological.  Passeron 
and Grignon debated these issues in an exchange which took place as a research seminar in 
Marseille in 1983.  In that year Passeron had been responsible for the implementation of the 
government’s decentralisation policy in respect of higher education and reseach provision.  He 
had been responsible for establishing a base for EHESS and CNRS activities in Marseille.  From 
1984 until 1992, Passeron was director of a research group entitled the Centre de Recherche 
sur Culture et Communication (CERCOM) as well as director of the Institut Méditerranéen de 
Recherche et création (IMEREC).  The exchange with Grignon was first published in 1983 as a 
working paper of G.I.D.E.S, entitled “Sociologie de la culture et sociologie des cultures 
populaires” (Passeron & Grignon, 1983).  It was re-published, as “A propos des cultures 
populaires” in the first number of a journal – Enquête – launched by CERCOM in 1985, and 
finally published by Seuil/Gallimard, Paris in 1989 as Le savant et le populaire:  misérabilisme 
et populisme en sociologie et en littérature (Passeron & Grignon, 1989).  Throughout the 1980s, 
therefore, this text was a point of reference, articulating the implications of Passeron’s view of 
‘sociological reasoning’ for research on popular culture and literature.  Passeron also reflected 
specifically on the relationship between historical and sociological research (see, for instance, 
Passeron & Prost, 1990), and he collected his epistemological work in a volume, first published 
in 1991, with the full title:  Le raisonnement sociologique:  l’espace non-poppérien du 
raisonnement naturel (Passeron, 1991).  This publication was the prelude to a wider 
concentration on epistemological considerations in multidisciplinary research in the social 
sciences, manifest in the establishment, in 1992, of a new research group entitled Sociologie, 
Histoire, Anthropologie des Dynamiques Culturelles (SHADyC) – the Sociology, History and 
Anthropology of Cultural Dynamics.  As with the earlier research groups, the concern was still 
with dynamic change in contemporary culture, but, unlike before, the focus is also explicitly on 
the relationships between the ways in which three disciplinary discourses seek to conceptualise 
cultural phenomena. Passeron was director of SHADyC until his retirement in 1996 and he has 
since remained – and remains - closely associated with the group and its publications. The new 
anthropological dimension was initially provided by the first co-director – Jean-Pierre Olivier de 
Sardan – who published an article in 1995 in the first number of a re-launched Enquête, 
entitled “La politique du terrain.  Sur la production des données en anthropologie” (Olivier de 
Sardan, 1995).  This first number of a new series of the journal, now explicitly called Enquête, 
anthropologie, histoire, sociologie, was devoted to “Les terrains de l’enquête” [enquiry on the 
ground] which carried articles exploring the epistemologuical implications of different kinds of 
practical fieldwork situations.  These included Passeron’s “L’espace mental de l’enquête (I):  la 
transformation de l’information sur le monde dans les sciences sociales” (Passeron, 1995) and 
Jacques Revel’s “Ressources narratives et connaissance historique” (Revel, 1995).  The new 
series ran for 5 numbers until 1997 and was followed by an ongoing series of occasional 
Enquête volumes, but that the nature of the intellectual concern has remained constant is 
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shown by the sequence of titles:  Les usages politiques du passé (Hartog & Revel, eds., 2001); 
L’argumentation. Preuve et persuasion (de Fornel & Passeron, eds., 2002) Pratiques de la 
description (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, eds., 2003);  Penser par cas (Revel, 2005);  Qu’est-ce 
qu’une discipline? (Boutier, Passeron & Revel, eds., 2006); Naturalisme versus constructivisme 
(de Fornel & Lemieux, 2008); and Ce que le genre fait aux personnes (Bonnemère & Théry, eds., 
2008). 
 
Passeron has struggled to retain an epistemological dimension in social scientific enquiry, 
seeking, on the one hand, to resist the tendency to detach epistemology from practice and, on 
the other hand, equally to resist the absorption of social science research into unreflecting 
instrumentality.  The trajectory of interdisciplinarity in the arts and social sciences in the UK 
and, in particular, at North-East London Polytechnic since 1980 has been rather different.  I can 
only outline an argument as the basis for elaboration, correction, debate and comparison.  
During the 1990s, Cultural Studies became a separate department within the Faculty of Social 
Sciences.  In 1989 the institution was temporarily re-named the Polytechnic of East London and 
then when, in 1992, the Conservative government abolished the institutional disctinction 
between universities and polytechnics, the current name of the University of East London was 
adopted.  By the end of the 1990s, the Faculty of Social Sciences comprised departments of 
Education; Economics; Cultural Studies; Innovation Studies;Social Politics, Languages & 
Linguistics; Human Relations; and Sociology.  These were essentially teaching departments.  
Cultural Studies accommodated the teaching of History and of Literature.  Innovation Studies 
accommodated Information Technology and Science in Society studies.  Social Politics, 
Languages & Linguistics accommodated the teaching of Politics, four foreign Languages, and 
Linguistics.  Human Relations accommodated Psycho-social studies and a link with Social 
Psychology at the Tavistock Institute.  Sociology accommodated Sociology and, from 1997, an 
anthropology component which was sufficiently strong to cause the department to be re-
named Anthropology and Sociology at the end of the decade.  In 2002, the institution 
abolished Faculties and established, instead, new Schools.  In this process, the department of 
Education became a School of Education; the department of Economics was absorbed into the 
School of Business; the departments of Cultural Studies and Innovation Studies merged into a 
School of Cultural and Innovation Studies; the department of Social Politics, Languages and 
Linguistics was abolished – the teaching of Politics transferring to the department of Sociology, 
the teaching of Linguistics transferring to the School of Education, and terminating the 
teaching of foreign languages.  The department of Human Relations and Anthropology & 
Sociology became the School of Social Sciences.  In 2004, the institution again decided to 
rationalise its structure.  In this process, the Schools of Cultural and Innovation Studies and 
Social Sciences were merged to constitute the School of Social Sciences, Media and Cultural 
Studies.  To facilitate this merger, the new School established five ‘fields’ which 
administratively grouped undergraduate teaching specialisms.  Field 1 covers media, 
communications, and film studies;  Field 2 covers  Social Work and Social Policy; Field 3 covers 
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Sociology and Innovation Studies;  Field 4 covers Anthropology, Politics, and Development 
Studies;  Field 5 covers English Literature and History.  Since inception in 2004, new ‘Fields’ 
have been added. 
 
The ‘Field’ organisation represents a ‘map of learning’ for the School, based on the 
undergraduate teaching provision.  From the early 1990s, however, the organisation of learning 
in UK HEIs has been in part shaped by an orientation to the way in which research has been 
funded nationally and to the way in which research performance has been assessed. The most 
relevant funding agencies, both for staff research and for student research scholarships, are 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Board 
(AHRB) which, by analogy with the other funding agencies, itself became a funding agency in 
1997 entitled the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).  Although both funding 
agencies endevour to facilitate ‘interdisciplinary’ funding and training, they operate through 
committees of traditional subject disciplines with the result that, for instance, Cultural Studies 
has an ambivalent existence for both agencies.  There have been national Research Assessment 
Exercises in which the research performance of all UK academics has been evaluated in 1992, 
1997, 2002, and 2008.  The University of East London submitted returns on each occasion in 
three subject areas:  Cultural Studies; Social Work/Policy; and Sociology.  In these years, 
therefore, staff adapted the account of their research to fit the parameters indicated by these 
denominators of the respective research Assessment Exercises.  The third factor in the 
definition of academic identity in the last decade has been the development of Research 
Groups or Centres in the School.  These tend to be organised around social problems or 
interests, such as Refugee Studies or London East Regeneration and are independent of 
epistemological considerations.  Doctoral students, therefore, are supervised by specialist staff 
who may dominantly identify themselves intellectually either with an area of undergraduate 
teaching, or with a problem-centred Research Group, or with national research organisations 
which help with the mobilisation of approaches to funding agencies. 
 
I have tried to outline the historical background to the present conduct of research in two 
institutional contexts.  The situation at the University of East London has been representative 
of a British tendency to be indifferent to epistemological reflexivity.  The situation in SHADyC is 
representative of a particularly philosophical approach to research practice.  The intention is 
that this Yearbook should juxtapose these two positions by reference to student research 
practice rather than by a priori speculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  20
References 
 
 
Aron, R., 1935, La sociologie allemande contemporaine, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France 
– translated as Aron, 1957. 
 
Aron, R., 1957, German Sociology, Translated by Mary and Thomas Bottomore,  William 
Heinemann, London 
 
Aron, R., 1983, Mémoires.  50 ans de réflexion politique, Paris, Julliard. – translated as Aron, 
1990. 
 
Aron, R., 1990,  Memoirs.  Fifty Years of Political Reflection, New York/London, Holmes & 
Meier. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1971, “Reproduction culturelle et reproduction sociale”, Information sur les 
sciences sociales, X, 2, 45-99.  – translated as Bourdieu, 1973. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1973, “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction”, in R. Brown, ed.,  
Knowledge, Education, and Cultural Change, London, Tavistock. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1979 La distinction.  Critique sociale du jugement, Paris, Ed de Minuit. – translated 
as Bourdieu, 1986. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1986 Distinction.  A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, London & New York, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1968  Le métier de sociologue, Paris, 
Mouton-Bordas. – translated as Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1991 The Craft of Sociology, New 
York, Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Bourdieu, P.,  with Passeron, J.-C., 1964 Les héritiers, les étudiants et la culture, Paris, Ed de 
Minuit. – translated as Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1970  La Reproduction.  Eléments pour une théorie du 
système d’enseignement,  Paris, Ed de Minuit. – translated as Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1977 Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 
London-Beverley Hills, Sage Publications. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1979 The Inheritors, French Students and Their Relation to 
Culture, Chicago-London, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Debeauvais, M., 1976, L’Université ouverte:  les dossiers de Vincennes, Grenoble, Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble. 
 
Guéroult, M., 1953, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, Paris, Aubier. 
 
Hoggart, R., 1957, The Uses of Literacy, London, Chatto & Windus. 
 
Hoggart, R., translated by Passeron, J.-C., 1970, La culture du pauvre, Paris, Editions de Minuit. 
 
Olivier de Sardan, J.-P., 1995, “La politique du terrain.  Sur la production des données en 
anthropologie”, Enquête, 1 (new series) 
 
Passeron, J.-C., 1980, Les mots de la sociologie, Nantes, Université de Nantes. 
  21
 
Passeron, J.-C., 1991, Le raisonnement sociologique:  l’espace non-poppérien du raisonnement 
naturel 
 
Passeron, J.-C, 1995, “L’espace mental de l’enquête (I):  la transformation de l’information sur 
le monde dans les sciences sociales”, Enquête, 1 (new series) 
 
Passeron, J.-C, & Grignon, C., 1983, Sociologie de la culture et sociologie des cultures 
populaires, Enquête, Cahiers de CERCOM 1, Marseille. 
 
Passeron, J.-C, & Grignon, C., 1989, Le savant et le populaire:  misérabilisme et populisme en 
sociologie et en littérature, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard. 
 
Passeron, J.-C., & Prost, A., 1990, “L’enseignement, lieu de rencontre entre historiens et 
sociologues”, Sociétés contemporaines, 1, 7-45. 
 
Revel, J., 1995, “Ressources narratives et connaissance historique”, Enquête, 1 (new series) 
 
Robbins, D.M., 1988, The Rise of Independent Study.  The Politics and the Philosophy of an 
Educational Innovation, 1970-1987, Open University Press, co-published 
with the SRHE. 
 
Robbins, D.M., 2006, On Bourdieu, education and society, Oxford, Bardwell Press,  
 
Robinson, E.E., 1968, The New Polytechnics.  The People’s Universities, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin. 
 
Schumpeter, J.,1972,  Impérialisme et classes sociales, Paris, Editions de Minuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
  23
Pluridisciplinarity in SHADYC seen by an insider2 
 
Karim Hammou 
 
« The choice of pluri in French stems from a political compromise. 
Edgar Faure, Minister for Education, seemed to react to one of the 
May 1968 cries for interdisciplinarity by including the word “pluri” 
in the law, but by leaving what this new prefix would mean open 
to interpretation (choose one or several: administrative 
juxtaposition, continuation of the French model of non-
specialized teaching, theoretical interactions, uprising of the 
concept). »3 
 
The birth of a practical pluridisciplinarity in SHADyC's history raises at least two questions. 
First, the question of its permanence. How was this laboratory, associating three disciplines 
(sociology, history, anthropology) born and how has it evolved over the last 15 years? Secondly, 
the question of its transmission. Being a research lab, the Marseille chapter of EHESS is also a 
doctoral training. What educational tools relay this pluridisciplinary vocation? Without solving 
these problems, I would like to sketch an answer, through a testimony anchored in my 
subjective and retrospective point of view, the one of a PhD student at SHADyC since the early 
2000s. 
 
From CERCOM to SHADyC 
 
The Marseille chapter of EHESS did not reflect the interest of Passeron for epistemology and his 
reflection around the disciplinary divisions from the beginning on. At first, the CERCOM was a 
research group with a strong sociological identity. It developed in connection with the IMeReC, 
which rather represented an attempt to strengthen bonds between research and society, via 
local artistic circles and museums. 
 
Passeron's position on the disciplinary borders became more explicit at the end of the 1980s. 
Its scientific visibility was at its acme with the publication of Le raisonnement sociologique, and 
Passeron's position found an institutional outcome in the birth of the SHADyC in 1993 – 
Sociologie, Histoire, Anthropologie des Dynamiques Culturelles. The name of this new research 
group did not express a “trans-” or “anti-” disciplinary project. Rather, the SHADyC is 
pluridisciplinary: it found its origin in the conviction that, even though sociology, history and 
anthropology are not different by their epistemological nature, these three disciplines keep a 
singular identity through their methods and traditions. 
 
Passeron directed the CERCOM and then the SHADyC until 1996. Throughout this period, his 
personality constituted one of the intellectual cements of the laboratory. His scientific 
                                         
2 I am especially indebted to Christoph Jankowski and Maruta Herding for their help on this article. 
3 Dubreuil L., « Défauts de savoirs », Labyrinthe n°27, online : 
http://www.revuelabyrinthe.org/document1892.html. 
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orientations and his intellectual curiosity were one of the decisive factors in explaining which 
researchers joined or frequented the SHADyC. The presence of Philippe Gaboriau and 
Emmanuel Pedler is connected with Passeron's work on the relationship between the popular 
and learned cultures. The regular presence at SHADyC of well-known historians such as Paul 
Veyne - a personal friend of Passeron - and Jacques Revel, then the rapprochement with the 
anthropologist Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan can be partly explained by the intellectual dynamic 
which will lead to Le raisonnement sociologique. Jean-Pierre Grossein's association with the 
research group echoes Passeron's interest in the work of Max Weber, etc. 
 
Behind the work of Passeron, figurehead of the SHADyC during the 1990s, we thus find a 
variety of theoretical and epistemological axes which will increase further throughout the 
2000s. 
 
Pluridisciplinarity and teaching programs 
 
This variety of researchers doubtless plays a central role in the scientific formation of the 
students associated to the doctoral training. Seminars, debates, workshops, and more widely 
sociability between students, create an atmosphere in which the opportunities to meet (or to 
face) new fields, new theoretical approaches, new disciplinary orientations are multiple. 
 
Beyond this atmosphere, the training of the SHADyC offered a sort of obligation to discover 
other disciplines for a long time. At the beginning of the 2000s, every student of the EHESS' 
diploma in Marseille (equivalent of a Master 24), whether he or she was of sociological, 
anthropological or historical training, acquired a minimal bookish knowledge in each of these 
three disciplines. This obligation of reading was supplemented by lessons of anthropology, 
history and sociology, open to all students. 
 
From 2005, the university reforms transformed the SHADyC's doctoral training, which now 
delivers Master 1 and Master 2 diplomas. The transmission of a pluridisciplinary culture is 
henceforth transmitted through a collective survey. This survey offers the opportunity to cross 
methods of different disciplines (for example direct observation and examination of archives), 
but also to create an explicit epistemological dialogue around the links between anthropology, 
history and sociology. 
 
PhD students of the SHADyC and interdisciplinarity 
 
The majority of the current generation of young researchers in SHADyC has known one of these 
two trainings. But the methodology and epistemology of a PhD project are above all chosen by 
the PhD student and his or her supervisor: we thus observe a huge diversity of orientations in 
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the PhD of the group research. Even though the mobilization of two disciplines at least is the 
norm, the balance between both is very variable. 
 
The association of anthropology or sociology with history is the most frequent, but also the 
least risky: history can be used only as a marginal contextualisation of relatively traditional 
analysis, on a disciplinary point of view. Several research subjects discuss the link between 
both disciplines farther, by exploring first-hand documents (Sirna5), and / or by developing a 
questioning at the explicit intersection of history and sociology (Le Pape, Sevin) or 
anthropology (Saint-Lary). 
 
Anthropology and sociology are also usually associated (Pecqueux, Zotian), and the 
rapprochement between these two disciplines is an obvious phenomenon in the French social 
sciences of the past years. Rarer but still present are the research projects using three 
disciplines (Bouillon, Farnarier), or those who venture on other disciplinary fronts: anthropology 
and ethology (Savalois), sociology and musicology (Jaffré), anthropology and psychoanalysis 
(Bonnet), sociology and geography (Fernandez, Moreira), etc. 
 
Rather than a jointly practiced and a collectively framed interdisciplinarity, the research group 
usually offers a place where the borders between disciplines but also between methods of 
survey and empirical fields are relatively thin. However, the wider academic institutions bear on 
the feasibility of interdisciplinarity. Cross-practices are (unevenly) possible, but not always 
easy. 
 
French scholar institutions remain deeply structured in disciplines 
 
The PhD students of the SHADyC do not escape the institutional constraints of a French 
university system which remains deeply structured by disciplines. The registration for doctorate 
demands, in the majority of the cases, a precise disciplinary assignment. French scientific 
journals, even when they show a pluridisciplinary ambition, publish only few articles tightly 
crossing two disciplines6. The possibilities for recruitment as maître de conférence7, depend on 
a qualification delivered by a commission which is, also, disciplinary. The double qualifications 
exist, but they are unevenly possible depending on the disciplines. Each disciplinary section 
has its specific criteria and a variable tradition of tolerance for atypical trajectories. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
4  In France, a Master 2 is the second year of a Masters degree, usually a two-year degree. 
5  Names in brackets refer to post-doc and PhD students of the SHADyC. More informations on their researches 
are available online, see http://shadyc.ehess.fr/sommaire.php?id=108 and 
http://shadyc.ehess.fr/sommaire.php?id=123. 
6  Masson P., Suteau M., «Histoire, sociologie, ethnographie. De nouvelles lignes de partage ? » in Arborio A.-M. 
& al. (dir.), Observer le travail. Histoire, ethnographie, approches combinées, Paris, La Découverte, 2008, pp.235-248. 
7  Equivalent to the post of lecturer. 
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This report, in return, enlightens the role of the SHADyC, which, after all, is an an institution, 
too. As a doctoral training, as a place for teaching, as a support for workshops or publications, 
the research group offers potential institutional path toward interdisciplinarity. 
 
In a research group which practises pluridisciplinarity rather than interdisciplinarity, we must 
not underestimate the workload and the time needed for implementing a well-balanced and 
faithful use of several disciplines8. Actually, in the SHADyC as elsewhere, PhD students possess 
a strong disciplinary identity. The mobilization of another discipline then rarely leans on a large 
mapping of the researches led in this second disciplinary field. Sociologists, anthropologists 
and historians have, for the greater part, only a partial vision of the bordering disciplines. The 
doctoral training of the SHADyC limits this flaw, but does not suppress it. It facilitates on the 
other hand the discussion with researchers or PhD students belonging to the other disciplines. 
It is maybe in such collective dynamics, which are hard to institutionalize, that a strong 
interdisciplinary approach can be elaborated. 
 
Finally, maybe it is worth mentioning that the disciplinary borders are not the only ones that 
researchers face. Differences in methodologies sometimes follow the disciplinary borders 
(critical method in the interpretation of archives is the specialty of historians, statistical 
analyses remain mainly a sociologists' tools). But lines of division also run within a discipline as 
it was the case with sociology, for a long time split between “quantitative” methods and 
“qualitative” inquiries. 
 
Criticized in the French university for at least twenty years, this opposition has also been 
questioned for a long time in the EHESS Marseille. In the middle of the 1980s for instance, 
Passeron and Pedler suggested to use quantified observation for analyzing cultural reception9.  
Recent works deepen this tradition by combining biographically-orientated interview and 
multiple correspondence analysis (Djakouane), ethnography and questionnaire (Cornu), or 
ethnography and network analysis (Hammou). 
 
A biographic illustration 
 
These general considerations inform about the large variety of relationships toward university 
disciplines which a student can experience in the EHESS Marseille. To exemplify some aspects 
of SHADyC's intellectual training, I shall conclude with some remarks on my own trajectory. As 
a student of an Institut d'études politiques (Institute for political sciences) before entering the 
doctoral training of the SHADyC, I already had a strong anchoring in sociology and some 
superficial knowledge in other disciplines (political sciences, economics, history) before joining 
                                         
8  On practical difficulties of doing interdisciplinary research, cf. Heintz C. et Origgi G., « Rethinking 
Interdisciplinarity. Emergent Issues », online : 
http://www.interdisciplines.org/interdisciplinarity/papers/11/version/original. 
9  Passeron J.-C., Pedler E., Le temps donné aux tableaux, Marseille, ImeReC, 1991. 
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the EHESS Marseille. Subject to an obligation of pluridisciplinary reading as my fellows, I do not 
feel that this constraint represented a theoretical turning point in my studies. They 
nevertheless facilitated more and more frequent incursions into historian works. 
 
The association of sociology and history in my PhD on the emergence of a professional culture 
of French rappers during the 1990s, comes from several origins. The unease felt with previous 
scholar books on French rap music became a driving force of my inquiry. Historicizing rap 
music and rappers' careers gradually became a credo – both a scientific bet and a choice bound 
to a competition within the academic field. 
 
The membership to SHADyC offered me the material and intellectual means to follow this path. 
The lessons given by historians introduced me to source criticism, as well as to some current 
issues within this discipline. My PhD supervisor, Emmanuel Pedler, a sociologist, raised no 
objection in principle to this disciplinary inflection. I then engaged in the analysis of a corpus 
of TV programs from 1987 to 1991, as well as in the systematic examination of records 
released between 1990 and 2004. Informal meetings allowed me to start deeper discussions 
with historians, to take advantage of their critical reading of my work, particularly in the 
implementation of a diachronic network analysis. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I would like to conclude with the evocation of the workshop organized by PhD students of the 
SHADyC in December, 2008. This workshop was designed to discuss, twenty years after its 
publication, Le savant et le populaire10. This book analyzes the way sociology, but also 
literature seize popular cultures. It was co-written by Jean-Claude Passeron who asserted the 
epistemological sameness of history, anthropology and sociology11. Two remarks expressed 
during the workshop illustrate the ease of the declarations in principle on interdisciplinarity, 
and the difficulty to operationalize it. First of all, Philippe Gaboriau underlined the weak 
mobilization of anthropology in the paper preparing the workshop. Jean Boutier, historian and 
director of the SHADyC, then draw attention to the paradox of the relative subdivision of the 
debates in sociology on one hand, in history on the other hand – a subdivision which, without 
his intervention, the workshop would have totally reproduced. 
 
The pluridisciplinarity shown at the EHESS Marseille is not of a radical originality. The 
Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail (Research group of economics and sociology 
of work) or the Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme (Mediterranean house of 
human sciences) in Aix-en-Provence, only to mention institutions geographically close to 
SHADyC, claim just as much the interest of crossing disciplines. But the virtue of 
                                         
10  Grignon C., Passeron J.-C., Le savant et le populaire. Misérabilisme et populisme en sociologie et en 
littérature, Paris, Seuil, 1989. 
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plurisciplinarity, in the SHADyC as elsewhere, is to institutionalize opportunities for criticism 
when, for instance, a handful of young sociologists, still too much sociologists in their 
attention, let the lights of their tradition become a source of blindness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Writing, rewriting and “truth-telling” in sociology 
 
                                                                                                                                   
11  Passeron J.-C., Le raisonnement sociologique, Paris, Albin Michel, 2006 (1991), pp.84-85. 
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Foreword to Howard S. Becker, Ecrire les sciences sociales, Paris, 
Editions Economica, 2004  
 
Jean-Claude Passeron 
 
(Translated by Rachel Gomme) 
 
 
I read Writing for Social Scientists12, in the French translation published here, with special 
pleasure because it represented the crystallisation, in book form, of a sociological reflection I 
had followed through several stages. The book also brought back a vivid memory of my first 
face-to-face encounter with Howard Becker, in 1985. At that time, over a series of 
conversations we engaged in during free moments at an international conference on the 
sociology of art in Marseille13, we spoke at length about the difficulty our respective students 
found in writing or finishing their theses. The conference was organised by the Société 
française de sociologie in collaboration with EHESS and the CNRS; at the time I was involved in 
the process of decentralisation of these two research and research training organizations, 
setting up sections for the study of art and culture in the Vieille-Charité cultural centre in 
Marseille. 
 
Strolling along the sea front, wandering the beaches and coves of the Marseille shoreline as we 
took a rest from preparing the papers we were both to deliver at the closing session of the 
conference – which focused on the question of whether the aesthetic “value” of works of art 
could be reduced to their social value – we came to talk of the practices and techniques, the 
problems and tricks of the trade specific to writing up research in the different social sciences. 
Why was it that not only students and doctoral candidates, but often also established 
researchers, found it so difficult to begin to write, to show others their drafts, to rewrite, to 
rethink their scientific data through a series of rewritings and, above all, to complete the 
refining of the text of their theses, study reports, scientific articles or monographs? On his 
return to the US, Becker sent me the first draft of an article he had written diagnosing the 
problems of sociological language which arise at the point when it is “put into text” – a 
painstaking and painful process which Becker calls “composition”, incorporating the sense of 
the dispositio, elocutio, and the inventio of Latin rhetoric. Becker had already been offering 
group therapy for some years, in the form of his seminars at Chicago’s Northwestern 
University, transforming them into a workshop for analysis and experimentation in the 
pathways, pitfalls and stumbling blocks involved in scientific writing in the social sciences. 
                                         
12 Writing for Social Scientists: How to start and finish your thesis, book, or article, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1986. 
13 This conference (13-14 June 1985) was organized by our long-time mutual friend Raymonde Moulin on behalf of the 
Société Française de Sociologie, of which she was at that time chair, with the support of the Centre National de 
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), and in collaboration with 
Research Committee 37 of the International Sociological Association. Most of the conference papers were collected in a 
volume edited by Moulin, Sociologie de l’art [The sociology of art], Paris, La Documentation française, 1985 (reprinted 
by Editions de l’Harmattan, Paris, 1999). 
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The nature of the challenge in writing 
 
Was the problem one of psychological inhibition, anxiety or depression, such as may be 
experienced by any author or artist whose self-esteem is dependent on the judgment of others 
(peer, boss, reader, editor or commissioning body)? Probably. But are individual “character 
traits” and the variation in narcissistic equilibrium sufficient to explain the polymorphous 
anxiety of intellectuals and researchers about the value of their performance? Or is it the tasks 
themselves, and the interactions involved in apprenticeship in the professions, beset as they 
are by unregulated competition of everyone against everyone else, that feed this insistent, 
insurmountable and, for some, paralysing doubt? In a society increasingly marked by the fiction 
of mass education, the publicity given to achievements and winners, and the media’s constant 
rehashing of the same themes, I would argue that we are witnessing, particularly in the 
intellectual professions, a self-destructive “democratisation” of the childish desire of everyone 
to acquire, as a birthright, the material and symbolic gratifications of social rarity and cultural 
legitimacy that distinguish the “happy few”. The personal “glory” which attaches to someone 
who produces truth or beauty is presented, against the background of the jargon of the 
moment, as both the just reward for exceptional universal value and a universal goal accessible 
simply on request or whim. This stimulates the onset and feeds the fever of failure neuroses, 
punctuated by brief upsurges of hope constantly reawoken by the illusion of having found the 
miracle recipe, with the suffering and panic which inevitably follows. The ego aspires to the 
ideal; at all levels of the psyche, the cruelties of the super-ego bind juvenile ambition for the 
highest realisation of the self as creator of unique values inextricably with the magical fear of 
failing pitifully, through bad luck or malicious persecution. The two are tied up in knots which 
are all the more impossible to untangle because the tightest bonds are those between the 
imaginary and the symbolic. 
 
And why is it that the difficulty, as far as scientific writing is concerned, is restricted to or more 
acutely felt in the social sciences, and still more specifically in the case of sociology, in the 
difficult process of learning to put arguments and evidence into writing? Becker’s intensive 
study, along with other “indicators”, shows exceptional levels of unease in the discipline among 
those faced with the “obligation” to write a text, particularly when the writer is in a situation 
where sooner or later the text will have to be submitted to the criticism of a jury, whether 
formal or informal. Why should this be? What, for example, is behind the very high rate of 
abandonment of planned theses, through stress, breakdown or disillusionment? Avoiding the 
work of writing is primarily an avoidance not so much of the linguistic difficulties of written 
expression, as of the risk of having to think under the gaze of others. These others, as readers 
momentarily lifted out of this status of voluntary victim, are then placed in the comfortable 
position of masters who can examine and test, without risk or obligation, a text offered up to 
their scalpels, naked and immobile, incapable of defending itself on its own through counter-
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attacks or defensive arguments, “a fatherless orphan”, as Plato described writing. Improvised 
speech does not expose the improviser so cruelly to the mockery of his/her listeners, since it 
can always strike back if it is contested; it is a flow that cannot be immobilised as a target, a 
thread of fleeting spoken words quickly forgotten in what follows, leaving little trace except 
perhaps the memory of the prestige, bearing or presence of the speaker. 
 
One of the reasons for the failure of social scientists to express themselves effectively in 
writing surely lies in the generally diminished levels of willingness and enthusiasm among 
today’s students, combined with a narcissistic rejection of the impersonal labour imposed, in 
any consistently pursued, in-depth reasoning, by the “formal”, burdensome, frustrating 
demands of scientific communication, always potentially addressed to a “universal audience”. 
But in order to identify the ways in which different writing situations reactivate the childish fear 
of “submitting” to the mockery of classmates or playground companions, we need to put the 
rather too general question of the “legibility” or “difficulty” of scientific texts in specifically 
sociological terms. In what locations, and in the service or exclusion of which social groups, 
which audiences, which professions, which interactions, which writing strategies, does the 
semantic fog surrounding sociology’s most abstract concepts and schemas form? Why does it 
accumulate in the vocabularies of causality and meaning of actions and interactions, around 
criteria of the truth or falsehood of sociological discourse? Where do the pedantic turns of 
phrase and the nebulous or abstruse words, which in sociologists’ writing seem to be 
prompted by the fear of encountering an informed and critical reader or editor, come from, and 
why and how do they spread from sociology to other historical disciplines (by which I mean all 
the sciences which are not strictly formal or experimental)? It is fear that leads the wary 
sociologist to sense danger in handling phrases which are too clear, unscreened and open to 
the day, in the uninhibited use of indicative affirmations untrammelled by all their rhetorical 
shadings and nuances, and to apply the “maximum precaution principle”. What are the sources, 
whether realistic or fantastical, of this fear? The constantly reiterated “It is as if…”, the elastic 
use of various modes of the conditional mood, the superfluous approximations which conceal 
contradictions, the use of indefinite pronouns and “vague quantifiers” give rise, in all 
languages, to most of these “empty formulations”, padding for a stilted tongue or academic 
dissertation phrases that French philosopher Eric Weill, with pitiless logic, would annotate in 
the margin with “not even false”. This semantic dilution relieves such formulations of all risk of 
error, removes their empirical vulnerability; by the same token they are emptied of all 
assignable assertory meaning because, if we analyse the logical significance of these “weak” or 
cunning systems of assertion14, they are no more than expressions devised expressly for the 
purpose of quietly avoiding the scientific obligation always to formulate assertions which refer 
clearly and unequivocally to a definite mode of confirmation or objection. 
                                         
14 For an example (of the use and abuse of the “Admittedly… but…” formulation), see Jean-Claude Passeron, “Logique 
formelle, schématique et rhétorique [“Formal, schematic and rhetorical logic]”, in Michel de Fornel and Jean-Claude 
Passeron (eds) L’argumentation: preuve et persuasion [Argument: proof and persuasion], Enquête (new series, II), Paris, 
Editions de l’EHESS, 2002, p. 159-164. 
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There is no doubt that recent changes in the educational ethos which shapes the forms and 
public image of scientific work from the earliest age have had some effect here. As the social 
and technological conditions of family and school socialisation change, we see in all classes 
and social groups the spread of, and emphasis on, behaviours characterised by stop-start 
commitment (alternating brief moments of effort with long periods of “cool”, playful or 
nonchalant attitude); this can be observed in apprentice sociologists just as in other apprentice 
intellectuals. But we also need to consider other causes for the acute presentation and rapid 
progress of a professional disease which, in many intellectual professions, dilutes 
apprenticeship in scientific language and work in a soup of approximations and caveats. For 
example, it seems – and this hypothesis is epistemologically even more disturbing for 
sociology – that the original sin, from which the recurrent failure of the social sciences to 
manage precision in references and assertory monosemy in the empirical description of their 
“facts” derives, must be the language itself of scientific theory in these disciplines. Here 
grammar, vocabulary and rhetoric of explication and interpretation have not converged to unite 
in a more or less homogeneous semantics, as they have in the strictly formal or experimental 
sciences, through reciprocal exchanges between them. On the contrary, the social sciences 
have diversified and merged in a confusion, over a series of crises in a scientific consciousness 
which is almost always “unhappy”, dissatisfied with the methodological status of these 
disciplines, tormented by their perpetual desire for a renewed theoretical foundation. 
 
This is perhaps the nub of the epistemological issue, which explains the lack of rigour and the 
congenital permeability of sociological language to conceptual approximations, elisions of 
connotation, authorial jargon, dialects composed through mechanical accumulation of 
sentences cut and pasted together, which are themselves simply passively mimicking the lazy 
syncretism of the most academic teachers. To put it more precisely, the popularity of the 
language of avoidance among students and most researchers in sociology is due to the 
constant concern to minimize risk: the risk of having to make a public statement, about an 
affirmation too exposed to objections, or of having to respond to a request for clarification 
about the evidence for or the meaning of this affirmation. The memory of examinations still 
stings for students who have had to spend a long time skirting the danger of speaking too 
clearly before an omnipotent judge or a distant sovereign tribunal, whose judgment is 
experienced as arbitrary because it is always formulated on the basis of implicit expectations 
and demands, never fully articulated in the traditional pedagogy of “it goes without saying”. In 
this situation the defensive use of the academic language of imprecision seems the only means 
the student has to maintain some chance of neutralizing the destructive criticism of examiners 
who specialise in the sarcastic savaging of apprentice texts, particularly in a science like 
sociology which is almost universally suspected of being epistemologically unstable or 
“dubious”. The sacrifice of readability results from this tremulous prudence, reflecting an 
intense fear of “getting wet”. As Howard Becker shows us, we first need to diagnose, without 
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disciplinary complacency, this disease which attacks some scientific languages more than 
others. In this way we can formulate and put into practice a pedagogic therapy capable of 
countering the disease’s long incubation in the interactions of university apprenticeship: what 
is needed is a social re-apprenticeship as interactive as that in which the fear of speaking 
clearly originated. 
 
 
Parallels, divergences, tangential encounters 
 
I had been impressed for some time by the study data and descriptions Becker presented in his 
earlier work, which posed epistemological questions similar to those I was asking myself in the 
1970s. My research was based on logical, linguistic and rhetorical analysis of a body of texts 
drawn from various texts in the social sciences, both classical and contemporary, deriving from 
a range of tendencies or schools and engaging different methodologies or styles of argument15. 
In 1985 I discovered Becker’s initial studies of the struggles of sociological writing, noting the 
acuteness of his observations and his interpretations, very close to the epistemological 
description of the scientific labour demanded by sociological research or reasoning that I 
myself was sketching out at the time. 
 
I would even go so far as to say, on this point, that Becker’s probatory approach seemed to me 
more convincing than my own, if only by virtue of his focus on an individual “case” – that of 
writing sociological arguments or proofs in a university learning context. Behind our 
epistemological agreement, which we noted with mutual satisfaction, I was surprised to 
discover an unexpected divergence with my “interactionist” colleague. Ultimately Becker was 
more of a sociologist than I, despite the fact that at that time I believed that I was and 
presented myself as firmly “Durkheimian”, resolved in the name of the Rules of the Sociological 
Method to “explain the social purely in terms of the social”. I now see clearly that, in his 
analysis of the relationship between university language and scientific language Becker, without 
abandoning his interactionism, was orienting himself with the demystifying vein of the 
objectivist analyses of Reproduction16 on the “arbitrary” symbolics of university “authorities” 
and administrations. 
 
Under the Weberian influence of a “sociology of understanding”, I had recognized that 
interpretation is inherent in the construction of historical objectivity in any description of a 
“state of affairs”, and even in the interpretation of the meaning of the simplest statistical table, 
once we restore it to its context. But by the same token, my recent discovery of the role of 
                                         
15 A first version of this study of “descriptive epistemology” appeared in Les mots de la sociologie: analogie et 
argumentation [The words of sociology: Analogy and argument] (State thesis, University of Nantes, 1980); I 
systematised this epistemology of “theoretical plurality” in Le raisonnement sociologique: un espace non poppérien de 
l’argumentation [Sociological reasoning: A non-Popperian space of argument], Paris, Nathan, 1991. 
16 Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in education, society and culture, London, Sage Publications, 
1990. 
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interpretation in historical explanation, in privileging clinical observation of social actions, 
tended to obscure the institutional power of objective constraints – in the case of sociology, the 
formidable institutional weight of academic idiom, the arbitrariness of which Becker was 
happily exposing. In short, my conceptual framework for interpreting the intellectual fear of 
betraying oneself through one’s writing had remained Freudian in texture, since, in the analysis 
of a text or a behaviour as in the treatment of a patient, it only engaged the interaction 
between two interpreters of a set of symptoms, indicators or signs – the analyst and the 
analysand, the observer and the text of his observation, left alone together to construct the 
meaning of their hermeneutic agreement. The semantics of an interpretation based on this 
psychic grammar can thus only return to the most generic form of the “instincts of the Self” in 
operation here. The only possible therapeutic outcome is the very relative efficacy of the 
teacher’s exhortations to the anxious writer to dismiss the phantoms and phobias, 
recommending her/him to undertake rational exercises in rereading and rewriting her/his 
scientific argument in private. In a sociological research project the transference and counter-
transference set in motion by the study, in the form of texts submitted unrefined, cannot be so 
radically abstracted from the reality and the repercussions, tensions and conflicts of social life; 
the risk here is that we believe, and lead others to believe, in the universal value and efficacy of 
interpretations which are exhausted merely in the affective “resonance” of interpersonal 
relationships formed in a clinical context of “private” exchanges. 
 
There was a simple reason for my over-simplification. As in psychoanalysis – but minus the 
prior agreement with the student on the way his request for help would be approached – it was 
only in one-to-one tutorials that I encountered the resistance of doctoral candidates who 
balked at writing or at stating explicitly the principles of a consistent process of rewriting. They 
did not hear my offers of help; I did not understand their deafness. Moving to a “doing” therapy 
was “naturally” impossible: for the subject, undertaking a procedure of rereading her/his own 
work, transformed into a reader capable of standing outside her/his spontaneous actions of 
sociological writing in order to think more precisely about the meaning of what s/he had 
written, established a “rule” that the author’s narcissism must be put to one side, and thus 
effectively became a technique of thinking as unnatural to this subject as that required by “free 
association” used to free a patient from the need to reiterate rationalisations for his/her 
everyday actions and feelings. But in the case of the student, the verbal contract was not 
embedded in the “analytical situation”, where it would hold only for the duration of the session. 
In a socially “normal” dialogue situation, that is to say one that is open to debate – where each 
of the partners seeks to occupy the position of both analyst and analysand – the work of 
thinking essential to a fruitful, considered rewriting process was always deferred in favour of a 
voluble reiteration of fantastic, ever more ambitious plans, constantly reformulated through 
oral improvisation and volatile expression, but abstracted from any rereading. Here I was 
encountering the same phenomena as Becker described: paralysis, refusal, avoidance, protests 
and other subterfuges characteristic of the trainee researcher put on the spot by the teacher, 
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who resists encouragement to write and show a draft text, always putting off the task until 
later, as if to avoid indefinitely the disillusion, ridicule and humiliation of being “corrected”. But 
I had not succeeded in establishing the rules for a collective catharsis 
 
I admit that I can count on the fingers of one hand the few cases in which I managed, in one-
to-one encounters with doctoral students, to “sociologise” the student’s thinking through a 
concerted rehabilitation process based on writing, rewriting and rewriting. Becker, however, 
had succeeded in introducing a programme of exercises derived from a more appropriate 
method for analysis of university socialisation: the rules of the game had been formulated and 
applied within the context of a co-operative process, which still remained an ordeal, but made 
it possible to restructure the relationship between reasoning and writing, because the evasions 
were less effective in a group where the members knew one another, as regular participants in 
the same socio-drama. In this case the sustained observation operates in a context of multiple 
interactions, themselves embedded in the familiar context of the university institution which 
vouches for the professional usefulness of such time-consuming and frustrating work, which it 
justifies by relating it to the memory of previous failures, and the continuity of the participants’ 
projects and already substantial experience. This volume includes lengthy quotations from 
young researchers who were at the beginning of their career, like Rosanna Hertz and Pamela 
Richards, who were able to present a retrospective written analysis of their process, its 
implications and its key points – refusal, block followed by crisis and emergence from crisis 
(see Becker, 1986, 26-31 and 111-120, translated as Becker, 2004, 33-37 and 117-127). The 
subjectivity of these testimonies, with their dips and high points, outlines the role of the 
various personae who for each individual symbolically occupy the place of the “good” or “bad” 
models of writers or readers, teachers or pupils. Hertz’s account, for example reveals which 
models of writing were spontaneously experienced as “classy” (as opposed to “folksy” or “inside 
dopester”), and which ones gave an indication of the modes of expression that conferred 
“authority” and the right to say things as they should be said. This demonstrates the role of 
peers, and of the close or more distant circle of colleagues, present and past, as “assumed 
readers” – all their real or symbolic weight bearing on the controlled expression of anyone who 
writes a text for an audience. As we shall see, the majority of Chapter VI is taken up with 
Richards’ retrospective recounting of her anxieties, dreams and daydreams, the “benefits” she 
gained from analysis of writing exercises undertaken at Becker’s recommendation or at his 
insistent demand for writing: it is effectively written by a collective author derived from an 
interactive experiment which examines what happens to the dramas and work of writing when 
they are rewritten during the course of the experiment itself, in order to discover and say what 
one is experiencing. 
 
Here we come to the heart of the question of why battling against inhibition is less effective as 
self-therapy when it is conducted as a monologue or in a one-to-one interaction than when it 
is embedded in a situation of multiple and repeated interactions which bring into play various 
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intellectual forms of symbolic power, submission and rebellion, as well as the full range of 
social roles, affects and complexes which have governed the formation of attitudes of romantic 
exaltation alternating with stubborn resistance to the labour of writing. What has been 
constructed through and in the context of repeated interaction, through the training and 
learning, joys and suffering of socialisation, can only be taken up and reconstructed in an 
interactive context which is itself endowed with revived desire for learning, resupplied with 
self-representation and thus made accessible to new emotions. 
 
Sociological thinking and writing 
 
During our conversation by the sea, we coincided in our diagnosis of all these issues, 
particularly since we were able to provide specific examples of the forms of resistance that our 
attempts at pedagogic intervention in the face of the “fear of writing” or the refusal to “show 
what one has written” had encountered in our students and colleagues: many, and often 
amusing, were the instances of evasion and bad faith to be found just as frequently in the 
digressions of wily experience as in adolescent panic. There were two reasons for our 
epistemological agreement that sociological reasoning and sociological writing are 
indissociable. On the one hand, we accepted the theory, now widely shared in much writing in 
the human sciences, that the structures of thinking and of the oral or written expression of that 
thinking are mutually inherent, whether in everyday or in scientific languages. This thesis runs 
counter to the impression the individual derives from internal experience of the link between 
“thinking” and “saying”: analysis of the difficulties or weaknesses of a language communicating 
information or explanation shows writers who have difficulty with the writing of that language 
almost always experience and conceive of it as a subordinate tool of, or even an accessory to, 
thought. In the spontaneous metaphysics of self-consciousness, “thought” – whether 
communicated clumsily or accurately, expressed or silent, oral or written – can only be 
conceived as a substantive reality which always remains equal to itself in the interiority of a 
reflection unaffected by the way in which it is communicated. Furthermore, Becker and I, like all 
sociologists who rebel against traditional or modern scientisms, subscribed to the premise that 
we can only describe as social actions those behaviours and intentions for which we can 
identify the actual or virtual “others” who provide the orientation for these actions (as Weber 
formulated it). 
 
Sociologists’ relationship with sociological statements is never either immediately, or 
somewhere in the ether of Logic, a “pure” relationship with the sociological truth of these 
statements. In describing the forms and evolution of such utterances, we must not forget that 
this relationship was constructed during the years of study (and already preconstructed in the 
prehistory of representations of “correct expression” and “truth-telling”). Before it was even 
conceived, students’ relationship with sociology – like any relationship to the legitimacy of a 
science or a belief – was represented and perceived as a relationship with a “higher authority”: 
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a hierarchical establishment on the model of a Pantheon of gods or a family. This authority was 
fantasised as a supreme court which summoned apprentice sociologists, “caught red-handed” 
with their incorrect texts, to appear before it, bringing their error-strewn essays as evidence. 
This court even appeared in dreams and daydreams and, whether cruel or benevolent, was 
always imagined as entitled, “since time immemorial” and by ancient right, to impose 
implacably its undisputed power to condemn, without right of appeal, those subject to its 
jurisdiction – the bad students, who became the ridiculous, incompetent, clumsy, mediocre or 
uninspired researchers – and occasionally to confer good reports or rewards. This sociology of 
the origin of intellectual and scientific norms in the minds of students needs at least to be 
sketched in if we are to understand students’ behaviour in accepting or skirting logical and 
methodological norms, particularly when they mix acceptance and avoidance. Hence the 
satisfaction that Howie and I shared, I believe, at each meeting a colleague who did not 
minimise the epistemological importance of this field of sociological enquiry, which was 
admittedly conveniently close to home, since it was located in our lecture theatres, but which 
allowed us to get closer to the scientific and pre-scientific meaning of what all the field 
studies, and their various expressions in text form, signified than we could have done in a less 
familiar field. 
 
This approach might appear pernickety or pettily sociocentric to most philosophers, who 
believe that great thinkers are made only by “great subjects” and a remote gaze. But the 
sociology of scientific practices is, like their history, an indispensable prerequisite for their 
epistemology. Errors or approximations in articulation are not just errors of vocabulary or 
language, rhetorical clumsiness or grammatical weakness which only a grammarian or 
stylistician would find reprehensible. They are in fact logical barriers raised in the path of 
affirmations of “fact”, fences in which the barbed wire abstracts the sense of an argument from 
the scientific norms of theoretical coherence and empirical verification. Evidence is not subject 
to the monitoring of “relevant features” required by historical comparison, or to the 
interpretation of the parameters or results of a calculation of probability, or indeed to the work 
of argumentation which organises suppositions from various sources as to the social meaning 
of an action or an interaction into a rational argument: the empty circumlocutions of semi-
scientific dialect, more effective than the easily identified naivety of everyday language, 
dispense with all that. 
 
Writing and rewriting an argument in order to think what one has written, while asking oneself 
what the reader will read in it, is the only universal remedy for errors of writing and thought, 
which are always linked. As Becker emphasises right at the beginning of this book, stratagems 
or recipes for writing, of which his long study of writing practices has revealed the magical and 
propitiatory functions, are not simply all-purpose techniques aimed at releasing “writer’s 
block” using a generic treatment, or improving beginners’ muddled efforts by means of simple 
“stylistic exercises”. There are plenty of “essays”, short and long, which limit their pedagogic 
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strategy to recommending to everyone the same solo exercises as a way of overcoming 
difficulties in writing – just as there has always been a multitude of academic handbooks on 
good writing for use in primary and secondary schools, founded on Boileau’s deceptive 
aphorism that “whatever is well conceived is clearly said and the words to say it flow with ease”. 
There are more such handbooks in the United States than in France, and Becker makes frequent 
reference to them to demonstrate their limitations. Even when they are based on contemporary 
linguistic analysis, these manuals assume that all forms of writing are equally subject to 
grammatical and lexicographical analysis of discourses whose texture never varies, and which 
may be understood and successfully communicated to any readership. Thus they happily 
confuse the six functions which Jakobson so carefully distinguished – the phatic, referential, 
emotive, conative, metalingual and poetic17. The problem we are concerned with here obviously 
relates purely to the “referential” (here called the “assertory”) usage of statements made in a 
natural or artificial language. Thus we clearly need to describe the “logical space”18 in which the 
statements of a science like sociology assert, before we deny or affirm its methodological 
“specificity”: is a historical science a science “like all the others”, or not? And if we ignore the 
complacent “yes” of scientistic positivists, does answering “no” mean consigning social 
sciences to essayist literature, or does it imply a duty to describe a different “regime” of 
scientific being, a different “style” of handling procedures of evidence? 
 
Becker and I thus discovered that we had in common at least our methodological concern with 
the “case study” and “collections of cases”. Logical, methodological, juridical or ethical 
approaches to the individual instance, and particularly to the reasoned “description” of it as a 
“case”, raise a central epistemological question in all social sciences, once these disciplines 
admit that they cannot be reduced to the epistemological status of “nomological” sciences 
(those which can formulate “universal laws”). The case study or the series of cases pose in 
crucial form – in the sense of an experimentum crucis – the question posed in any historical 
science by the relationship between concepts and individual instances. Becker had already 
written What is a case?19 in collaboration with Charles Ragin, in which he examined his 
operative definition of the specificity of descriptions made by the researcher in an individual, 
localised “terrain”. I myself had begun to explore studies by historians of science looking at the 
position of Hippocratic collections of “cases” in Greek medicine vis-à-vis mathematics and 
geometry; I had then followed the succession and reworking of “clinical” approaches as far as 
Charcot and Janet’s studies of cases of “grand hysteria” and the archetypal “cases” in Freud’s 
                                         
17 Roman Jakobson, “Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics”, in Style and language, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1960, pp. 350-357. 
18 Wittgenstein used the term “logical space” (logische Raum) to designate the world of logical constraints necessary 
and sufficient for at least defining the possibility of truth or falsehood attached to the statements of a discourse: 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922 (first edition 1921), proposition 1.13, p. 3. 
Hence the rigour, which to Wittgenstein’s contemporaries seemed excessively “logicist”, of the last proposition in this 
work: “What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence” (ibid., proposition 7, p. 188). Clearly Wittgenstein 
abandoned this in his later philosophy of language. In fact this minimum of logical coherence defines the range of what 
can be truthfully stated in a given “assertory space” very differently depending on the different methodological 
circumstances of the scientific discourse. 
19 Howard Becker, Charles Ragin (eds), What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
  39
Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, during the emergence of modern clinical psychology. This 
revealed a relationship between the clinical method and the historical method, which in its turn 
revealed a relationship between what is required in the description of “cases” in history and in 
the description of “context” in sociology. What all these approaches have in common, in fact, is 
that they proceed by descriptions and comparisons of cases, without ever reducing them to the 
inert status of “examples” which can be interchanged within a given category and are subject to 
being included in the study as soon as they are shown to conform to the unambiguous criteria 
for exclusion or inclusion in the category. In effect, the inductive approach – a vertical 
“subsumption” – is adequate for identifying such basic elements and formalising them in an 
abstract structure, and for identifying repeated co-occurrences as scientific facts, in an 
experiment in the strict sense. Conversely, thinking by cases produces intelligibilities, and 
thus, by traversing and reconfiguring collections of cases horizontally – i.e. by treating the 
“relevant” features of a coherent interpretation of their semantic analogies as an ideal type – 
places the question of what “speaking and writing truth” means in sociology in its true 
“epistemological place”. 
 
The general problem of the operators and forms of a scientific language – formalisms or 
contexts, amorphous or structured states, normalities, exceptions or deformities – only 
acquires its full clinical meaning (both symptomatic and aetiological) when it is posed as we 
work in depth on “cases” whose sociological relevance is constituted by their social 
complexity.20 Reading a number of Becker’s texts21 had convinced me that with extreme cases, 
that is to say cases that are extremely localised and very restricted in scope – “marginal” cases 
in some of the “art worlds” he described, or quasi-pathological ones, like that of the 
misunderstandings that arise in “inter-comprehension” between sociologists, who whether 
students or established are all equally lacking any possibility of arriving at a single or dominant 
theoretical paradigm (and thus are always potential competitors or adversaries in their struggle 
to defend at all costs the truth of their statements) – with such cases, we enter a realm of 
epistemological singularity such that it fully exposes the peculiarities of a scientific 
communication which aims to give an account of such social objects. Communicating a form of 
knowledge like that of individual historical instances can only operate without semantic losses 
through texts which synthesise multiple dimensions of description. This is certainly the case 
for sociological writing, in day-to-day fieldwork or literature research, in the simultaneous 
recourse to several theories of the social, and in the communication of sociological results and 
the presentation, in legible texts, of both its heuristic progress and the evidence ultimately 
assembled. 
 
                                         
20 In anthropology too, at least the anthropology which holds fast to the “casuistic” ambition of the first ethnographers, 
only in-depth analysis of “cases” can define the scientific function of a “thick description”, by contrast with a “thin 
description”: see the first part of Clifford Geertz’s book The interpretation of cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973. 
21 Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance, Glencoe, Free Press, 1963; Art worlds, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1982. 
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The vision of sociology is indissociably both synthesising and historical, thus setting the 
discipline a task which is at once statistical and historical, comparative and clinical. The price of 
this totalising ambition, limited only within the programme of specialised social sciences, is 
that today our discipline is condemned to writhe ceaselessly on a Procrustean bed which 
requires it, simultaneously and at every point in its arguments, to conform both to the 
prestressed posture of an exact science and to the very different one of an interpretative 
science of historical “objects”. It is a heavy epistemological privilege to have to force oneself, if 
one is not to refute one’s beliefs, to take on the whole package of historical scientificity. Most 
other social sciences are allowed, by virtue of stylistic habits consolidated over the course of 
their scientific history, to specialize in a preferred methodology – a position which releases 
them from the contortions between one extreme and the other of scientific reasoning that are 
required of sociology. The specialization or autonomy of the “particular” social sciences allows 
them a wider range of methodological choices to select from. They may use modelling of 
empirical co-occurrences which define a “state of affairs” – an overall historical configuration 
can always be simplified in a “simulated model”, as in economics, demography and linguistics. 
Conversely, they may use chronological recounting of the succession of global social 
configurations in order to then attempt to reconstruct series or systems of analogies revealed 
by historical comparison – as do history and historical anthropology, exchanging methods with 
one another. If we look closely it is only in sociology, whatever the name under which it is 
practised, that the two criteria for a complete social science have to be satisfied at the same 
time: it must both operate as an empirical “science”, in the demanding sense implied by any 
scientific handling of quantitative evidence, and must also remain a “historical” science of 
individual actions and events which does not cut out any actor or any pertinent fact which may 
have meaning for the explanation. Thus there is a double requirement, for “interpretation” 
(Deutung) of the singularity of actions in the Weberian sense, and “explanation” of social 
patterns in terms of cause and function, in the Durkheimian sense. 
 
Put to the test of drawing a conclusion, I notice here the difficulty of introducing this book by 
Howard Becker, since its originality, like that of other ethnographic, interactionist or ethno-
methodological texts, does not lend itself easily to an overall summary or a list of the main 
themes. At once a study of the writing of sociological texts and a theoretical reflection on the 
texture of practices and paradigms in the social sciences, the richness of Becker’s analysis of 
the social position of sociologists forced into the straight-jacket of precise writing in a “case-
based science” suggests a vast range of possible developments, from the most theoretical to 
the most empirical. It would not be possible to replace Becker’s thoughtful overview with a 
preface summing up the content without losing much of its probatory richness, its 
convergences of arguments, its paradoxes unravelled and above all the pleasure the reader 
takes in its agreeable illustrative digressions. As in most of Becker’s other books, the reader 
also has the opportunity to become more fully personally acquainted with Howie and his anti-
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academicism, his rigorous observation and his enthusiasms, his humour and his scientific 
indignation. 
 
Writing for Social Scientists is not only a fully realised study, but also a crossroads opening up 
a multitude of other possible studies, conducted in similar style, using the acute methods of 
“symbolic interactionism”. The text deals with both the words and the wants of sociology, 
losing nothing of its aim to analyse a “case” as it traverses the vast ocean of disputes among 
sociologists. It clarifies both the social conditions of truthfulness of sociological assertions and 
the non-assertory element always contained in the sociologist’s utterances, never to be 
completely eliminated. To a greater or lesser degree, the sociologist is always in a double bind, 
between the quest for simplicity and the risk of banality, between informed and well-formed 
sociological reasoning and non-sense or rhetorically overburdened arguments. The 
epistemology of sociological reasoning proposed by Becker’s study explains perfectly why the 
work of deconstruction, reconstruction and “review” of evidence in a social science is never 
finished22 – like a Freudian analysis. It reveals the scientific emptiness of projects which seek to 
avoid, simply through integral formalism or through the author’s rhetoric, the sociological 
work of continual revision of sociological utterances. But this continuous, detailed work, 
adjusted to the descriptive patience of “non-monotonal logics” of reasoning, is the only 
approach which can enable us to overcome the difficulty of being a sociologist without verbal 
artifice or mathematical conjuring tricks. The words of sociology, congenitally too flexible and 
incapable of giving “absolutely definite descriptions”, do not in themselves explain the 
assertory ills from which sociological discourse suffers: the cunning or incompetence of some 
sociologists certainly play a role. But the texts of canny or clumsy sociologists are not the only 
ones to reveal the impossibility of containing all the words, concepts and assertions of 
scientific sociology in a single theoretical system: the uncontrolled use of sociological language 
is just one element in the failure of all attempts to reintegrate the Protean state of research in 
social sciences within a unified paradigm –albeit one whose rhetorical digressions aggravate 
this failure. The writing of the best sociologists encounters the same epistemological barrier, 
the same internal challenge, embedded in the language which must be spoken by a discipline 
whose central concern is to describe the singularity of contexts in ever more precise detail. The 
sociological study most devoted to exploring the empirical peculiarities of a “field” or a “case” 
is also a theoretical work of continually recasting the language of description of historical 
worlds, constantly replenished with new “facts” which could not have been observed if a new 
theoretical framework had not first made them conceivable. 
 
                                         
22 See, for a recent use of this notion which has become a principle of logical analysis of “natural reasoning” in 
historical comparatism and ethical and juridical “casuistics”, Pierre Livet, “Formaliser l’argumentation en restant 
sensible au contexte [Formalising argument while remaining sensitive to context]”, Enquête II, op.cit., p. 49-66. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Notes on Passeron’s Foreword to Becker’s Writing for Social 
Scientists. 
 
Derek Robbins 
 
1. 
Writing in March, 2004 a Foreword to the French translation of a book first published by the 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago in 1986, Passeron begins by establishing the social 
historical conditions of his first encounter with Howard Becker.  His first ‘face-to-face’ meeting 
with Becker was in Marseille in 1985 at a conference organised by Raymonde Moulin, the 
proceedings of which were to be published that year as Sociologie de l’art.  In the same year, 
Passeron, Moulin and others collaborated to write Les artistes:  essai de morphologie sociale 
[artists:  an essay in social morphology), and, in 1982, Becker (with Howard Saul) had published 
Art Worlds.  This was the period in the early 1980s – shortly after the publication, in 1979, of 
Bourdieu’s La distinction – when, as we have seen, Passeron and his colleagues were anxious to 
advance a sociological discourse about art which did not ‘reduce’ (in their terms) art 
appreciation to strategic social position-taking.  The emphasis, therefore, was on the 
development of a sociology of aesthetic discourse.  Passeron had already completed his thesis 
on the ‘words of sociology’ in 1980.  Whilst an undergraduate and later a graduate student at 
the University of Chicago in the 1950s, Becker had also worked as a professional jazz pianist.  
His first book was Outsiders:  studies in the sociology of deviance (Becker, 1963). His doctoral 
research was a sociological study of Chicago teachers.  This background led to an interest in 
research methodology as a process of improvisation and in teaching and learning as a process 
of communication.  In 1970, he published a collection of articles about his research 
methodology entitled Sociological Work.  Method and Substance (Becker, 1970) in which he 
argued in his Preface: 
 
“Over the years I have engaged in many large research projects, some reported here, 
some published elsewhere in works on education and deviance.  In the course of trying 
to gather and make sense of a body of data, I often found myself improvising 
techniques and using ideas I later realized I did not fully understand.  Having done 
things a certain way, I tried to understand what I had done and make its logic clear;  
having used a certain concept in an uninspected way, I tried to work out what it might 
mean in some extended theoretical context.  I call attention, without going into the 
matter in detail, to how this differs from approaches that develop ‘correct’ methods a 
priori and choose concepts by seeing what will ‘fit’ with already established theory.” 
(Becker, 1970, vii) 
 
He was conscious, in other words, that he deployed in research enquiries a conceptual 
discourse instrumentally and only clarified the ‘logic’ of his meaning retrospectively.  The 
emphasis of Writing for Social Scientists - which Becker was probably writing or planning when 
he and Passeron met in Marseille - was to focus attention on the need to clarify linguistic 
meaning when communicating research findings.  Typically, Becker’s book represents writing 
as a process of improvisation – that meaning is constituted and refined in the process of 
producing drafts, revised drafts, and final drafts.  Writing for Social Scientists concentrates on 
the retrospective clarification of language use when communicating findings.  He was to write a 
further book which argued that linguistic reflexivity should be an integral part of the research 
process itself, but, even here, he makes this case retrospectively.  In his Preface to Tricks of the 
Trade (Becker, 1998), Becker comments: 
 
“Having to explain what you do to students pushes you to find simple ways of saying 
things, examples that give concrete form to abstract ideas, and exercises that give 
students practice in new ways of thinking and manipulating what they learn in their 
research.” (Becker, 1998, ix). 
 
He found that he developed ‘tricks’ from his own research experience which he could 
communicate to his students, with the result that: 
 
“… having written a book on the problems of academic writing (Becker 1986b), I 
decided I could follow that up with a book on ‘thinking’ if I started with the materials in 
the file of ‘tricks’ I had started.” (Becker, 1998, ix). 
 
In other words, Becker extrapolated ‘tricks’ derived from his own research experience to 
generate a battery of tricks to be deployed by students when undertaking their research.  
Passeron makes no reference to this later Becker text, but there is a clear affinity between 
Passeron and Becker in their common interest in the integral function of concept formation in 
relation to research practice and in relation to the communication of research findings.  
Arguably, however, Becker’s ‘tricks’ are almost unconsciously prescriptive or directive whereas 
Passeron seeks an analysis of “writing, rewriting and ‘truth-telling’ in sociology” which is itself 
sociologically sensitive to the relative positions of staff and students. 
 
2. 
In introducing the French translation of Writing for Social Scientists, Passeron noted that Becker 
had already in 1985 been offering seminars on writing as ‘group therapy’.  The first question to 
be considered, therefore, was whether the problems experienced by students and researchers 
in writing in the social sciences was one of ‘psychological inhibition’ as might be experienced 
by ‘any author’.  Posing the question in this way, Passeron was really asking two separate 
questions: firstly, are psychological inhibitions discretely independent of the social conditions 
in which they become manifest, and, secondly, are there factors particular to the writing of 
social science which induce inhibition?  Passeron suggested that individual character traits do 
not adequately explain inhibition nor do they explain the anxiety of intellectuals about the 
‘value’ of their work.  Although Passeron proceeds to use the language of psychology (“The ego 
aspires to the ideal; …”,), he insists that the psychological condition is induced within “a society 
increasingly marked by the fiction of mass education”.  He blames a social situation in which 
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celebrity or, in this instance, intellectual distinction, are thought to be effortlessly accessible to 
all as of right, and in which, correlatedly, failure is thought to merit stigma. 
 
3. 
Passeron then turns to the second part of his question.  Why is inhibition most acutely felt in 
the social sciences, as evidenced by “the very high rate of abandonment of planned theses, 
through stress, breakdown or disillusionment”?  He suggests that the problem does not lie in 
the difficulty of linguistic expression but in the disinclination to subject written texts to 
judgement precisely because, unlike spoken conversation, written communication entails a 
commitment to unmodifiable meaning.  But this does not yet explain the prevalence of 
inhibition in writing in the social sciences.  He goes on to claim that the particular problem in 
the social sciences arises from their assumed universal applicability and, hence, to the 
reluctance to debate proximate findings in immediate and local contexts.  Passeron takes many 
of the characteristics of social science writing exposed by Becker in examples from the work of 
students and researchers and tries to account for what he calls the “semantic fog surrounding 
sociology’s most abstract concepts …”.  What he calls the “semantic dilution” of many 
sociological formulations is paradoxically explicable in terms of a crisis in scientificity.  As he 
puts it:  “… they are no more than expressions devised expressly for the purpose of quietly 
avoiding the scientific obligation always to formulate assertions which refer clearly and 
unequivocally to a definite mode of confirmation or objection”. They are expressions which are 
deliberately resistant to verification or falsification, whether of the testability of a Bachelardian 
kind outlined by Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron in Le métier de sociologue (1968, 
1991) or of a Popperian kind. 
 
4. 
Sociology of education can explain how contemporary society has diminished this capacity to 
emphasize intellectual apprenticeship, but, more fundamentally, Passeron believes that the 
social sciences have “not converged to unite in a more or less homogeneous semantics”. In Le 
métier de sociologue, Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron argued that the social sciences 
needed to develop a distinctive epistemology which was neither dependent on positivism 
borrowed from the natural sciences nor on hermeneutics operating on idealist assumptions.  
Passeron’s work has been dedicated to the tasks of establishing such a distinctive 
epistemology of the social sciences and of differentiating between disciplines within the social 
sciences (between history, anthropology, and sociology in particular).  Passeron concludes that 
the inhibition experienced in social science writing arises from a fear of risking explicit 
articulation and the consequent confrontation with disagreement.  The cultivation of “the 
academic language of imprecision” is the consequence of the social conditions of pedagogic 
encounter and what is needed is “a social re-apprenticeship as interactive as that in which the 
fear of speaking clearly originated.”. 
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5. 
After this general consideration of the problem, Passeron moves towards a closer comparison 
between his own work and that of Becker.  He suggests that Becker’s ‘interactionism’ was 
strengthened by his acquaintance with the exposure of systems of objective reproduction in La 
Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970, 1977), whilst he claims that Becker’s tendency to 
locate writing and communication in a classroom context was a corrective to the influence on 
himself of Weber’s ‘sociology of understanding’ and also of his persistent inclination to  
understand communication in terms of inter-personal, Freudian encounter, without sufficient 
reference to systemic social context.  Passeron attributes the supposed weakness of his 
perception of the problem of social science writing to the fact that it was only in “one-to-one 
tutorials that I encountered the resistance of doctoral candidates who balked at writing …”.  
This denied him the possibility of sociologising the pedagogical encounter which was the 
supervisory situation.  He admitted that he had mostly failed “to ‘sociologise’”  the thinking of 
his students, whereas, by contrast, Becker’s book was the product of group sessions in which 
writing of social science itself became socially collective. 
 
6. 
After this expression of his admiration for the success of Becker’s writing seminars, Passeron 
proceeds to articulate the two reasons for the epistemological agreement between himself and 
Becker – “that sociological reasoning and sociological writing are indissociable”.   Both shared 
the view that ‘thought’ does not have autonomous existence, preceding expression.  It follows 
that problems of ‘expression’ are not simply problems of writing but, inseparably, problems of 
thinking and expressing. Both, equally, were opposed to ‘traditional or modern scientisms’ in 
believing that ‘social action’ cannot be understood abstractly but only by reference to the 
concrete actions of individuals acting in particular times and places. 
 
7. 
Passeron proceeds to emphasize slightly differently his conviction that sociological explanation 
cannot be abstract.  Sociological statements are never, he insists, abstractly ‘true’ and this 
enables him to give more philosophical force to his earlier psychological argument that the 
difficulty experienced by researchers in writing social science arises from their fear of 
judgement.  That fear exists because researchers are initiated early into the belief that their 
findings will be assessed by established authorities against universal criteria of truth and 
falsehood rather than dialogically by other researchers who are also fellow practitioners.  This 
means that, for Passeron, the kind of ‘epistemology’ of the social sciences which is possible is 
distinctive not by virtue of its particular logical status in abstract but by virtue of the particular 
dialectical  relationship in the social sciences between fact and explanation.  As he puts it;  “ 
…the sociology of scientific practices is, like their history, an indispensable prerequisite for 
their epistemology”, and this applies to every researcher.  Passeron, therefore, asks for 
linguistic reflexivity in the conduct of research on the understanding that this does not involve 
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a detached scrutiny of language use in terms of logic or grammatical correctness but, rather, a 
constant scrutiny of the constitutive function of language in identifying and solving problems.  
It is for this reason that Passeron admits to a skepticism, which he shares with Becker, about 
the standardised manuals which purport to teach how to write.  He argues that these manuals 
confuse the six functions of expression articulated by Roman Jakobson.  Social scientists are 
involved in the ‘referential’ use of language – which Passeron calls ‘assertory’ – rather than, for 
instance, in poetic or emotive uses.  In order to define the epistemologies of specific social 
sciences, Passeron then contends that we need to define the ‘logical space’ within which 
distinctive dialectical language/phenomenon usages operate.  Passeron’s footnote here to 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus relates his understanding of the identification of 
different ‘logical spaces’ for different disciplines or discourses to Wittgenstein’s essentially 
socio-linguistic criterion for determining truth or falsehood.  Unlike Becker, perhaps, Passeron 
adds his philosophical concern with truth and verification to Becker’s more pragmatic 
orientation. 
 
8. 
Passeron elaborates next the second conviction which he shares with Becker – that sociological 
explanation is dialectically involved with social actions.  The corollary of this shared conviction 
was that both emphasized “concern with the ‘case-study’ and ‘collections of cases’” (p.9).  
Passeron points to Becker’s co-editorship, with Charles Ragin, of a book devoted to the 
question of what constitutes a case-study (Becker & Ragin, 1992) and to his own work in 
exploring the use of case-studies in the histories of Greek medicine and modern psychology.  
The important point, for Passeron, is that case-studies are vital elements in the research 
process – that is to say that they do not exemplify pre-formed theories but participate in the 
theory-making process.  The difference here is between the inductive approach used in the 
natural sciences in which particular cases are subsumed vertically in a hierarchy of universality 
of explanatory laws and an approach involving ‘thinking by cases’ which operates 
‘horizontally’.  The former procedure in the social sciences assumes falsely the validity of a 
research model derived from the natural sciences whereas the second approach focuses on the 
particuilar characteristics of social scientific analysis.  Whereas induction is effective in 
generating explanations of the universally common behaviour of atoms and molecules, 
thinking by cases grasps the continuous contingency of human behaviour.  It “places the 
question of what ‘speaking and writing truth’ means in sociology in its true ‘epistemological 
place’” – recognizing, that is, that social scientific explanation is pragmatic rather than 
referential, and, therefore, involves a distinctive criterion of ‘truth’, one which is always 
provisional and never absolute. 
 
 
9. 
This articulation of an epistemology of the social siences which is neither exclusively positivist 
nor hermeneutic enables Passeron to return to his opening sense of the crisis of writing in the 
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social sciences.  The anxiety of researchers and students about communicating their findings 
arises from the misguided pursuit of a wrong kind of truth.  Passeron refers to Becker’s 
classroom research to reiterate that sociologists, “whether students or established are all 
equally lacking any possibility of arriving at a single or dominant theoretical paradigm (and 
thus are always potential competitors or adversaries in their struggle to defend at all costs the 
truth of their statements) …”.  By his choice of language, he here introduces another way of 
talking about the problem.  The error is to pursue a single theoretical paradigm, or, to put this 
in terms more associated with Raymond Aron’s critiques of Durkheim and Bourdieu, the error is 
to seek any totalising social explanation.  To relinquish this totalising orientation is to liberate 
discourse and diminish anxiety.  However, the rejection of the quest for one total social 
scientific explanation does not imply a retreat to working within delimited discourses such as 
those of economics, anthropology or history.  On the contrary, Passeron argues that we should 
embrace pluridisciplinarity.  We need to adopt plural methods to establish pragmatic truths 
rather than singular procedures to define a singular truth.  As Passeron puts it:  
“Communicating a form of knowledge like that of individual historical instances can only 
operate without semantic losses through texts which synthesise multiple dimensions of 
description.”.  
 
10. 
Passeron accused Bourdieu of allowing his battery of conceptual instruments – ‘habitus’, 
‘cultural capital’, ‘field’ – to become referentially true accounts of social reality, and of 
developing ‘reflexive’ sociology to enable sociology to become a meta-science which could 
explain all other science.  Nevertheless, Passeron’s commitment to theoretical and 
methodological ‘plurality’ has its own totalising orientation.  As he moves to a conclusion, he 
discusses the ‘vision of sociology’ which, as a discipline, has its own distinctive problem of 
being “indissociably both synthesising and historical” by contrast with “most other social 
sciences” which have developed autonomous procedures.  Economics, demography and 
linguistics are cited as operating with simulated models whilst history and historical 
anthropology are cited as involving “chronological recounting”, and these contrasts are related 
to the distinctive traditions which have been the legacy of the work, respectively, of Durkheim 
and Weber.  Passeron’s vision of sociology does appear to be of a meta-science which 
eclectically and pragmatically deploys the specific approaches of ‘other’ social sciences to 
generate transient truths which transcend their circumscribed perspectives. It is Passeron’s 
belief in transience or continuing provisionality that saves him from totalisation.  If sociology is 
indissociably both synthetic and historical, Passeron tries to subsume the synthetic under the 
historical whereas he would claim that it was Bourdieu’s mistake to try to do the reverse.  
 
 
11. 
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Passeron returns to a summary of the strengths of Becker’s book before articulating his own 
concluding remarks.  In these final comments he repeats his opposition to the pursuit of a 
“unified paradigm” and emphasizes that he advocates theoretical plurality in order to ensure 
that research in the social sciences remains an ongoing process, constituting meaning 
dialectically through the continuously sensitive use of language.  He concludes:  “The 
sociological study most devoted to exploring the empirical peculiarities of a ‘field’ or a ‘case’ is 
also a theoretical work of continually recasting the language of description of historical worlds, 
constantly replenished with new ‘facts’ which could not have been observed if a new theoretical 
framework had not first made them conceivable.”. 
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‘… now that’s cultural studies!’: reconsidering a conference 
paper on retro style 
 
Sarah Baker 
 
Many academics recycle their work and due to increased workloads and pressure to publish 
research this is not surprising. This paper, which was given at the PhD workshop on 16th June 
2008, is not so different in this regard. It reuses a paper I gave at a workshop called ‘Putting 
Pierre Bourdieu To Work’ on May 15th of the same year. However, the paper is also an attempt 
to reflect on the academic context in which the original presentation was given and to consider 
the response that I received. While this may seem like an exercise in ‘navel gazing’, by 
completing this exercise I hope to consider the relationship between sociology and cultural 
studies and the role that institutions have in shaping the position of PhD students and their 
work. 
 
I suspect that this ‘paper within a paper’ is more suited to spoken presentation, than the 
written word. However I believe it adequately demonstrates the process of redrafting and 
revision involved in academic research, which Derek Robbins highlights as one of the focuses 
of this yearbook, and thus is, I hope, a useful exercise. The paper begins by describing the 
context in which the original presentation was given. I then insert the original paper that I gave 
and the questions I was asked. I reflect on these questions and consider how my research has 
progressed since this experience. I conclude by discussing my own position within academic 
disciplines. 
 
‘Putting Pierre Bourdieu To Work’ 
 
‘Putting Pierre Bourdieu To Work’ was a workshop hosted by The Centre for Research on Socio-
Cultural Change (CRESC), a research centre funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) in collaboration with the University of Manchester and The Open University. The 
centre has received £3.7 million of funding until 2009. Whilst interdisciplinary in focus, the 
majority of academics involved in the centre are from sociology departments. Their research 
interests are divided into four key themes. These are ‘Cultural Economy’, ‘Transformations in 
Media, Culture and Economy’, ‘Culture, Governance and Citizenship’ and ‘Cultural Values and 
Politics’. In researching these areas many of the academics involved in the centre draw on the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu. Thus Mike Savage, the director of CRESC, and Loïc Wacquan, the 
originator of the ‘Putting Pierre Bourdieu to Work’ series of conferences, decided to hold the 
workshop at CRESC. Previous workshops had been held in New York, Berkeley and at Ann Arbor 
in Michagan. 
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The call for papers defined the workshop as an ‘interdisciplinary vehicle for doctoral students 
and post-doctoral researchers conducting social research deploying Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts 
to present and discuss their work and to learn from each other’s approaches, problems, and 
solutions.’ However, this open and inclusive intention, was made difficult by a number of 
factors. According to the organisers they had an unexpectedly high number of abstracts in 
response to the call for papers. This meant that the workshop was extended from one to two 
days and the time given for individual papers was shortened from twenty to twelve minutes.  In 
addition when the conference schedule was published it was surprising to find that many of the 
speakers were established academics. This may have been due to a resurgence of interest in 
Pierre Bourdieu’s work after his death, particularly in a British context where economic 
inequality seems to be growing (Savage, 2000). It may also have been evidence of academic 
rivalry and position taking in regard to the legacy of his extensive body of work.  
 
That aside, this meant that there were only four postgraduate students participating in the 
whole two-day workshop, which significantly changed the premise of the event. For example 
participants were encouraged to email papers or chapters prior to the workshop. The papers 
that I received were polished and some had already been published. As one of the four 
postgraduate students, who didn’t have a paper to circulate and was hoping to use the 
conference to discuss ideas for a chapter, this was particularly disconcerting. This is 
characteristic of the academic anxieties regarding performance that Jean-Claude Passeron 
(2004) documents in his discussion of the pressures of academic research.  
 
The discrepancy between the call for papers and the workshop itself may also have partly been 
a result of a model of workshops usually used in the American academic context being 
transposed into a British one. Indeed Loïc Wacquant seemed disappointed with the lack of 
dialogue between the delegates and tried to encourage more open discussion. However, this 
was also inhibited by his own symbolic capital within the field, as it seemed as though anyone 
who used Bourdieu’s concepts ‘incorrectly’, in his eyes, would be subject to a weighty critique.  
This was intensified by a comment that he made, which also seemed to contradict the 
interdisciplinary nature of the conference outlined in the call for papers. In part of his own 
lecture when discussing social class, cultural change and identity, Wacquant said: 
 
‘People don’t have identities that change quickly, you know, twenty identities at once, 
switching them at will …now that’s cultural studies!’  
 
Whilst this was an ‘off the cuff’ comment, it reflects an attitude towards cultural studies that 
Bourdieu and Wacquant previously voiced in ‘On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason’ written in 
1999. In this article they (1999:47) argue that cultural studies is a mongrel domain that does 
not exist in the French university, and that it owes its international reputation to a successful 
publishing policy. The impromptu comment of Wacquant at the workshop seems just as 
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uninformed and outdated as the attitude towards cultural studies evident in ‘On the Cunning of 
Imperial Reason’. It is based on a particular strand of 1980s cultural studies, of which most 
later cultural studies research, mine included, is critical of. Since its conception, cultural 
studies has been engaged in investigating and critiquing the perpetuation of social inequalities 
determined by class, gender, race, age and sexuality, which I would argue makes it largely 
concerned with similar issues to those of Bourdieu, even though it may take a different 
methodological perspective. This is a discussion I will come back to further on in this paper. 
 
My feelings of irritation at this statement are, of course, a product of my own position and 
institutional background. Having studied for an MA and PhD in a department that combines the 
disciplines of sociology, media and cultural studies, and in which my lecturers and supervisors 
have encouraged me to read widely across disciplines, I did not feel that I had a position within 
academic disciplines until recently. Although my work uses the theories of Bourdieu and 
sociological research more generally, I have, however, increasingly felt engaged with the 
discipline of cultural studies. At the conference the influence of cultural studies on and in my 
work was continually emphasised. For example in the panel on ‘Class, Culture and 
Consumption’, in which my paper was situated, I was the only person who had conducted 
ethnographic research and had not used multiple correspondence analysis. Whilst methods are 
not, and should not, be thought of as inherent to specific disciplines, they are illustrative of 
their wider characteristics.  
 
Multiple Correspondence analysis was used by Bourdieu in Distinction (2005[1979]) and maps 
cultural consumption in space according to two or three variables or axis. It makes analysis of 
large numbers of data, common in sociology, easier to analyse. However, I find the use of 
correspondence analysis to analyse cultural consumption largely problematic, as it does not 
allow for changes in the meaning of cultural forms. Correspondence analysis can often imply 
that taste and class are largely unrelated and thus that class is irrelevant in the contemporary 
context. For example data would show that opera has become consumed by a wider strata of 
the population. This method does not account for changes in taste hierarchies within opera 
itself, or that new cultural forms that may have taken its place in creating and reflecting 
cultural capital. In addition, this more objective approach also seems to discourage reflexivity, 
as opposed to Bourdieu’s general recommendations. For example the other panel members 
were largely unreflexive about their role in the research process, neither keen to recognise, or 
include, their position in their own analysis. Although prior to the conference I had envisaged 
these differences and hoped that this would make for an interesting group of papers, my paper 
seemed to stand out; as the ‘mongrel’ paper within a ‘classic sociology’ panel. This affected the 
questions, or lack of questions, I was asked. These will be discussed after the original paper, 
which is inserted below. 
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Practice and field; a discussion of the internal and external distinctions of retro 
enthusiasts 
 
Decorating an interior, whether simply putting up a poster or completely gutting a room and 
redesigning it, is a practice that most people will have been involved in. Significantly fewer 
people, however, commit large amounts of time and money to their interior. Even fewer define 
their interior as retro and dedicate their leisure time to making it perfect. This paper draws on 
13 video interviews conducted with people from this group. The interviews, mostly with 
couples, took place in homes across the South East of England in 2006/07. In these interviews I 
found that an interest in retro is not only a stylistic preference, but it also structures 
interviewees understandings, procedures and displays of decorating and their cultural practices 
more generally. Drawing on both Pierre Bourdieu’s (2005[1979]; 1990[1980]) concepts of 
habitus, capital and field and Alan Warde’s (2005) theories of practice, this paper 
conceptualises retro as a disposition within the wider practice of decorating. It considers the 
relationship between the internal and external distinctions generated by, and involved in, the 
making of a retro interior.   
 
In comparison to other decorating dispositions, I would argue that retro maintains a high 
position both in the cultural and consumer cultural fields, and in social space more generally. 
Making a retro interior both demands and generates high levels of cultural capital. For example 
knowing about, finding and displaying an original 1970s sideboard demonstrates knowledge 
about the history of design and contemporary fashions. Enthusiasts also emphasise that their 
interest in retro style is motivated by a desire for original and authentic objects that both 
reinforce and contribute to their unique and authentic identities. These values are similar to the 
ones that Sarah Thornton (1995) associates with high subcultural capital, and are also those 
that James Clifford (1988) identifies as positive in the hierarchy of value and as structuring the 
art-culture system.  
 
It is not only knowledge of past styles and fashions that is needed to make and define an 
interior as retro. In order that objects and styles are not misconstrued as old fashioned, owners 
must have the appropriate identity and context for the object. For example the meaning and 
value of a sideboard changes whether owned by a working class elderly woman and displayed 
in her front room, or by a young middle class couple and placed in their designer apartment. 
Whilst age and gender clearly influence the categorisation of an object as retro, the ability to 
appropriate and transform the value of old-fashioned objects into retro ones is also the 
product of a particular class position. The capacity to appropriate past objects and styles and 
make them legitimate is an example of symbolic capital that theorists, such as Pierre Bourdieu 
and Loïc Wacqaunt (1992:148), and Bev Skeggs (2004), have associated with the middle 
classes.  
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Indeed, in my research it does seem that the consumers involved in making retro homes are 
largely middle class in terms of their own occupations and lifestyles. However, their 
backgrounds, capital composition and levels and manifestations of commitment to the making 
of a retro interior vary. The interviewees can largely be split into two groups; those with an 
eclectic retro taste, and those fully committed to one particular era. 
 
Eclectic tastes 
 
Andy and Louise are examples of the former group. They are passionate about retro, however 
they appropriate styles from different periods. They both come from middle class backgrounds, 
and their love of retro was encouraged by their parent’s interest in design and antiques. They 
are enthusiastic about 50s, 60s and 70s styles and enjoy mixing contemporary design with 
their retro pieces, for example they have a contemporary kitchen. 
 
The eclecticism of Andy and Louise demonstrates their knowledge of a variety of periods and 
their ‘good taste’ across a range of objects and styles. Eclecticism or omnivorousness, as Mike 
Savage (2000) has suggested, is often viewed as a less hierarchical way of acting and can be an 
attempt to disassociate with the fixed tastes and snobbery associated with high culture. Andy 
and Louise were not only keen to disassociate themselves with high culture, but also with the 
fashionable interiors shown by retailers or in the media, preferring to frame themselves as 
choosing objects and making them fashionable themselves.  
 
However, Andy and Louise’s tastes for retro objects or mid-century modern mixed with the 
contemporary are not unlike those displayed on the pages of high-end lifestyle magazines, 
such as Elle Decoration. In addition to being eclectic, like the styles in these magazines Andy 
and Louise’s taste is also dynamic. They often change their interior and buy new retro furniture 
from boutiques and from ebay. They were also keen to tell me that their tastes had become 
more sophisticated over the years. Thus I would suggest that the values and tastes of Andy and 
Louise maintain and reflect the dominant values of the cultural field and of advanced consumer 
culture, in which individual and decommodified material objects are bestowed with high value.  
 
Interestingly Andy and Louise work in the media industries themselves; Andy as a publisher 
and Louise as a graphic designer. Bourdieu (quoted in Swartz, 1997:130) argued that there is 
often a structural homology between cultural producers and cultural consumers, and in this 
case they are the same people. Thus habitus and field mutually reinforce each other. Although 
not directly, Andy and Louise’s roles in the media industries and their middle class 
backgrounds enable them to legitimate their own tastes and enhance their exchange value; 
Louise can appropriate her Grandad’s 1970s wineglasses and define them as cool.  
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Specialist tastes 
 
In contrast, Peter and Mary are highly committed to 1940s style. They purposely bought a 
1940s house and are keen to fill it with original 40s objects. Even in the interview they wanted 
to give me an authentic 1940s experience; they played 1940s music throughout and Peter lit 
the fire rather than putting the heating on. Their attention to detail and in-depth knowledge 
was also replicated in their interior. For example they had sourced an original 1940s pink 
bathroom suite that they were about to install.  
 
Their high levels of commitment to retro and the 1940s means that within the practice of retro 
they gain admiration and respect. This is both from the other 1940s enthusiasts they 
encounter at the swing dance groups and vintage car rallies they go to, and from other less 
committed retro enthusiasts. The former have similar styles and interests, and the latter, whilst 
critical of ‘slaves to period style’, appreciate their commitment to acquiring original, authentic 
objects. As Alan Warde (2005:148) notes ‘judgements of performance are made internally with 
respect to the goals and aspirations of the practice itself, and proficiency and commitment 
deliver satisfaction and self-esteem.’ In the case of Peter and Mary their proficiency and 
commitment make their practices highly specialist. They have a very strong idea of the objects 
they want in their home, which is guided by an adherence to the styles of the period. This 
affects their shopping practices, as these quotes demonstrate; 
 
Peter: ‘If we decide we need a bed we can’t just go out and buy a bed like normal people 
would do, just go to MFI or Ikea and think ‘oh yer that one will do’. Ok it will be in the 
back of our minds that we need a new bed, but it might be three, four, five years before 
we see the one that we want and we might happen upon it in the most strangest of places 
and think we’ve got to have that bed. Then we work out the logistics of getting it home 
from Newcastle or wherever it is you happen to be when you see it…you know it is a 
different philosophy.’  
 
Mary: ‘Sometimes, you think, oh gosh you know it would be really nice to like the stuff 
that is normal taste, and it would be easy, but it’s just really really satisfying when you are 
looking for the one, not even when you are looking for the one thing, when you see the 
one thing, and you just think that is absolutely, absolutely right.’   
 
Peter and Mary’s style and their shopping practices, ‘waiting for the perfect objects for their 
home’, do not seem wholly compatible with the dominant discourses of consumer culture, 
which encourage the adoption of new objects and styles and a play of difference. Although 
their knowledge of the 1940s is exhaustive, they do not have such a general interest in fashion 
and design and thus have less cultural capital than the other group of interviewees. Whilst Peter 
and Mary’s retro style is socially recognisable and valued because of their commitment to 
authenticity, it is so specialist that it does not transfer easily into other fields. For example 
knowing the manufacturing process of an early 1950s English Rose kitchen in detail gives little 
external reward. This is unless, however, lifestyles such as Peter and Mary’s are appropriated 
and legitimated by the media, which is the increasingly the case. 
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Peter and Mary, like the other interviewees committed to one particular era that I interviewed, 
had less institutionalised forms of cultural capital. They had not been to art school like the 
other interviewees. Although Peter now works as an IT consultant and Mary as a district nurse, 
they also came from less privileged backgrounds. Indeed it could be these factors that create 
the propensity towards a more specialised interest, for fear of being interpreted as old-
fashioned rather than retro. This also makes their cultural capital more difficult to convert into 
economic capital without institutionalisation through the media industries or the education 
system. 
 
 
Implications 
 
So what does this very brief expose of two groups of retro enthusiasts offer to discussions of 
the work of Bourdieu?  In the abstract I stated that I would discuss the adequacy of Bourdieu’s 
theories for understanding the internal relations and practices of enthusiasts, and this is the 
point I want to go back to. Theorists such as John Fiske (1989) and Sarah Thornton (1995) have 
created concepts like popular and subcultural capital in an attempt to recognise that popular 
culture has resources of its own and to describe the relations of fans or subcultures. Whilst I 
agree that the conceptualisation of working class or popular culture as lack that Bourdieu 
(2005[1979]) makes in Distinction, is problematic, I also consider Fiske’s and Thornton’s 
theorisations to be equally unsatisfactory. Aside from the fact that theories of subculture 
assume there is a homogeneous culture to be ‘sub off’, in attempting to democratise the 
theories of Bourdieu, Fiske and Thornton argue that popular or subcultural capital is less 
bound by class. In my analysis of retro style and the internal and external distinctions of retro 
enthusiasts I have certainly not found this to be the case. Whilst the practice of decorating itself 
is inevitably varied in class terms, the disposition to create a retro interior and the levels and 
manifestations of commitment to that interior do not seem so varied. 
 
Thus the model I have found most useful is one that combines the concepts of practice and 
field. This acknowledges that valuable cultural knowledge and resources can exist and circulate 
within practices without being considered valuable in the fields of cultural production or 
consumer culture. By separating cultural knowledge and resources from fields we can focus on 
the process of legitimation; what and whose values and practices are recognisable as capital 
and/or made symbolic. In terms of the retro enthusiasts in this study who are in a relative high 
social position this seems to be the majority of their values and practices. Yet, for other 
enthusiasts in less stable social positions this may not be the case.  
 
Questioning, revising and restating 
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After giving this paper at the ‘‘Putting Pierre Bourdieu To Work’ workshop I was asked three 
questions. The first was addressed to all the speakers on the panel and was related to issues of 
taxonomy, for example the categorisation of individual enthusiasts and the definition of their 
class positions. The second question asked whether the participants I had interviewed with 
specialist tastes continued their interests outside of the home. The third question asked 
whether I was arguing that subcultures create value in their own practices because their classed 
identities are not valued in the wider fields of power. Having previously considered these 
questions in other chapters of my thesis, apart perhaps from the last, I found them relatively 
straightforward to answer.  
 
I addressed the first question by discussing my methodology more generally. I said that in 
most cases interviewees had identified themselves as enthusiasts and as having a passion for 
retro, vintage or mid-century modern. But of course because I argue that retro is a social, 
cultural and aesthetic judgement, I have had to question the extent to which this project is 
simply an exercise of my own taste. To try to address this I have adopted a reflexive practice 
throughout my PhD, which attempts to make my own journey obvious by accessing the 
knowledge required to recognise retro style.  
 
I gave a more descriptive answer to the second question stating that Peter and Mary, like the 
other interviewees who had specialist interests, were keen to continue displaying their tastes 
outside of the domestic environment. However this was made more difficult by conventions in 
the workplace. In relation to the third question, whether subcultures create value in their own 
practices because their classed identities are not valued in the fields of power, I said that yes it 
was the case that extreme levels of commitment to a practice, which I prefer to the term 
subculture, may be a reaction to less external rewards generated in the wider fields of power, 
however I only had evidence of this in regard to retro style. 
 
Being asked and answering these questions made me aware of themes that needed to be 
emphasised in my thesis, for example discussions regarding the differences between private 
and public space. However, I was surprised and disappointed by the lack of questions 
regarding my use of Bourdieu’s theories of capitals, field and practice because I had used these 
terms differently to their typical usage. Firstly I had expected a question on why I had 
interviewed couples together, rather than separately, as in most analysis of cultural 
consumption cultural capital is viewed as the property of individuals.  I would have answered 
that this was both a product of interviewees assuming that they would be interviewed as 
couples, but also indicative of the collective production of taste, which, in my opinion, studies 
such as Distinction (Bourdieu, 2005[1979]) do not address adequately.  
 
I had also envisaged a question regarding my suggestion that cultural resources should be 
viewed as separate from fields and was ready to answer and to argue this point. I would have 
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made it clear that I was not suggesting that practices are unrelated to contexts, just that some 
practices are not valued by fields and are not exchangeable. Thus I would agree with Skeggs 
(2004:24) when she says that ‘it is possible to re-work cultural capital not just as high culture 
if we think more generally about culture as a resource or use-value which can be separated 
from fields and means by which it is exchanged.’ In addition I expected a question regarding 
my critique of the concept of subcultural capital. I would have replied by recapping on Sarah 
Thornton’s (1995) theorisations of subcultural capital in which she argues that it does not 
correlate in a one-to-one way with class. She (1995) suggests that class is wilfully avoided by 
subcultural distinctions. This contradicts the findings in my study and I would argue that this is 
because the values integral to high levels of subcultural capital have become those integral to 
high levels of cultural capital. This means that Thornton misrecognises cultural capital and 
middle class values. 
 
Usually I can roughly predict the questions that I will be asked. However in this instance there 
was a mismatch between the questions I expected and those I was asked. The lack of questions 
regarding subcultural capital may have been a product of the audience being unfamiliar with 
the term and evidence of a difference in emphasis in studies of cultural consumption within the 
discipline of sociology. But the question regarding the way I had used the concepts of capital, 
field and practice; had I got it so wrong that no one wanted to embarrass me? Or was it a 
product of trying to minimise risk and making my argument so subtle that no one understood 
it?  The latter, as Passeron (2004) argues, is common among students and researchers and due 
to the anxieties I felt due to the change in the premise of the workshop would be unsurprising. 
On reflection I feel that I was nervous of critiquing the theories of a highly acclaimed academic 
on which a whole workshop was based and in the presence of some of his most avid followers. 
With the advice of Becker and Passeron (2004)  in mind I will attempt to rewrite the argument 
of my paper clearly and directly below.  
 
In my research, theories of capitals and fields seem highly useful when describing the practices 
of retailers, the media and the power relationships of the middle classes. However when it 
comes to the practices of retro enthusiasts in their domestic spaces, especially those in less 
dominant positions, I need an additional theory or concept, otherwise all actions are reduced to 
the accumulation of capital. Thus I require a theoretical framework that focuses on use as well 
as exchange value, a theory that combines Bourdieu’s theorisations of capital and fields with 
one that looks beyond practice as motivated by the accumulation of capitals. This mix and 
match approach is, of course, typical of a ‘mongrel discipline’ like cultural studies. 
 
 
Conclusion: Cultural Studies the ‘mongrel’ discipline 
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In light of my experience at the ‘Putting Bourdieu to Work’ workshop, and the process of 
returning to the comment made by Wacquant, has only made my alignment with the discipline 
of cultural studies stronger. Whilst I feel that the research emanating from cultural studies 
should be more concerned with epistemology, a lesson that could be learned from sociology, a 
mongrel discipline has many advantages. A mongrel is unsure of what it is and thus is relatively 
open to different approaches. It is also continually questioning, and trying to find, its identity 
and thus is never complacent. At UEL, at least, I feel this makes for a research environment that 
advocates interdisciplinarity and the use of theory and method as tools rather than inherent to 
one particular approach or discipline. 
 
As for the critique of cultural studies research as owing ‘its success to publishing policy’ and 
arguing that ‘identities are can be switched at will’; whilst some theorisations influenced by 
cultural studies, particularly those concerning style, consumption and postmodernism in the 
1980s/90s over emphasised freedom from categorisations of identity (e.g. Polhemus, 1994), 
they are matched, and in some cases, exceeded, by theories that denied the relevance of class 
to contemporary culture and echoed neo-liberal discourse originating from the discipline of 
sociology (e.g. Giddens, 1991). Theoretical perspectives from both disciplines, it seems, have 
advertently or inadvertently contributed to the discourses of neo-liberal capitalism. However, at 
this point in time, in Britain at least, it seems to be theories emanating from cultural studies 
that are being most critical of these developments, and this is certainly a project with which I 
would like to align myself.  
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Chapter 6 
Framing Nation-State and Gender  
Rumana Hashem 
 
In her recent book, “The Body of War”, Zarkov (2007) explored the ways in which women were 
subjected to the ethno-nationalist violence in former Yugoslavia and the ways media 
representation of female and male bodies were gendered. Mukherjee (2008), in her article, 
gendered embodiments of the nation in Bangladesh showed that violence in Bangladesh 
Liberation War in 1971 was inscribed upon the bodies of women. While men soldiers were 
fighting on the frontier for the sake of the motherhood; their mothers, daughters and sisters left 
at military camps and/or at so called ‘home’ were subjected to massive reproductive and sexual 
violence by the Pak-Military soliders. Furthermore, feminist scholarship such as Cockburn (2004, 
2001),  Enloe (1993), Giles and Hyndman (2004),Hyndman (2008), Korac (2006, 2003, 1998) and 
Moser and Clark et al.(2001) have articulated that there is a notion to see political violence and 
armed conflict as “male domains, executed by men, whether as armed forces, guerrilla groups, 
paramilitaries or peace-keeping forces” (Enloe 1993 cited in Moser and Clark, 2001) and that 
there is a tendency to see women as simply victims in the armed conflict and gendered violence. 
However, there has been much academic work that demonstrates the complex links between 
gender, nation, state, and armed and ethnic conflict. The doctoral thesis, from which this paper 
is extracted, has been informed by these literatures. The thesis explores the gender dimension of 
violence in the armed conflict in the South-Eastern part in Bangladesh which is a hilly area largely 
populated by indigenous people23. It investigates into the causes of gendered violence in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) addressing the militarization and extreme human rights violation in 
the CHT that explores the ways in which the indigenous land became Bengali Settlers land.  
 
 
 
 
 
Nation, State and Gender 
                                         
 The paper was presented in the PhD workshop in June 2008 to demonstrate research progress and with an intention to 
share my ideas and data for the research. In the workshop, I have briefly discussed the research design, theoretical and 
methodological stance of the thesis as well as attempted to outline some background issues that generated the armed 
conflict with a view to provide an overall presentation of the thesis. However, this paper is an edited version of the 
presentation which does not cover all of the above issues, rather it provides with an understanding of the theoretical 
stand point of the research clarifying and defining the several concepts central to my analysis. The paper has been 
largely derived from the theoretical chapter of the thesis. It argues that gender, nation and state are intermeshed and 
shaped by each other which then produces nationalist conflict that produces armed conflict and violence. 
 
23 The indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts constitute the most significant number in terms   of the other 
minority groups in Bangladesh. There are thirteen different ethnic minorities in the Hill who belong to the same 
community see themselves as Jumma.   
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This chapter is set aside to define some of the important concepts will be employed in the 
thesis, as well as to elaborate its conceptual framework. Firstly, I will attempt to describe the 
notion of the nation and nationalism in accordance with a growing body of historiographical 
work. Second, I elaborate a working definition of the state. Given my claim as to the 
significance of the state to the politics of gender and ethnicity, I undertake to defend-albeit 
with qualifications-the treatment of the state as a meaningful social actor. While, I am 
concerned, in particular, to define a necessary conception of the nation and state that sets out 
the relationship between gender and the modern nation-state, the chapter provides with a 
discussion that encompasses the totality of state practices. The actual intention is to enable the 
readers to see the ways in which various social axes intersect each other and how various state 
apparatus together constitute nationalist ideologies that produces gender specific violence in 
the nationalist and armed conflict.24   
Thirdly, I will attempt to analyse the concept of gender and the important historical relationship 
between gender and the nation-state. For an understanding of gender dimensions of 
nationalist conflicts and violence, it is crucial to understand the relationship between gender 
and the nation-state. To meaningfully understand why nationalist movement and armed 
conflict generate violence with gender implication, one needs to look at the different ways in 
which the discourse on gender and that on nation-state tend to intersect and construct each 
other (Yuval-Davis, 1997). It is also necessary to look at each discourse separately as this is the 
only way to see how they are informed by each other. However, in accordance with a growing 
body of literatures that include work in sociology, history, political science, post-colonial 
studies, anthropology and psycho-social studies (as interprets the constructions of identities), I 
will demonstrate the centrality of gender to the material and ideological creation, justification, 
and maintenance of the nation-state. An understanding of the gender politics of the nation-
state depends not only on an awareness of the content of this history, but moreover on the 
explanatory mechanisms it set in place, still dominant processes that strongly bind the idea of 
gender to conceptions of national identity and belonging.   I go onto consider how the 
relationship between gender and the state has been colluded in social and political theory. By 
insisting on the continuing gender politics of the nation-state, finally, I set out the general 
structure within which my argument will take place in the thesis. 
To begin with, I would like to examine what precisely is signified by the concept of ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ as is important to analyse the two objects of the concept ‘nation-state’ separately. The 
first term ‘nation’ can simply be described as a population who live in a specific boundary. This 
boundary is either a geographical territory or an imagined border.  The second term ‘state’ 
indicates a political apparatus that derives its meaning from the legitimacy of its sovereignty 
over a socio-geographical population, and, that of the ‘nation’. Yet, this is only a self-
generated definition and thus over simplistic which could not provide us with any information 
                                         
24 My argument is certainly informed by the deconstructive feminist approach which analyses the gendered construction 
of the nation and state on the one hand, the intersectionality of other social axes such as race, ethnicity and class, on 
the other. This is to claim that these axes together construct state and nation which latter forms in gendered violence 
in the nationalist conflict.    
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about its historical genesis that could reveal the structures of power underpinning the nation-
state or any other state apparatus. For a clear understanding of the process of how ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ is constructed as one entity that works like a ‘syntactic hyphen in yoking together’ (to 
use Pitcher, 2007:18), it is essential to look at the different theorizations of nation , 
nationalism and state as they have been debated as separate social phenomena.  
The notion of the nation and nationalism 
Nation and nationalism are conceptualized variously by different schools. As Smith noted, 
“definitions of the nation range from those that stress ‘objective’ factors, such as language, 
religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely ‘subjective’ 
factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments” (2001:11). Notwithstanding, nations are 
mainly reproduced by women, both biologically and culturally (Chatterjee, 1994; Mukherjee, 
2008; Yuval-Davis,1997; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Zarkov,2007), most of the hegemonic 
theorizations of nation and nationalism have ignored gender relations as relevant to this 
discussion. The primordialist definition of the nation is based on a naturalized image which 
claims that nations are not only ‘eternal and universal but also constitute a natural extension of 
the family’ as well as kinship relations.  In these constructions the family and kinship units are 
actually ‘based on natural sexual divisions of labour in which the men protect the women and 
children’ (see Yuval Davis, 1997:15,also see Enole 1989). Definitions that stress ‘objective’ 
factors, for example, Joseph Stalin’s assertive concept, “a nation is a historically constituted, 
stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic 
life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (1973:61 cited in Smith 
2001:11),certainly isolate important features of the nation. This idea is partially supported by 
scholars, such as, Bhabha (1995:2), when he notes that the concept of the nation as a symbolic 
force and ‘an idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity’ and the ‘epithet’ 
most commonly used to express the ‘authenticity of cultural location’. Such definitions reveal 
by turn that culture alongside other aspects of nations (ethnic origins, religion, tradition and 
economy) plays an important role in construction of nation.  
However, what seems to be most important for the construction of the nation, as is explored in 
much of the literatures on nation and nationalism, nations are mainly produced and 
reproduced by the idea of ‘other’25. This others can be ethnic, cultural, or religious or racial 
depending upon the context, as Hutchinson and Smith noted, ‘it is generally in the context of 
other [..] groups who are opposed by the first one’ (1996:4).Hutchinson and Smith also pointed 
out that ‘ethnicity’, the meaning of the term which is ‘equally uncertain as it can mean “the 
essence of an ethnic group” or “the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group”, or 
“what it is to be are an ‘ethnic group’”, is one of the most important tool for the construction of 
a nation. Taking account of Eriksen’s (1993) assertation, the two scholars argued that ethnicity 
                                         
25 The term is widely used by scholars in the field of humanity and social sciences that identifies various ways of the 
construction of the ‘other’. One of the common constructions of the ‘other’ in nation-state is ethnicity (to use Smith et 
al, 1996), while the other powerful constructions include race and gender (see Anderson 1983 and Hart, 2006, Giles & 
Hyndman et al, 2004).  However, this thesis looks at the tools and process that constructs the other, that are ignored 
by the hegemonic notion of the nation, such as, gender, militarization and internal colonialism (as part of the so called 
globalization) and the ways in which the state produces ‘other’ and shapes ideologies of nationalism. 
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is the common tool for the ‘classification of peoples and the relations between groups, in a 
context of “self-other” distinctions’ (Eriksen,1993:4, Hutchinson and Smith 1996:4). For 
example, Greeks who are differentiated as ‘barbarian other’ (racially different from English) 
tend to characterize the English and the ‘non-Greeks-peripheral’ as  ethnea-‘foreign 
barabairan’.  For Greeks, ‘others’ are those who are ethnically different, the people who’s 
culture, religion, language and traditions are uncommon to Greek ethnic origins. Hence, they 
can not have membership in the same group and can not belong to the same nation. 
Hutchinson and Smith noted,  
 What these usages have in common is the idea of a number of people [..] who 
share some cultural or biological characteristics  and who live and act in concert. 
But these usages refer to ‘other’ peoples who,[...] belong to some group unlike 
one’s own.  (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:4) 
However, the dichotomy between a ‘non-ethnic “us” and ethnic “others” has continued to dog 
the concepts in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism’ (Chapman et al., 1989:15). 
To an account for another core feature of the process through which ‘others’ are constructed 
and nations are constituted, it is important to look at the colonial histories. As explored in 
post-colonial scholarship, apparently, colonial powers redesign the nations and rules as 
‘mandates or protectorates’ (Said, 1995). The colonial mission of the West in the name of the 
development of the modern institutions and technologies of power created conditions for new 
nations in the countries of Asia and Africa through. On top of the colonial praxis of extreme 
economic exploitation to capture land and resources of its colonies, the colonial rulers often 
create assumptions around class and race to such an extent that produces conditions for the 
colonial populations to understand themselves “as inferior, subhuman or otherwise” not like 
the colonial superiors. The marginalized colonial populations long for national sovereignty and 
follow self-determination as the only way to liberate themselves from the racial and class 
boundaries, as such (Chatterjee, 1986; Said,1978; Pitcher,2007:22) .  
 The modernist historians of nationalism, such as, Benedict Anderson (1991), insist that the 
construction of ‘the nation’ is an ‘imagined community’ and that nations are not eternal and 
universal phenomenon. Anderson and his fellow historians (for example, see Gellner, 1983; 
Hobsbawm, 1990) argue with varying emphases that the phenomenon of nationalism, ‘as a 
description of the convergence between the political state and the population over whom it has 
jurisdiction’ can be traced back no further than the social and Industrial revolutions of the 
modern period. Contrary to this notion, other hegemonic definition (for example Smith, 1998) 
emphasised on the ethnic genesis of nations and by doing so Smith locates nation’s origins in a 
common identity antedating the state. For Smith, “ethnic identities and communities constitute 
a large part of the historical and social background of nations and nationalism” yet, it is not an 
ethnic community (2001:1 &12). Rejecting the earlier notion of nations, he argues that both 
“subjective” and “objective” definitions are somewhat vague and problematic, as such. Drawing 
from Max Weber’s (1948) investigation to the construction of nation Smith argues that the 
objective criteria of the nation, for example, language, religion, and territory often ‘fail to 
include some nations’ and such conceptualizations are “stipulative”, while subjective definitions 
of nation and national belonging ‘makes it difficult to separate out nations from other kinds of 
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collectivity such as regions, tribes, city-states and empires which attract similar subjective 
attachments’ (2001:11). However, this does not tell us anything about gender dimension of the 
nation but enables us to see the seemingly ignored features of nations, which sometimes are 
‘quite intentionally’ ignored (to use Smith, 2001). 
None of the above hegemonic theorizations about nations and nationalism has recognised 
gender relations as relevant to the construction of nation and nation-state. Contrary to such 
gender blind and hegemonic theorizations, the deconstructive approaches to nation (for 
example, Chatterjee, 1986, 1994; Mukherjee, 2008; Yuval-Davis,  1997; Zarkov, 2007)  
articulate that the notion of ‘the nation’ has to be analysed in relation to gender and to 
nationalist  ideologies that includes not only ethnicity but also race, class and gender . 
Furthermore, the institutions of the state that enable us to see the dichotomous public/private 
locations of men and women as well as the construction of ‘other’ need to be related to the 
notion of the ‘nation’. Such an approach also suggests that nations are situated in specific 
historical moments and are ‘constructed by shifting nationalist discourses promoted by 
different groupings competing for hegemony’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997:4, also see Giles and 
Hyndman, 2004). However, from the hegemonic notion of the nation, it becomes possible to 
identify a process by which gendered locations of women and men in the nation-state has been 
effectively rationalized. While women are the main reproducers of the nation, they have been 
hidden from the history, and the notion of the nation, except a small (but growing) group of 
deconstructionist feminists, does not see it is necessary to include a gender dimension of the 
nation in the discussion.  
Indeed, the idea of the ‘nation-state’ that is derived from nationalist ideologies should be seen 
as different from that of nationalist projects. Furthermore, it is important to take into account 
that the membership of ‘nations’ can be seen as ‘sub-super-and cross-states’ (Yuval-Davis 
1997:3-11) depending upon the nature and structure of the collectivity. History demonstrates 
that there are people who live in a particular society and within a state but do not necessarily 
see themselves to be considered as members of the hegemonic nation or the hegemonic nation 
does not consider them as obvious members (see, for example, Said 1978, 1998,2001;Bhabha 
1996;Tibi 1996 ). At the same time, members of national collectivities are living in other states 
and nations with no state or are divided across several states are widespread. This suggests, as 
argued Yuval-Davis (1997), that the concept of ‘the nation-state’ which is often assumed to 
have ‘a complete correspondence between the boundaries of the nation and the boundaries of 
those who live in a specific state’ is a fiction. Most of the boundaries of nations do not virtually 
correspond with the ‘nation-states.’ However, such deconstructive approaches to nationalism 
argue that assuming nations to be coincided with those of the ‘so-called nation-state’ is 
certainly a fiction and that this fiction has been at the centre of nationalist ideologies. 
Highlighting the crucial importance of social and economic power relations and the ‘cross-
cutting social divisions in which any concrete historical social categorization is enmeshed’, 
Yuval-Davis rejects the ‘extreme post-modernist construction of contemporary citizens as 
disembeded ‘free floating  signifiers’ (1997:3; also see Wexler, 1990). She argues that these 
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social divisions have organizational, experiential and representational forms that can have 
implications for the ways they are linked to other social relations and actions. However, these 
are “not reducible to each other but have different ontological bases” argued Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis (1992).  
The discourse of Nationalism 
Bhabha notes indicating the orthodox and ‘pure type’26 of nationalism that the nationalist 
discourses persistently producing an idea of the nation as a ‘continuous narrative of national 
progress, the narcissism of self-generation, the primeval present of the volk’ (Bhabha, 1995: 
2). Smith insisted agreeing with others27 that a nation is not a state and “the concept of the 
state relates to institutional activity, while that of the nation denotes a type of 
community”(2001:12). Apparently, the concept which has brought into the term ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ together as an essential link and an entity is ‘nationalism’. Post-modernist idea of 
nationalism has accordingly been based on the ‘presumption of a common linguistic heritage, a 
religious tradition, the idea of monarchy, or some combination of all three’. The invention of 
antecedents thus created legitimacy and stability for the radical new institutions and social 
structures of rapidly industrializing modern nation-state. This is not to suggest that 
nationalism should be regarded as a ‘mere-fig leaf for some teleological explanation of 
modernist progress’, but, as rightly pointed out Pitcher, that its development as a social, 
cultural and political phenomenon was an intrinsic component in the forging of the embryonic 
nation-state (Pitcher, 2007:19). 
However, the definition of nationalism that allows us to see the political construction of nation-
state and the fiction of nationalism in the modern state is, in essence, the modernist concept of 
nationalism. The modernist theorizations indicate that it is “a theory of political legitimacy” that 
requires that ethnic boundaries are not supposed to cut across political ones and that “ethnic 
boundaries within a given state should not separate the power holders from the rest” and thus 
“state and culture must be linked” (Gellner 1983: 1-36 cited in Yuval-Davis, 1997;11). While 
analysing this definition Yuval-Davis (1997) argued that the “fiction of nationalism is to 
naturalize the hegemony of one collectivity”and its access to the “ideological apparatuses of 
both state and civil society”. Yuval-Davis insisted that such naturalization is at the roots of the 
inherent connection that exists between nationalism and racism, 
 It constructs minorities into assumed deviants from the ‘normal’, and excludes 
them from important power resources. It can also lead the way to an eventual 
‘ethnic cleansing’. Deconstructing this is crucial to tackling racism on the one 
hand and to understanding the state itself on the other (1997:11) . 
This suggests that the development of nationalism in a sense develops racism and ethnicity 
which allows state to practice otherness and exclusionary politics to ‘other nationalists’. If 
nationalism was first and foremost a construct means of securing the viability of a 
                                         
26 See Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World for a detail debate on the problem of 
conceptualization of nationalism. Chatterjee’s work also enable us to see that much of the post-colonial literatures are 
highly influenced by the Western conceptualization of nationalism.   
27 Despite their differences in conceptualization of nation, scholars concerned and devoted to study the subject of 
nation, nationalism and nation-states, based in various schools and disciplines, agree that nation and state are two 
different concept. For example, see Max Weber 1948, Stalin 1973 and Anderson, 1991 for detail.   
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homogenous national culture, the form I have described it limited to the extent that it remains 
the idealist creation of national elites, “the bourgeois of bourgeois revolutions” (to use 
Pitcher,2007:20). For the concept of nationalism to become thoroughly naturalized as 
hegemonic description of national unity, it needed to be embodied in an organic form that 
would rely not on the authority of its propagandists, nor on abstract bonds of allegiance to the 
capitalist state, but, as suggests Pitcher, “on a supplementary concept that would link together 
a disparate population in a fictive bond of kinship to which all could lay claim by virtue of their 
living within the territory of the nation –state”. The supreme organic ideology of nationalism 
finds form in the concept of race. However, this is not to suggest that the spectre of race arises 
(of its own kind) from the nationalist project. Rather, as Bendict Anderson argues, its intimate 
connection to ideas of ‘blood and breeding’ could be best understood to have originated, in 
the ideologies of class rather than nation, as the means by which “European aristocracies 
defined and maintained their elect status in the rule of subject populations” (1991:149-50, 
also see Anderson, 1998). Nevertheless, appointed to nationalist projects it becomes possible 
to identify a process by which race has effectively been democratized28. The same process also 
allows democratization of gender inequalities in the nation and the nationalist ideologies.  
Yet, again, what worth investigation here, is, who identifies the differences between groups and 
who constitutes line between nations and ethnic groups that provoke people’s desire of self-
determination and enable people to follow the problematic ideologies of nationalism? Who 
develops the concept of race, ethnicity, class and gender that shapes nationalist ideologies? As 
pointed out Hutchinson and Smith, in a plural society “the ethnic and cultural segments are 
institutionally separated and incorporated differentially and unequally into the national state” 
(1996:237).Apparently, it is the ruling regimes of the state and the nationalist leadership that 
produces ‘other’ using various differences between cultures, traditions and religions. The 
ruling regime of the nation-state identifies ethnic origins of people and creates conditions for 
membership in certain groups. People’s failure to demonstrate sameness to certain groups and 
legitimacy to certain groups are identified as other and they become marginalized in the 
nation-state, as stated earlier (see Enloe, 1996, Smith 1996, Korac, 1996). Furthermore, the 
dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘others’ has reproduced in the ways in which the Latin natio was 
applied to distant, barbarian peoples, whereas the Roman term for themselves was populus.’ 
Hutchinson and Smith argues that it is also in ‘the English and American (White Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant) tendency to reserve the term ‘nation’ for themselves  and “ethnic” for immigrants 
peoples, as in the frequently used term “ethnic minorities”’ (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:4-5). 
Such exclusionary politics create conditions for resistance and the marginalized groups of 
people in the nation-state often find self-determination is the only way to respond to such 
oppression. Nationalism has its roots here. Apparently, the discourse of nationalism, is so 
kaleidoscopic and seemingly paradoxical a set of phenomena. 
Theorization of the state and its institutions 
                                         
28 Furthermore, the concept of race does have much to prevent the disaggregation of individual groups by its 
inscription at the common level of the nation-state. See Anthias and Yuval-davis 1992 and Ben Pitcher 2007 for a 
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Now, if we look at the theorization of the ‘state’ as a separate sphere from that of ‘the nation’ 
and ‘the civil society’, which, indeed is essential for an adequate analysis of the relationships 
between gender relations and national projects,  we will see that state often plays an important 
roles in both gender relations and nationalist projects. Likewise nation, the concept ‘state’ has 
been analysed from different theoretical perspectives and in very different ways (for example, 
Lenin,1977, Stuart 1984; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989) and positions of different theorists 
vary from each other to a large extent. Some of these are extremely idealistic and, thus, 
problematic. Stuart Hall’s definition of the ‘modern state’, as one of those problematic, claims 
that state should be seen as an institution which must have a ‘shared power’, ‘constitutional 
and legal definition of rights to participate  in government’, ‘wide representation’ as well as 
‘power’ that is ‘fully secular’. He also argued that state must have ‘boundaries of national 
sovereignty’ that are clearly defined (1984:9-10 cited in Yuval-Davis, 1997:12). This concept of 
Hall is challenged by the deconstructionist feminists who articulated such definition does not 
allow us to see the ways in which contemporary nationalism interrelate with racism. Further to 
this, the term ‘boundary’ and ‘national sovereignty’ requires contextual justification. History 
demonstrates that state produces boundaries that exclude ‘other nations’ and construct 
ideologies around race, ethnicity and gender to rationalize exclusionary politics within the 
same state (see Said 2000; Enloe, 1980; Loomba, 1998; Zarkov, 2007). Studies in state, conflict 
and violence also argue that in the present international state system geography of absolute 
national spaces has been mapped which is then seemingly reconfigured through organized 
human violence (see Cowen and Gilbert, 2008). ). This violence is either produced by internal 
colonialism (see Stone, 1996) or enforced by global imperialism (Hyndman,2008; Said 
2004).Thus, national sovereignty is persistently under threat and borders of the states are 
produced and reproduced by colonial and imperial powers.   
Another important attribute of the state is militarization through which modern states maintain 
exclusionary politics. Work on the political economy of armed conflict and violence explicitly 
emphasise on the intimate and perennial relationship between modern state and militarization 
(for example, see Cowen and Gilbert et al, 2008; Giles and Hyndman, 2004; Bllentine and 
Sherman, 2003; Said, 2004,2000,1995; also see Huggan, 2001). Apparently, military is the 
core element of the post-colonial states through which they function and violate citizen’s 
rights in the globalized humanitarian era and constructs ‘race-nation’, ‘ethnic nation’ and 
‘gendered nation’. Through its military, state shares power with ruling class and silences civil 
society, whether secular or religious, as Said (2004) articulated in his eloquent writing Enemy of 
the State. In the modern state people who have the ‘temerity to speak out’ against or criticizes 
state’s exclusionary policies in public and ‘displeases the powers that be’, they are usually 
‘severely cut down’ and ‘systematically punished’ through state’s emergency decree (i.e. 
military rule) and imperialism. Thus, exclusionary praxis and construction of ‘other’ could not 
be defended at any level in the state.  Whereas nations and communities were abandoned to 
colonial powers in former states, Said warns  
                                                                                                                                   
detail discussion. 
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[....] there is now a situation of such profound antagonism, whereby the individual 
citizen can be threatened with near extinction by government and ruler, that the 
entire balance between various interests in the state has lost all meaning. 
(2004:82). 
Despite the claim for civil society and multiculturalism within the society, the terrible abuse of 
power, in various levels in the society, is one of the main features of the modern nation-states. 
Said suggested that ‘neither a constitution nor an election process has any real meaning’ in 
modern states as “suspension of law and justice” takes place frequently “with the relative 
acquiescence of an entire people” (2004:80). Most striking is that the concept of the modern 
democratic state was found in the context of distortion of anarchism in the society.The concept 
of the state has been defined by Smith as “a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from 
other institutions, possessing a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given 
territory” (2001:12) while simple Marxist (1954) theory of state indicates that it is an 
independent institution that serves the interests of and built for the ruling class only. Such 
theorization explores the nature of many modern nation-states as they maintain the trend of 
‘shared power’ as part of the politics of neo-liberalism and globalized humanitarianism. 
However, the territories of the state are produced/reproduced using various power tools of the 
state such as race, ethnicity, class, and are enforced by colonial and imperial power. 
Now, to account for another important function of the state, we need to turn our attention 
away from the hegemonic theorizations and move towards the often ignored dimension of the 
nation-state. It is important to discuss the theories that enable us to see the gender politics of 
state (colonial and postcolonial, ancient and modern, imperial and democratic) and its 
institutions, how these are seemingly producing ‘gendered –nation’. The deconstructive post-
modernist analyses reveal that state is seen as a single and individual identity in terms of 
international relations, while dealing with relations between state and society it becomes 
heterogeneous in character29. In her investigation into the widely influential classical theory of 
‘the social contract’, Carole Pateman (1988) found that the sphere of civil society has been 
divided into two ‘binary opposite’-the public and private domains. Furthermore, men’s location 
is the public domain while women are located in the private domain and the domain which is 
considered as politically irrelevant. However, state should be understood as an institution that 
is ‘not unitary in its practices, its projects or its effects’ (Yuval-Daivs, 1997:14). Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis have long-drawn-out this concept and defined state as  
a body of institutions which are centrally organised around the intentionality of 
control with a given apparatus of enforcement (jurisdical and repressive) at it’s 
command and basis...Different forms of the state will involve different relationships 
between the control/coercion twin which is the residing characteristic of the state. 
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989: 5)          
This suggests that in the modern democratic state, various social institutions, for example, 
schooling and the media, can be used for ideological construction. Hence, argued Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis, these cannot be seen as ‘inherently part of the state’ and they are  ‘not even 
owned’ by the state. There is a need to differentiate between state institutions and civil society 
institutions and the domain of family and kinship relations, in order to understand the state 
                                         
29 See Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.12-15 for detail of such theorization of the state. 
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and society. Indeed, civil society includes only those institutions, collectivites, groupings and 
social agencies which lie outside the formal custom of state parameter outlined but which both 
inform and are informed by these. The domain of the family includes social, economic and 
political networks and households which are organized around ‘kinship or in friendship 
relations’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997:14). 
However, all three of the above domains30 construct their own ideological contents and in 
different states they would have differential access to economic as well as political resources. 
As none of these spheres is ever homogenous, different parts of the state can act in 
contradictory ways to the other. Moreover, their effects on different ethnic, class, gender and 
other groupings in the society could vary as well. The states nature can also differ in the extent 
to which their powers of control are concentrated in the central state government or in local 
state governments. They also differ in their tolerance towards different political projects which 
are in conflict with those that hegemonic within central government. These questions of the 
correspondence, in political projects, of the different components and levels of the state also 
involve the questions of what are the mechanisms by which these projects are being 
reproduced or changed; of how state control can be delegated from one level to the another, 
and most importantly, of how sections and groupings from the domains of civil society and the 
family gain access to the state’s coercive and controlling powers. It is within this context that 
the relationship between ‘nations’ and ‘states’ as well as between other forms of ethnic  
groupings and the state has to be analysed as a precondition to understanding the ways 
women and men affect and are affected by these processes. Only then we will be able to 
understand that the ideological and political construct ‘nation’ is separate from that of the 
‘nation-state’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989;Randall and Waylon, 1998; Yuval-Davis, 1997).  
Gender and the nation-state 
To account for the notion of the nation and the construction of nation-state, it is necessary to 
look at the discourse on gender –how the concept is informed and how it tends to intersect the 
discourse on the nation and the state. An account for the gender construction of the nation-
state is also crucial because gender, ethnicity and class- albeit ‘with different ontological bases 
and separate discourses’- have been intermeshed in each other. All of them are articulated by 
each other in concrete social relations. They cannot be seen as preservative and ‘none of them 
can be prioritized abstractly’ (Kennedy, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1992). However, the discussion, here, on ‘gender’ is based on the deconstructive feminist 
approach that sees the ‘theoretical debates around the category of ‘woman’31 and ‘the 
relationship between the notions of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ as essential. This is a means by which 
one can understand the debates on the different power relations between men and women on 
one hand, analyse the ways the relations between women and men affect and are affected by 
various nationalist projects and processes. The ways notions of femininity and masculinity are 
                                         
30 The state, civil society and the domain of the family. 
31 The category of woman is important for our discussion in terms of class, race and ethnicity. As these are the ones 
which articulate different power relations and they construct nationalist ideologist which lead in the formation of the 
race-nation and ethnic nationalism, the category of woman discourse needs to be understood well.    
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constructed within nationalist discourses could also be seen through such a framework (Yuval-
Davis, 1997:4). 
The concept of gender, within sociology and feminist literatures that explore the intersections 
of different power apparatus of the society (see, for example, Anthias, 2001; Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis, 1992; Enloe, 1980; Kennedy, 2005; Knapp, 2005; Lentin et al. 1997; Stanley, 
1979; Stassiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995; Yuval-Davis and Werbner, 1999;) has usually been 
understood as a power relation between men and women, while some gender-blind literatures 
attempt to define gender with ‘sex’, ignoring the social, cultural and political construction of 
the term. However, gender differences are not embedded in sexual characteristics of women 
and men, it is the meaning people give to this biological reality. Women are seen as the 
reproducer of the nation and ‘the ideology of woman as mother is a dominant symbolic 
imagery through which the position of the woman becomes visible in national projects’ 
(Mukherjee, 2008:36, Walby, 1992; also see, Zarkov, 2007).The predominant culture in every 
society does identify women as the caretaker of  ‘home’ and responsible for (re)producing 
children for the nation through which women become increasingly precious property for the 
nation (as well as  the subjects of the enemy of the nation) which in turn provide men of the 
nation with the right to protect and control women (Korac, 2006, Walby, 1992) .Such rights 
enable men to see women as powerless on one hand, the essential role of reproduction and the 
identity of ‘precious property’ of the nation/and its men construct women’s subjectivity to any 
potential violence and danger, on the other. Whatever their actual ethnic background is, 
women’s role and location is always identical. Further to this Giles and Hyndman argue that 
gender relations and identities are often “reproduced by governments, militaries, militia’s 
schools, sports and media” and thus, gender is an important analytical tool for understanding 
the “internal dynamics of pre war, war and post-war situations” in the nation-state (Giles and 
Hyndman, 2004:4).  
Gender is always embedded within other social forms (Holmwood, 2000 cited in Walby, 
2005:331) and the differences between men and women could easily be found in their social 
positioning and the dichotomous constructions of social spheres such as the ‘public/ private 
domains’( Walby, 2005). While much of the feminist analysis of women’s oppression has been 
recognized it is related to their location in a different social sphere than that of men, others 
recognized the divide of nature/civilization is similarly oppressive to women. Such divides 
enable us to see the power differences between men and women on one hand; construct 
gendered roles for women and men in the nation building process, on the other. As women’s 
naturalized location is the private domain, which is not considered as politically relevant, it 
becomes possible to reject the central role of women in the nation building process. Yuval-
Davis rightly pointed out “as nationalism and nations have usually been discussed as part of 
the public political sphere, the exclusion of women from that arena has also affected their 
exclusion from that discourse ( 1997:2). Although women have been the chief reproducers of 
the nation, women’s inclusion ‘explicitly in the analytical discourse around nations and 
nationalisms is only a very recent and partial endeavour’ (1997:3).Ignoring women’s significant 
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role in the national production and reproduction the notion of the nation often relates the state 
bureaucrats and intellectuals to national growth. Furthermore, materialist analyses of 
nationalism have given primary importance to state bureaucracy and other state apparatuses in 
establishing and reproducing national and ethnic ideologies as well as boundaries. National 
and ethnic divisions also operate within the civil society though, “it is the differential access of 
different collectivities to the state” that dictates the nature of the dominant national ethos in 
the society (Yuval-Davis, 1997:2).    
The validity of these divides has been challenged by a growing number of feminists (for 
example, Pateman, 1988; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Grant, 1991,Yuval-Davis, 1997); 
nevertheless, both of these dichotomous lines are actively contributing to the formation of 
different role for men and women in the nationalist movement. Feminist analyses of such 
divisions between women and men have pointed out that public realm could not be understood 
entirely in the absence of the private sphere and ‘meaning of the original contract is 
misinterpreted without both, mutually dependent halves of the story’ ( Pateman, 1988: 4 cited 
in Yuval-Davis, 1997). It  is argued that these divisions are ‘fictional’ to a large extent and they 
are both gender and ethnic specific, and that often ‘this division has been used to exclude 
women from freedom and rights’ (Phillips, 1993:63 cited in Yuval-Davis, 1997:5, also see 
Rowbotham, 1973), yet nation-state continue to praxis such exclusionary process of women. It 
is also suggested that the line between the public and the private is a ‘completely inadequate 
tool for analysing constructions of civil societies is post-colonial nations and that a ‘non-
westocentric analysis of gender relations cannot assume the boundary between the public and 
the private as given’ (Chatterjee, 1990, cited in Yuval-Davis, 1997: 6).  Yuval-Davis,  
the identification of women with the nature has been seen not only as the cause for 
their exclusion from the civilized public political domain, but also as the explanation 
of the fact that in all cultures women are less valued socially than men (1997:6). 
Pnina Werbner (1999: 221) argues that the overt space occupied by 'political motherhood' in 
the public domain enables a breaking down of public/private dichotomies in which women are 
stereotypically situated. It creates conditions for the 'feminisation’ rather than essentialist 
definitions of male and female qualities of citizenship which show that women are not victims 
but active agents of their destiny with a strong sense of concern for family and community' 
(1999: 231 cited in Mukherjee, 2008:36). Contrary to this Mukherjee (2008) argues that the 
notion of viewing the “motherhood as a space of public agency for women” is somewhat 
problematic. Investigation into the factors what for instance are the implications of using 
motherhood as ‘the dominant image through which women are symbolized in the nationalist 
project for the imagery and subjectivities of women who are not part of that maternal mould”, 
is essential. This requires justification whether the nationalist project makes its public, 
symbolic space available only to women with certain specific subjectivities. However, analysis 
of the processes of gendering that are drawn upon to secure 'political motherhood', could bring 
answers to such questions. Further to this, Mukherjee insists that ‘focusing just not on 
manhood and womanhood but on the processes through which gender roles are embodied 
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enables us to understand the contradictions inherent in the ‘’fraught relationship between 
gender and nation’’’ (Mukherjee, 2008:1).  
As a means by which the nation-state reveals its problematic notion of women’s subordination 
in the society is patriarchy. The notion of patriarchy claims if patriarchal male identity depends 
for its existence on unconscious dependence on women as the symbolic bearers of loss and 
lack, women’s refusal to accept this position threatens some men with psychical extinction ( 
Minsky, 1996: 170). The theorization of patriarchy suggests that gender relations should be 
reduced to and isolated into necessary effects of biological sexual difference, which is certainly 
problematic. However, deconstructionist feminist approaches argue that any generalisation of 
women’s subordination can ‘detract attention from historically specific ways in which gender 
relations are constructed and in different societies and the ways they are reproduced’. This is 
to suggest that not all women are women are equally oppressed or subjugated in the same way 
and to the same extent. Studies on gender and nation articulate that even within the same 
society and at any specific moment women have been subjugated variously and to different 
extent.  
Anthias Floya and Yuval-Davis (1992:106-9)) have rejected the notion of patriarchy as a 
distinct social system which is autonomous of other types of social systems such as capitalism 
and racism. Rather, they argued that women’s oppression is endemic and integral to social 
relations with regard to the distribution of power and material resources in the society. Yuval-
Davis argued:  
Gender, ethnicity and class, although with different ontological bases and separate 
discourses  ,are intermeshed in each other  and articulated by each other in concrete 
social relations. They cannot be seen as additive and no one of them can be prioritized 
abstractly.  (1997:9)                                                                                                                            
This is to suggest that gender should be understood not as real social difference between men 
and women, but as a mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles 
are defined by their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic positions or 
their membership  in ethnic and racial collectivities. Sexual differences should be understood 
as a mode of discourse, one in which groups of social subjects are defined as having different 
sexual/biological constitutions. However, both ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ can be analysed as modes of 
discourse, but with different agendas. Unless there is separation between the discourse of ‘sex’ 
and that of ‘gender’, as they suggested, biology would be constructed as destiny in the moral 
and political discourse of that society (Anthias, 2001,Kennedy, 2005, Walby,2005). 
It is arguable that the category ‘woman’ can be perceived as a unified category only if all these 
other differences are suppressed, as was the situation in feminist white middle class 
‘consciousness-raising groups’ in the late 1970’s which aimed at their participants  
‘discovering ‘ that the condition of all women is essentially the same (Yuval-Davis, 1997:10, 
see also, Yuval-Davis 1984). One of the most important differences among women is their 
membership in ethnic and national collectivities which needs to be taken into serious account 
before going to any gender analysis. Likewise other differences among women, their 
membership in the different collectivities should be understood within structures of domination 
and as articulated by other social relations. These can affect not only the status and power of 
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some women versus others, but also, as argue Yuval-Davis, ‘the extent to which their 
membership in the collectivity constitutes a ‘forced identity ‘or can become little more than 
post-modernist’ concept of identity (1997:11). However, this analysis suggests that relations 
between nations and states in specific historical circumstances play a central role in all these 
constructions. 
Furthermore, the intersections between gender and nation which has been examined by Yuval-
Davis in her Gender and Nation reflects that ‘from the naturalized roles of women as biological 
reproducers of the nation, through their roles in the cultural constructions of nations, to the 
ways civil constructions of nation-hood , via rights and duties of citizenship’ (to use her own 
word) , are all ‘gendered’ (1997:4). Nationalist projects also become gendered through the 
nature/civilization divide. In this section I have set out the theoretical focus in which the thesis 
as a whole is located. I am arguing for an analysis in which one can see the gender relations 
and the dichotomous positioning of men and women are deliberate construction of the nation-
state. Such an approach also requires an analysis that addresses the question of gender and 
ethnic structuration within the context of political, economic and ideological relations (Anthias, 
2001; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992, Enloe, 1989; Kennedy, 2005;Zarkov, 2008;). This 
position also suggest that the phenomena of gendered violence in armed conflict should also 
be understood in relation to the ideologies, whereby gender is seen as a doctrine that specify 
women’s subordination. Indeed, the construction of gender and gender relations should be 
looked at with regard to practices and discourses within a range of social forces that includes 
social classes, race, ethnicity, the nation and the state. For an account on nationalist conflict 
and gendered violence, there is a need to understand the process of contestation and 
negotiation amongst these different social forces. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Julie Moreira-Miguel 
 
 
Power struggle for public space between a street art festival 
and its neighbourhood in Marseille 
 
 
Last year I began writing my thesis at the SHADyC under the supervision of Emmanuel Pedler, 
co-director of the research unit, former student and now colleague of Jean-Claude Passeron. I 
study performing arts in public space, its role in public policy and its impact on local 
population. My project focuses on analysing the conflicts that happen during these types of 
event and what they reveal about social ties and how the groups involved perceive each other. 
To introduce my talk, I will briefly present links between performing arts in public space (which 
are called arts de la rue in France, street arts). In a second part, I will present my fieldwork. It 
consists in a cultural project named “Small is beautiful festival”. I will explain why I can qualify 
it as a “militant neighbourhood project” and which type of conflicts can emerge during this 
kind of event because of the way different groups figure each other. 
 
Sorry in advance for the homemade translation of concepts. 
 
Street arts and public policy in France 
 
Street arts as they exist today, emerged in the 60s and 70s as a reaction to conventional forms 
of theatre and the elitism they are connected to. Street arts were to attract new audiences to art 
through proximity, accessibility and because they are free but especially by the artists’ skill of 
involving passers-by in the performance and turning them into members of the audience. 
Performers in public spaces claim to be closer to all audiences without compromising their 
artistic quality or the subversive and dissenting potential of their performance. This potential 
however, obviously varies depending on the theatre companies and the performances. 
 
You probably know that in France, culture is considered a state matter, and that institutions’ 
positions influence the artistic landscape on the production as well as on the reception side, 
either through their strength or their absence. 
 
Public institutions use culture as a political tool for educational, entertainment or civilising  
purposes. in the last 20 years, cultural and social issues have become mixed up with each 
other in the institutional discourse which prioritises social cohesion, the importance of 
« citizenship » and of « participation » to treat social ills. 
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Street arts are imbibed with the notion that social ties can be born out of a shared aesthetic 
and/or festive experience in public space. This is why national, but especially public 
institutions would consider street arts as a « mobile, temporary and ephemeral cultural tool ». 
 
Also, street arts that forty or so years ago would have considered themselves as counter-
culture, have progressively entered the lines of either subsidised art forms or entertainment 
performances that are programmed by local councils to give life to urban public spaces. It is 
therefore difficult to class street arts according to Bourdieu’s legitimate culture or non-
legitimate culture. Audience research has shown that a significant part of street arts festival-
goers consider this art form as legitimate as traditionally highbrow forms of art. 
 
The « Small is Beautiful » festival : a militant neighbourhood initiative 
 
My work, which I consider as halfway between sociology of culture and urban sociology, 
concerns a festival which is organised by an arts organisation called Lieux publics in Saint-
André, a popular urban district of Marseille. 
 
Lieux publics is an organisation whose main mission is to produce performances for public 
space. To a lesser extent, they also programme externally produced performances. They have 
the status of Centre national de création which means that that it receives state subsidies. 
Lieux publics also benefits from the support of local institutions at all levels such as the region, 
city… and is hereby has a mission of public service. 
For fifteen years, Lieux publics has been based in a popular neighbourhood, almost a village in 
its own right, which is home to a relatively mixed population : lower middle-class families, 
elderly people who have always been there but also many families of north-African origin, 
Turkish and Kurdish families and a high number of settled gipsy families. These populations 
are stigmatised because of their social conditions and ethnicity.  
 
The staff of Lieux publics believes that the local population are not used to seeing many artistic 
performances, either out of lack of interest or accessibility. They also believe that they don’t 
use public spaces correctly: not used enough as meeting space, for social exchange, between 
age groups for instance. Part of Lieux publics’ work is understood as wanting to change the 
under-use of public space. The projects that they run are also meant to be small solution to 
the ills of urban life. 
 
Lieux publics neither set out to fulfil the audiences’ expectations or tastes, nor does it want to 
transform completely its tastes in cultural consumption. Above all, Lieux publics’ objective is to 
develop the audience interest in performing arts. The programmes’ content and its quality is 
entirely up to Lieux publics. According to Albert Hirschman, the audience has no other choice 
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than loyalty, which is generally the case of the usual audience which travels from the city 
center, to « exit » or leave, or to voice its criticisms.  
 
The local inhabitants are in no case at the project’s initiative and when they do participate, it 
will be on the strict terms of Lieux publics. 
 
Lieux publics action is based on a militant approach which favours a particular vision of culture 
and values which make up part of their identity. To defend this attitude and values, they make 
use of violence which they consider as « legitimate » when faced with an « illegitimate » 
violence based on alienating mass culture. In a way, Lieux publics runs a neighbourhood 
missionary undertaking of which they define the means, the places and the forms. 
 
I don’t consider Lieux publics as an instrument of state ideology which would impose an 
institutional vision of culture. Indeed, the case of street arts contains a lot of contradictions in 
its relationship with institutions, law and order, and also in their conceiving of highbrow and 
lowbrow forms of art. 
 
Even though through my education and my own cultural tastes, I share Lieux publics ethos, 
faced with their pessimistic (Passeron would say misérabiliste) view of the local inhabitants I am 
tempted, as an apprentice sociologist, to take the opposite stand. 
 
How is Lieux publics perceived in the neighbourhood ? 
 
Lieux publics being present in the neighbourhood for fifteen years, Small is Beautiful was the 
first programme run here, in September 2007. The inhabitants that do know of Lieux publics’ 
existence don’t really know its work. According to my source at Lieux publics, they were even 
known as the « weirdoes ».  
 
It is these weirdoes that opened the village to foreigners, artists and performing arts 
professionals from all over Europe that accompanied them, and especially the regular audience 
having made the trip from the city centre. Lieux publics’ communication strategies being 
reliant mostly on Marseille’s cultural networks, this regular audience can be easily identified. In 
short, allowing myself a moment of spontaneous sociology, as Passeron might well do himself, 
people of a certain cultural capital (arts and cultural workers, students, academics…), people 
sharing the same ethos, having the same « normative interpretation of the world and its 
order »32. 
 
                                         
32 Au sens où l’entendent Bourdieu et Passeron dans La reproduction – Eléments pour une théorie du système 
d’enseignement (éthos de classe, éthos pédagogique, 1970). 
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I believe that this cultural project constitutes a mixed contact situation in Goffman’s sense. 
Goffman considers mixed contacts as risky interactions between « normal » people and 
stigmatised people. According to him, an individual is considered stigmatised when he displays 
an attribute that disqualifies him in his interactions with others.  
 
 
Examples of power struggles and temporary marginalisation 
 
As I don’t have time to precisely and exhaustively describe and all these tensions I have 
observed, I shall give you several examples to illustrate my point. 
 
What I call power struggles during a performance is for example when young people in the 
speak loudly over a silent audience or when teenagers throw gravel at a clown, whose 
performance is nevertheless seasoned and successful; 
 
When a speeding car-driver doesn’t brake for a large crowd of people moving from one venue 
to another, simply shouting at scared and angry pedestrians: “Oi, this is my place!”. 
 
Another example is also striking: a gipsy family noisily leaving a performance, complaining that 
both actors were taking off almost all their clothes with the eldest girl telling a spectator: 
« Showing a man in underpants to children is a normal thing for you, but not for us! » This 
incident would seem trivial, but as a result of it, some angry teenagers acted out their 
frustrations on the village square. 
 
I will conclude this series of examples with a case of unintentional marginalisation of a part of 
the inhabitants by Lieux publics. Lieux publics were approached by a group of retired residents 
to organise a feast to close the Small is Beautiful festival, as a neighbourhood dinner. However, 
most of the people taking part of the feast were almost the usual audience or people from the 
cultural field. Also, one the hand, none of the people who asked for the feast came, and on the 
other hand, a large part of the village inhabitants couldn’t take part in the meal because it was 
during Ramadan. To explain the absence of people who weren’t fasting, my source in Lieux 
publics simply assumed that “maybe they didn’t want to have dinner in front of us”. 
 
This may sound anecdotic, but I think that these examples illustrate well what can happen 
during mixed contacts between people who have different norms, different uses, different 
rationalities. Here people are defining each other in terms of « them » and « us ». One of my 
issues will be to elucidate what is hidden behind these different « them » and all these different 
« us » and how these representations can affect all the way people receive an artistic 
performance and their tolerance to a cultural project they didn’t initiated. 
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For the next Small is Beautiful festival, Lieux publics will be reconsidering its programming and 
its communication strategy in the light of this experience and will, in a way, change its ways. I 
hope to follow these developments in the project’s implementation, as well as its effects and 
representations, through ethnographic observation of longer-term interactions and through 
qualitative interviews and questionnaires. 
 
To conclude 
 
According to the sociologist Fabrice Raffin, cultural projects linked to territory always contain a 
dimension of identity defined by the culture they convey. This dimension limits the symbolic 
space of each project. I would add that this project’s identity, rather than converting or 
integrating, first plays the role of indicator and gives ground to sensitivities that already exist. 
 
 
Isaac Joseph’s analysis La Ville sans qualité, 1998, seems to fit my particular case very well:  
In situations where normal people and stigmatised people are in physical proximity 
of each other, no-one knows what the other group “really” thinks of one, every one 
has the feeling of “performing” “d’être en representation”]. He who is subject to 
gaze of the “normal” can either “make himself really small” or on the contrary “put 
on a brave face”, being sometimes small, sometimes large, an instable size.”  
 
Only, on my own fieldwork, one doesn’t really know yet who the normal and who the 
stigmatised people are. 
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Chapter 8 
 
From Oral History to Narrative Research 
 
Linda Sandino 
 
 
 
Oral History: the problem 
 
Despite the increasing tendencies to proclaim the inter/disciplinarity of fields of research, the 
lack of boundaries can create conceptual difficulties because of the impact on what kind of 
questions one asks of one’s material, and to whom the answers might be of interest.  On the 
one hand, institutions create communities of shared interests but Phd research can pivot 
between inclusion and exclusion to accepted research terrains, or the ‘home’ we left behind in 
our search for new ways of thinking about problems.  What follows below is a consideration of 
reconciling Oral History with Narrative Research, in which the former is characterized as a 
method for gathering information about the past for History, while the latter is more concerned 
with the construction of narrative forms within, but not exclusively, social science research 
(Andrews et al. 2008; Hyvärinen 2006 p. 79). In Britain Oral History is particularly associated 
with ‘history from below’ as espoused by Raphael Samuel, and Paul Thompson whose The 
Voice of the Past (1988) has been a standard text for historians interested in using oral 
sources. In common with Narrative Research, British oral history work is used to ‘treat 
narratives as modes of resistance to existing structures of power’ (Andrews et al, 2008 p. 4) 
but the truth claims of narratives remains a problematic issue.  Whereas historians may use 
other sources for verification, the emphasis in Narrative Research is more about personal, 
cultural, or social meanings and the diverse ‘truths’ that can emerge in individual story telling.  
Although life histories contain ‘facts’, they sit more comfortably as ‘narratives of experience’ 
(Squire 2008).  
 
In my attempt to reflect on the experience and meaning of recording artists’ life histories for a 
public oral history archive held at The British Library, the question of whether I was being told 
the ‘truth’ was less an issue for me personally than it was for my sense of responsibility 
towards the archive.  However, what does ‘truth’ mean in life history work, especially with 
artists for whom imaginative and creative constructions permeate their thinking and working 
lives?  Conscious of taking part in an ‘oral history project’, the participants were respectful of 
certain ‘facts’ of their careers but, like the chronicle, the C.V. does not constitute a personal 
narrative of experience, or ‘thematic biography’. The archive’s concern with factual accuracy, 
was I felt, missing the point: life histories as occasions for making sense of the past from the 
vantage point of the present, narratives of experience with which listeners can engage and 
expand their sense of the world and its meanings.  However, as Joan W. Scott has pointed out, 
therein lies another danger: the privileging of experience as ‘incontestable evidence and as an 
 90
originary point of explanation - as a foundation on which the analysis is based’ (Scott 1991 p. 
777). 
 
Reconstruction and Construction 
 
The privileged status of oral history interviews comes from their position as testimony, as 
zero-degree of separation from events in the past. The fallibility of memory has been used to 
challenge, or problemtaize reliance on such testimony as historical evidence (Thompson 1988; 
Tuchman 1996) reinforcing History’s opposition to fiction. Although historians have explored 
histories-as-text in order to demonstrate its textual constructed-ness (Thompson 1988; White 
1973; White 1978; White 1987), the positive intersection between history and fiction and how 
this occurs has remained largely unexplored except for the work of Alessandro Portelli.  In The 
Death of Luigi Trastulli (Portelli 1991) explores the significance of a misremembered date in 
order to show how memory functions as meaning-making in the present about the past.  
Portelli’s interviewees provide a coherent emplotment of the events that led to the death of 
Trastulli but one that signified what the shooting meant to them and the community of workers 
in the past seen through the prism of the present.  Concluding his investigation, Portelli notes: 
 …if oral sources had given us “accurate,” “reliable,’ factual reconstructions of  the 
death of Luigi Trastulli, we would know much less about it.  Beyond the  event as such, the 
real and significant historical fact which these narratives  highlight is the memory itself. (p. 
26) (emphasis added) 
 
Portelli’s provides a compelling example of how testimony as narrative is subject to Ricoeur’s 
conception of configuration from the ‘prefigured’ elements demonstrating the narrators 
competence as story tellers of politically important events in Italian history. The term 
‘reconstruction’ indicates the positivist character (‘factual’) of conventional historical accounts; 
historians are involved in reconstructing past events into meaningful accounts.  Testimony, 
however, even as a narrative, functions as a trace of the past because it is never complete, is 
always partial, awaiting the ‘historian’ to use the trace in order to create (another) plot.  
(Portelli also comments on ‘the division of labor between informant and scholar’, hinging on 
‘the ambiguous utopia of objectivity,which connects the supposed factual objectivity of the 
source with supposed intellectual objectivity of the scholar’ between which lies the ‘uncertain 
borderland of …of subjectivity’. (Portelli 1997 p.79)  
 
 Ricoeur locates the reality principle of historical texts as a form of debt, which historians pay 
to the dead.   Reconstruction, therefore, has at its root an ethical responsibility to assemble the 
traces of ‘what was one day ‘real’ because historians ‘know themselves to be bound by a debt 
to people from earlier times, to the dead’ (1988, p. 100). It is this ethical imperative that binds 
historians to the documents, or traces: 
As soon as the idea of a debt to the dead, to people of flesh and blood to whom something 
really happened in the past, stops giving documentary research its highest end, history loses 
its meaning. In its epistemological  naiveté, positivism at least preserved the significance of 
the document, namely that it functions as a trace left by the past…(1988, p.119). 
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Riceour notes the institutional character of documents as a ‘proof’ or ‘warrant’ that ‘nourish 
[history’s] claim to be based on facts’, commenting also on the expansion of documents to 
include ‘anything that can inform a scholar’ (1988, p.117).  Oral testimony functions as such a 
document but my focus here is to untangle the testimony itself as a narrative construction, or   
in Ricoeur’s terminology, a configuration (emplotment) that makes sense of the various 
elements and is an operation common to both History and fiction; both open ‘the kingdom of 
as if’ (1984, p. 64).  Although at this stage Ricoeur sets aside the distinction between the 
“imaginary” of fiction, and the “real” of historical narratives, it is to situate emplotment as the 
paradigmatic function of configuration ‘without regard for the differences that concern truth 
claims of the two classes of narrative’ i.e. historical and fictional.  Even false testimony still 
arises from a real situation in which something happened, and ‘To the extent that historians 
perform the historiographical operation well they give a substitute representation of the past. A 
well made substitute is faithful to the available evidence and so deserves to be called true even 
though it is always amendable or reformable’ (Dauenhauer 2005).  
 
In order to understand, and untangle the various threads that unite oral history, narrative, and 
fiction, Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (1984, 1985,1988) has been particularly important 
for me because through its engagement with the representation of temporality in narratives, it 
considers history and fiction as the two principal narrative modes in Western culture, 
distinguished by their different registers of what is ‘real’ - rather than focusing on the 
instrumentality of ‘truth’. By complicating the concept of mimesis, Ricoeur is able to do justice 
to the complex referentiality of texts, their truth-claims, and their reception.33  Mimesis, for 
Ricoeur, draws on the Aristotelian tradition in which mimesis is ‘a fundamental expression of 
human experience in the world’ (Kelly 1998vol. 3, p. 233) rather than the suspicion of mimesis 
within the Platonic tradition which could be seen to drive positivist interpretations of narratives 
(Josselson 2004).  Ricoeur’s tripartite conception of mimesis (mimesis 1, 2, and 3) provides a 
framework, or  ‘hermeneutic circle’, within which one can grasp the mimetic correspondences 
of history and fiction: prefiguration as the competence needed to understand the world and 
actions; configuration as the work of emplotment; while the work of refiguration marks the 
‘intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader’ (Ricoeur 1984 
p.71).  Under mimesis3, narratives create ‘worlds’ and it is as such that oral history narratives 
of experience might be better understood.   
 
Recapitulation and Reconstruction  
 
Ricoeur has posed the fundamental question for historians and narrative researchers working 
with oral history documents: ‘How are we to interpret history’s claim when it constructs a 
                                         
33 This paper will concentrate on Time and Narrative v.3 although the earlier two volumes also address time, narrative 
and mimesis.   The successive, developmental aspect of the 3 volumes (in fact all of Ricoeur’s work) provides a parallel 
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narrative, to reconstruct something from the past?  What authorizes us to think of this 
construction as a reconstruction?’  Rather than focusing on the principle of truth, Ricoeur 
proposes an exploration of ‘reality’ and ‘unreality in narration’ (1988, p. 5).  This reframing of 
the problem collapses the opposition of truth versus untruth, and allows one rather to 
understand oral histories as both reconstructions of historical events and narrative 
constructions.  
 
The historian in Riceour’s formulation is a specific kind of scholar, a professional, academic 
researcher rather than the oral history witness whose testament becomes a trace (‘data’) for 
use by the academic historian.  Clearly, though, witnesses too feel a debt that their accounts 
seek to repay.  But in what ways is an oral history interview a trace of the past?  Traces are by 
their nature incomplete whereas oral histories are attempts to provide a more complete 
account in the form of a story.  Through the use of descriptive passages, narrators construct 
stories in order to reconstruct events.  They too become historians, not just in terms of their 
recollection of past events in order to feed the historian, but as creators of meaning about 
those events (Portelli 1991).  Oral history offers the opportunity, and narrative provides the 
means whereby individual interviewees become historians. 
 
The term ‘oral history’ seems to cover both the history that is told, as well as the History that is 
then written from the oral sources; a double interpretative operation in which the narrator 
recapitulates ‘the told in the telling’ while the historian reconstructs the told in his/her telling.  
Narrative is therefore the fundamental core of oral history and in order to understand the 
meaning of its accounts, attention needs to be paid to its configuration, which, as is the case 
with Portelli’s respondents, will draw on a variety of already-told versions; for Riceour the 
interplay between sedimentation (tradition) and innovation (1984 p. 68-9).  In oral history, 
therefore, a construction is always, a reconstruction, forever subject to retellings, or more 
accurately, reconfiguration since reconstructions provide the occasion of thinking again, or 
thinking differently about past events.  As Ricoeur so aptly states, the individual in interpreting 
his/her life  ‘appears as both a reader and the writer of [his/her] own life’, and ‘the story of a 
life continues to be refigured by all the truthful and fictive stories a subject tells about himself 
or herself. This refiguration makes this life itself a cloth woven of stories told’ (1988, p.246). 
So, rather than assuming the interview/recording stands with the final authority of a historical 
document, the accounts should rather be understood as situated within a particular context, 
achieved in and for a specific moment or function which changes each time the story is told.   
 
This point is reiterated by the psychologist Jerome Bruner (Bruner 1987) in his suggestion that 
‘stories are made and not found’ but he extends it to account for ways in which:  
                                                                                                                                   
‘emplotment’ of the themes that preoccupy his thinking, aspects also explored in Memory, History and Forgetting 
(2004) but not a text I use in this paper.  
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the ways of telling and the ways of conceptualizing that go with them become so habitual that 
they finally become recipes for structuring experiencen itself, for laying down routes into 
memory, for not only guiding the life narrative up to the present but directing it into the future. 
I have argued that a  life as led is inseparable from a life as told—or more bluntly, a life is not 
"how  it was" but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold.’  (1987, p. 708) 
 
This instability is an anxiety in oral history but a productive problematic in narrative research 
as Bruner suggests. Telling the same story twice, not only alerts researchers to their 
significance but provides resources for understanding how stories are reconfigured but allows 
one to explore the possible conditions and the forms of their reconstruction, as in the thrice 
told story by the master weaver Peter Collingwood of the events surrounding a joint exhibition 
with the ceramic artist Hans Coper  (1920-1981) held in 1968.    
 
Three versions of the story exist: an illustrated, written lecture (April 2003), an audio recording 
(May 2003), and a video film (October 2007), the latter two both conducted by me.  Further, it 
is likely that Peter would have recounted this story elsewhere because Coper, an influential 
figure was famously reticent and shy, but someone whom Peter knew and greatly respected.  
On opening night we saw the catalogue for first time. It was well-designed but there were NO 
PRICES or any HINT that everything was for sale!!  A year's worth of work, and then no prospect 
of a return.  "Right", said Hans, immediately and furiously, "I'll take all my stuff and sell it on 
the street outside."  Eventually we  calmed down and a notice appeared saying INQUIRIES AT 
DESK. But I found subsequently that I only got orders by hanging around the exhibition almost 
every single day!![Lecture, April 2003). (Collingwood 2003) 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audio May 2003 
 
 
And we went there on the day of the 
opening and we were shown this very 
handsome catalogue they’d produced. 
And immediately we saw there wasn’t a 
mention of a price or that anything was 
for sale. So Hans blew up and said 
“Right, I’ll take everything out and sell it 
on the pavement outside”.  Because the 
V&A’s view was that,  “It’s not our 
position to put a value on your work.  If 
we say this hanging is worth 50 quid, it 
would be like us saying, us putting a 
valuation on it and we’re not in the 
business of doing that”.  
 Video October 2007 
Were you able to sell work from that 
exhibition? 
 
Well, the V&A didn’t think we should 
[laughs] because when we got there on 
the opening night we saw this rather nice 
catalogue, we said “Well where is the slip 
that gives the prices?” They said, “Well 
you know the V&A can’t give prices on 
things like this”.  So Hans Coper was 
furious.  He said, “I’ll take everything out 
of here onto the pavement outside and 
sell it to the public out here”.  But he 
didn’t.  
 
 
 
 
Certain features are present in all three versions above: the catalogue, the lack of sale prices, 
Coper’s fury and threat.  The lecture provides a succinct recapitulation of the complete event, 
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which resulted in the notice (‘INQUIRIES AT DESK’) and the need for Peter to take care of sales 
himself (‘!!’). Emphasis is provided by key phrases in upper case capitals and exclamation 
marks (which the audio and video transcripts here do not provide34). The subsequent tellings 
are lengthier mainly because they offered more time (the audio recording amounts to 13 hours, 
the video to 4 1/2 hours) but each of the narratives responds to the specificity of its context.  
The lecture must be to the point but as a public performance contain some drama as well as 
providing a particular memory of Coper, possibly unique to Collingwood.  The audio recording 
(the ‘oral history’) provides a ‘thick description’ of which this is only a short section, but it 
includes the Museum’s reasons for not providing a price-list.  In the video, undertaken for an 
archive of craftspeople, I found I had to insert a question so that Collingwood could tell this 
part of the story since we both knew that it was important: as a Coper story, as an exhibition 
story, as Museum story, as well as a story of collaboration and solidarity between two master 
artist-craftsmen (the shift from ‘Hans’ to ‘we’). For the video, I am an interviewer rather than an 
oral historian.  However, the meaning of the narratives, a leitmotiv throughout all three 
accounts, is the financial pressure: ‘A year’s worth of work, and then no prospect of a return’; 
‘NO PRICES or any HINT that everything was for sale!!’  The audio version has:  ‘immediately we 
saw there wasn’t a mention of a price or that anything was for sale’; in the video ‘we said, “Well 
where is the slip that gives the prices?”’ The audio version is the least dramatic in that it forms 
part of much lengthier description of the gallery space, the design, the architect, the V&A 
personnel.  The lecture and the filmed version, however, provide a more ‘entertaining’ version 
with more reported speech, destined for a larger audience as opposed to one oral history 
researcher.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
                                         
34 A paradox in oral history research is the reliance on transcripts.  It is possible that eventually multimedia 
presentations may change this restriction.  
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What do the above differences mean to an oral historian?  Is the lengthier audio version ‘better’ 
than the others?  In a straightforward sense, it is because it explains more but what it explains 
is Collingwood, even though it also provides a description of the exhibition.  However, the 
meaning of the story is not the exhibition, but a story about both Coper and Collingwood’s 
resourcefulness in dealing with financial difficulties.  From the above excerpts, it would seem 
that oral history has no claim to privilege here since the story is told elsewhere.  However, the 
fact that the audio recording was a life history, is important in understanding that it answers 
the question ‘Who?’ and ‘the identity of this “who”… must be a narrative identity’ (Ricoeur 
1988, p. 246).  It is not sufficient, therefore, to treat oral history as a transparent account of 
the past but to examine its function as a particular form of narrative construction and 
reconstruction in which a subject (the self) begins to emerge.  Rather than using individuals as 
objects of research, Narrative Research provides the means of seeing them as subjects. OH 
'offers less a grid of standard experiences than a horizon of shared possibilities, real or 
imagined.  The fact that these possibilities are hardly ever organized in tight, coherent patterns 
indicates that each person entertains, in each moment, multiple possible destinies, perceives 
different possibilities, and makes different choices from the others in the same situation. These 
myriad individual differences, however, only serve to remind us that, byeone the necessary 
abstraction of the social science grid, the actual world is more like a mosaic or patchwork of 
countless different shapes, touching, and overlapping, and sharing, but also cherishing their 
irreducible individuality.  As sciences of the individual, oral history and literature deal with 
portions of the mosaic that cannot be subsumed under the grid.  They give us unwieldy 
representations, often harder to handle and work with, but perhaps more consistent not only 
with the presence of subjectivity but also with the objective reality of things.  In conclusion, as 
Squire suggests: 
By focusing on narrative, we are able to investigate not just how stories are structured and the 
ways in which they work, but also who produces them and  by what means; [and] the 
mechanisms by which they are consumed…  
(Squire, 2008) 
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Concluding Discussion: Sarah Baker, Rumana Hashem, Julie 
Moreira-Miguel, Linda Sandino 
 
Introduction 
Derek Robbins 
 
 
Yearbook III  has attempted to continue the discussion introduced in Yearbooks I and II.  The 
nature of that continuity is articulated in the Preface to Yearbook III.  There has been a 
movement from an attempt to frame PhD discussions by reference to the place of research in 
the social trajectories of individual researchers (Yearbook I), through an attempt to frame them 
by reference to the socio-historical construction of discipline discourses impingeing on 
individual projects (Yearbook II), to an attempt to consider Passeron’s position in relation to 
these two essentially Bourdieusian orientations and, in consequence, to test Passeron’s 
emphasis on the constitutive function of language in research enquiry and the communication 
of research findings (Yearbook III).   Whilst keeping an eye on this kind of continuity between 
Yearbooks, Yearbook III has also been trying to use elements of two PhD research workshops of 
2008 – May 15th and June 12th.  On May 15th , the workshop focused specifically and practically 
on Becker’s Writing for Social Scientists and tried to replicate some of the exercises which he 
carried out with his students.  No-one wanted to be ‘guinea-pigs’ in relation to writing and 
editing for use in Yearbook III (by analogy with Becker’s use of long passages from two of his 
students) and so, instead,Yearbook III coheres by using Passeron’s Preface to the French 
translation of Becker, considered at the workshop on June 12th, as a bridge between the focus 
on language and the additional focus on a comparison between the institutionalisation of 
research for PhD students at UEL and Marseille. 
 
Yearbooks I and II each concluded with a chapter in which contributors were invited to 
comment on the relationship between their pieces and the overall theme of the Yearbook. For 
the concluding discussion which follows, the contributors were asked to offer some reflections 
either on just their use of language in their work or on the extent to which their research 
practice is framed by the national context within which it is undertaken, or, possibly, on these 
two as essentially the same in that, perhaps, national differences of conceptual framework are 
embodied in linguistic differences (e.g., perhaps, different meanings of ‘class’). The following 
editorial ‘prompts’ were given and are reproduced here since they help to explain the emphasis 
of the contributions which, to some extent, are responses to the prompts: 
 
 Sarah gives the paper (Chapter 5) which she gave at a conference and surrounds that 
with a critical reflection on the context and the criticism given. In itself, this is a 
perfect exemplification of the gap between what dialogue could be and what it has 
been institutionalised to become, however you might examine how your use of words 
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 Rumana’s paper (Chapter 6) is explicitly an initial review of concepts.  To that extent it 
is already doing as a piece what is suggested for the contribution to the conclusion.  
However, you might focus on the trans-national application of concepts.  You are 
defining ‘nation, state, and gender’ with respect to an enquiry about Bangladesh, but 
these words are defined by reference to their historical meaning in Western discourse.  
There is, perhaps, a supposition that these categories are universally meaningful in the 
same way as instruments of analysis, but, what, for instance, might be thought to be 
the indigenous meaning of these terms in Bangladesh?  Given the relative newness of 
Bangladesh as a nation-state, have Western ideas of nationhood become embodied 
following Western colonialisation or are there languages of cultural identity (perhaps 
related to caste systems) which provide alternative truths about the situation you 
analyse?  The same points apply to the use of ‘intersectionality’. 
 Julie (chapter 7) could discuss the use of ‘public space and, also, discuss the 
transferability of the use of Goffman’s notion of ‘mixed contacts’.  For the UK reader, 
it would also be great if you could say something more about the work of Fabrice 
Raffin and Isaac Joseph – how would you locate them in discipline terms and how far 
have their definitions of the problem affected yours? 
 Linda’s piece (Chapter 8) is already a discussion of truth claims of narratives.  It is 
difficult to know how you might respond.  You write about the process of interpreting 
information provided in different media.  Perhaps you can pull out from this some 
comment on the relationship between the use of language in the different media and 
how this relates to your use of language in writing about it?  You might also say more 
about the way in which you use concepts derived from Ricoeur, although you have 
done that already really, perhaps. 
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Sarah Baker 
 
 
After considering the role of language in influencing my enquiry and in the dissemination of my 
findings, there are a number of words or concepts that I think warrant further discussion in 
terms of their meaningful transfer across disciplines and national boundaries. Although part of 
the following meta-commentary is only based on my rather-limited experiences35 of discussing 
my work with academics from other national contexts, I hope that my suppositions raise some 
interesting points for discussion. In addition whilst Derek Robbins did not raise the issue, I 
think that transfer of words and concepts across time, as well as space, is worthy of analysis 
and is a factor I consider below. 
 
First of all I would like to go back to the issue of identity, particular social class, that I raise in 
my paper. In my exposition of the disciplinary context in which I presented my work I consider 
and critique the way that particular understandings of class have come to be associated with, 
and are generalised as inherent to, specific disciplines: cultural studies with a conception of 
identity which is fluid and changes quickly, and sociology with one that is more entrenched. 
Although I am highly critical of this caricature, it does resonate with some of the comments I 
have received about the use of the concept of ‘class’ in my work. Using the term seems 
particularly tricky because it is, and has been, so integral to Marxism. Over time the labour 
theory of value has been challenged, and the direct relation between class background and 
behaviour has been questioned. Thus although I attempt to make clear that I view class as 
simultaneously inscribed by different symbolic systems such as age, race and gender (Skeggs, 
2004:3) and consider tastes and lifestyle choices to be one of the ways that class inequalities 
are played out rather than the direct cause of action, I have been accused of class determinism 
from some individuals within cultural studies. In order to address this throughout my analysis 
and in my writing style I try to continually emphasise the contingent and constructed nature of 
class classifications. The problems that I have experienced have made it clear that terms, like 
class, may be understood very differently from one academic context to another.  
 
Trans-national discussion of class may also be difficult. As Mike Savage (2000:4) notes, whilst 
it is possible to find discussions of social class in other national contexts, class seems to be a 
particularly British concept that is wrapped up with the historical identity of the British social 
sciences. Thus I wonder the extent to which my findings regarding the production and 
consumption of retro style would be reproduced in other national contexts. This would, of 
course, need to be the product of further research. 
 
                                         
35 One of the advantages of the workshop on the 12th June was the opportunity to discuss work with those from 
different institutional contexts. 
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The term subculture, which I refer to in my paper, is also a product of a particular moment in British social 
and academic history.  Whilst I would argue for the continued relevance of class to describe particular 
social relations, I believe that the concept of sub-culture is problematic in the contemporary British 
context, hence my critique of sub-cultural capital. I would suggest, therefore, that rather than all research 
contexts and situations requiring new conceptual instruments and terms, this is only necessary when the 
old ones seem inappropriate. However, from my own experience it does seem that the use of ‘old’ 
concepts, such as class, can create problems in terms of their meaningful transfer across space and 
time. Interestingly, these problems seem less evident in relation to ‘retro’. As one of my respondents 
commented whilst the meaning and value of retro is hard to pinpoint and complex for a number of other 
reasons, most people in the West seem to have an idea of what it indicates. This, I would suggest, says 
something about the symbolic power of the media in communicating concepts across national 
boundaries, in comparison to the ways in which academic discourses are generated and disseminated. 
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Rumana Hashem 
 
Indeed, it is fairly interesting for me to talk about use of language in my work. Before going 
into detailed discussion on the use of language in my paper, let me admit a couple of points I 
feel important.  
 
Firstly, it may sound interesting as Derek already presumed that ‘no one wanted to be a 
guinea-pig’, I, however, re-wrote the whole chapter for the second time before extracting the 
paper for this Yearbook. To my understanding, I have already turned out a guinea-pig, no 
matter whether I wanted to be or not. Apparently, all PhD candidates in Europe have to turn 
into guinea-pigs in terms of language and institutional rules, at some points, more or less, as 
this is the only way to get the work accepted in European academia. Secondly, I have a slight 
problem with Becker (1986) and Passeron’s (2004) idea of ‘decent’36 language. Indeed, I am 
very unsure about the need for particular rules for language in academic writings. For me, the 
term ‘decent’ may vary from person to person and I see it is fairly problematic to become 
preoccupied with the idea of ‘descent’ terms before starting to write an article. What I 
understand is essential for researchers and academics to have a clear perspective rather than 
leaving the paper with an indefinite stance. The notion of ‘decency’ in academic writing only 
makes the paper hard to access for the common readers and thus, excludes a wide range of 
readers outside the academia and restricts the paper only for a certain group of people within 
academia. To my knowledge, much of the European literatures are only accessible to some 
academics who can sit and talk for hours in seminar rooms or in the conference panel with no 
resolution on how to plan ahead for implications of the research output while recent human era 
has been marked by the need for a strong integration of in-depth research and operational 
work.  While I entirely agreeing with Passeron (2002:159 ),  where he says that academic 
writings are often not well-articulated as it often becomes uncertain and ambiguous with a 
hesitant use of ‘admittedly...but’37, I do not believe in imposing rules on the use of language 
for academic writings. Thirdly, and more importantly, I am unsure about the fact that all 
researchers and academics are interested in ‘truth telling’. Much of the literatures I have come 
across throughout my educational attendance for about twenty years have talked very little 
about the ‘truth’, but avoided any potential ‘truth’ carefully. Thus, the need for ‘re-writing and 
re-writing’ for ‘truth telling’ is not well-understood to me. From my experience, people with a 
clear politics can tell the ‘truth’ at the first instance where as many researchers end up with 
identifying ‘no truth’ after a long way of writing and re-writing.  
 
However, to respond to the queries whether the terminologies of the paper and my research 
practice is framed within the national context in which it is undertaken or are they framed by 
                                         
36 See Passeron, J-C . 2004. The text is available in the Part 1 in this Yearbook III.  
37 Cited in Passeron, J-C.  2004. Foreword: Writing, re-writing and ‘truth-telling’ in sociology, Part 1, Chapter 3, 
Yearbook III. 
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any particular institutional practice, I would like to elaborate on the constant ‘shifting’ ( to use 
the term often used by my supervisor Nira Yuval-Davis) in my educational as well as socio-
political life, so will be easy to understand the ‘truth’ about my writing. Let me first clarify my 
actual position as an ‘activist-researcher’ being actively engaged in political and human rights 
activities that involve serious operational work alongside scientific research. Apparently, the 
project I am undertaking for my PhD is a political project involving issues of national and 
international power politics. I do it deliberately as part of my political commitment. Also 
applying epistemological knowledge and scientific research tools in political project makes the 
work more significant and accessible to a wide range of readers. When I write I use to draw on 
both sources of literatures- academic and other38 literatures and choose terms that wouldn’t 
confuse any of my reader- academic and non-academic. Thus, words like class, race, gender, 
nation, state and intersectionalities are derived from the literatures and sources that are 
deconstructive in approach, no matter to what extent they are based in local or international 
literature. I keep using the terms as long as they explain my political philosophy. Let me also 
note that my ideas are certainly anti-class and anti-power hierarchic, not necessarily always 
Marxist though. To response to Derek’s question on the use of  ‘intersectionality’, I could have 
used other terms, for example, ‘interrelation’ or ‘intermesh’ which I actually did several times 
keeping the originality and assertion on intersectionality as it has been emphasised in the 
literatures by which my ideas are informed. However, I have carefully avoided the term 
‘correlation’, unlike some writers who mixes up the term ‘correlation’ with ‘intersection’, to 
avoid any risk of misinterpretation of the term by liberal readers. My tendency to use and reuse 
the term ‘intersectionality’ and ‘interrelation’ clearly refers to the deconstructive approaches 
and literatures I have reviewed while writing the theoretical framework of the research. Using 
alternative words and replacing the original terms of the literatures have informed and shaped 
my ideas, could have weaken my theoretical stance.   
 
The origin of the terminologies of my paper are also influenced by the ‘routining and shifting’ ( 
to use Nira again) of the disciplines in which the PhD research has been developed. Indeed, the 
current research project is built upon the original dissertation I started at the University of 
Munich in October 2001.  Having held a PhD fellowship in the Post-Colonial Studies 
Programme, I have worked on the dissertation entitled Conflict induced displacement of women: 
the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In the University of Munich I have worked within the 
discipline of Social and Cultural Anthropology and being based in the school of post-colonial 
studies programme I had to review post-colonial writings. However, I started the current PhD 
project in 2003 in the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology located in the University of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. One important reason to move in Newcastle was to work with Prof. Liz 
Stanley, one who calls herself a ‘purely a feminist sociologist’39. Hence, originally the project 
                                         
38Columns in newspaper, reports published in magazines, newspaper and political bulletin as well as creative writings 
and novel.  
39 See Stanley, Liz (2003:1). A Methodological Toolkit for Feminist Research:  Analytical reflexivity, 
accountable knowledge, moral epistemology and being ‘a child of our time’. The chapter was 
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was expected to be firmly based in ‘feminist sociology’ which, latter, did not happen by 
incident. Followed by some personal circumstances, I have had to move in the School of Social 
Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies in the University of East London that has brought the 
chance to work in an interdisciplinary framework. The work is now based on gender studies 
while the framework of the thesis in informed by a wide range of literatures in social sciences 
spanning from work in sociology, gender studies, development studies, migration and refugee 
studies, cultural and social anthropology to post-colonial studies. However, the language of my 
paper in this book has been derived from a number of disciplines of social sciences 40 and the 
terminologies often tend to cross the disciplinary boundaries given the interdisciplinary nature 
of the work.  
 
For another important account of my language, I must admit that I was originally trained as a 
journalist and have worked as a feature reporter in various national and international 
newspapers for four years which affected my written language to a great extent, I suppose. My 
supervisors use to say that my writings often turn out a report of newspaper than an academic 
article. During my undergraduate studies I knew that my career would have been a journalist of 
a leading international news agency41, eventually that ‘newswoman’ became a scientific 
researcher to know the ‘truth of the truth’ (to use the term of an ex-faculty of the school, 
Judith Burnett, 2008)  from a more scientific perspective and to protest the power politics in 
which media plays an important role. Turning out a European researcher from female journalist 
in South Asia must have strongly influenced my research framework as well. However, the often 
simple sentences and straightforward style of my writing are the positive influences of the 
‘journalistic’ as well as ‘political activism’ experience.  This also suggests that the linguistic 
difference in my work is originated by my activism and multi-disciplinary institutional practices 
rather than nationality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To respond to Derek’s comment whether I am arguing for a trans-national meaning of the 
concepts, I would say this is correct and the ‘supposition’ ( to use Derek) that the concepts 
have been derived from European discourse is also correct. However, given the history of 200 
                                                                                                                                   
published in Heather Piper & Ian Stronach (eds 2003) Educational Research: Diversity and Difference 
Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate. I read an electronic version of the chapter received from the author. 
40I have got my undergraduate degree in Public Administration and did my first MS thesis in Women and Development 
Studies. Then moved on to Gender and Migration Studies for my post-graduate diploma and switched to Social and 
Cultural Anthropology for Mphil. Now doing my PhD in Sociology and Gender Studies in the school of Social Sciences, 
Media and Cultural Studies.      
41 This view has certainly changed and I discovered myself being the luckiest one and not caught within the media 
machine any longer.  
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years of British colonization in Bengal, it is difficult for me to find out the aboriginal (if any) 
meaning of the concepts of nation, state and class. Although ‘caste’ system has been an issue 
equally important to class in Indian society, class and caste should not be interchangeably used 
as the concept of caste is closely related to both-‘race’ and class. Last but not least, it may be 
useful here to admit that my terminologies are mainly derived from the European discourses 
though the concepts are not dependent on any regional discourse. This is correct that I am a 
‘product’ of European academia given the fact that my research life has begun in Europe in 
particular. But my ideas are shaped largely by the Indian and Bengali deconstructive 
approaches.  
 
However, to conclude my reflection on the linguistic aspect of this paper let me also admit the 
fact that I am writing the thesis in a foreign language which makes the task often complicated 
to phrase arguments. I came to Europe with a first degree from a Bangladeshi University, an 
academic institution in a relatively new nation and predominantly influenced by Western 
discourses, and the medium of instruction in the University is Bengali. Hence, when I write in 
English I have to think and search for the words several times until I find the direct meaning of 
the word in Bengali dictionary. As one of my ex-colleague says her tongue ‘slows down’ when 
she talks in English42, infact, my pen slows down being ‘hesitant’ and unsure about the most 
suitable word for the exact expression of what I want to say, and I often end up being confused 
and dissatisfied with my writing as if nothing has been said clearly and there is still a lot to say 
to explain what I mean.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julie Moreira-Miguel 
 
Language is a particularly tricky point when you try to study a field of public action, which art 
and culture can be in France. Indeed, you have to determine exactly which terms belong to the 
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vocabulary of the social actors (users or workers of the cultural field), from those which belong 
to the institutional vocabulary, and from the conceptual tools of sociology. And, in the few 
cases we try to determine the veritable origin of the words we use, the porosity between these 
three lexicons makes the task difficult.  
 
Even only within the sociological field, we know how much a researcher’s words can reveal, for 
instance, a populist or a miserabilist tendency of one’s point of view. That is exactly what Jean-
Claude Passeron and Claude Grignon pointed out in Le savant et le populaire in 1989. In short, 
they denounce in this book what they name populism in literature and sociology, which 
consists in considering popular cultures as if they were autonomous, that is to say as if they 
were not subjected to relations of domination existing in general in the society. Conversely, the 
miserabilist tendency considers popular cultures only in terms of lack (of education, of money, 
of access to highbrow culture).  
 
Raffin is a young French sociologist who doesn't work in the academic field, but has produced 
several interesting papers about culture and cultural policy. Some of his work concerns the use 
of culture to reconquer urban territories that have been disused and deserted (as former 
factories, for instance). I was particularly inspired by the way he discusses the notion of public 
space, noticing that a space might momentarily lose its public character when its control is 
seized by a cultural event, which is exactly the case I am studying. This theory made me pay 
attention to the fact that a cultural event can be considered as a violent act because it literally 
monopolizes a place whose uses had already been step-by-step negotiated between 
inhabitants. One of my aims is to describe how people work out a new deal for the spatial and 
temporal sharing of this space. 
 
Reading Isaac Joseph warned me about the danger of borrowing too quickly the categories of 
those who organize cultural events and in a way represent the institutional culture. The risk is 
all the greater as I myself tend to consider highbrow culture as the legitimate one because of 
my own background. I think that the interactionist sociology allowed me to escape from these 
dilemmas and develop a more neutral view on actors and interactions. Isaac Joseph is a French 
sociologist, whose works have been deeply influenced by the Chicago School of Sociology and 
its heirs. Inspired also by Habermas, he discusses the concept of public space and is 
particularly sceptical about authorities’ discourses on it. He is also interested in the specific 
skills which city-dwellers develop and mobilize in the urban context. He translated several of 
Erving Goffman's books into French. He studied interactions between users of cities and 
behaviours in public spaces and it is precisely this aspect of his work that I am interested in.  
 
                                                                                                                                   
42 While reflecting on the influence of institutional practices in her research, Ulrike Vieten (2007) wrote that her tongue 
‘slows down’... it simply happens’. Ulriche is now teaching in the Netherlands. See Concluding Discussion (page 3) in 
Yearbook I.   
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People in my fieldwork have heterogeneous social and cultural characteristics. Especially during 
the cultural event that I am studying, the audience is composed on the one hand of people 
living in the neighbourhood who generally belong to the working class and aren’t used to 
seeing these forms of art, and on the other hand of people from outside, who are already 
connaisseurs and came especially for the festival. Among the audience, some elements enable 
us to identify these who don’t have a lot of experience as a spectator of a live performance. For 
instance, some people (often the youngest ones) – ignoring the implicit rules of good manners 
during a performance – can disrupt the show, even if they seem to find it pleasant. Some can 
stay away from the audience group - others obviously misunderstand what is happening. 
Others might consider the event as a disturbance and complain and loudly criticize. Differences 
are made visible not only by the behaviours but also by the clothes: lifestyle (leisure, cultural 
practices) is partly visible in the way of dressing as well as the body hexis reveals social origins. 
People are aware of these differences. These who visibly don’t belong to the cultivated fringe 
are identified and stigmatised by the others, and vice versa (as I explained in my paper). Erving 
Goffman defines stigma not as a person but as a point of view. Even if his book, Stigma, is 
focused on the handicap, Goffman explains that ethnical minorities and members of inferior 
classes are stigmatized as much as handicapped people can be. Having conducted several 
interviews among the organizers of the event, I noticed that they seem to have a miserabilist 
vision of the inhabitants of the area and describe them as lacking opportunities of opening 
one’s mind through performing arts. That is why I chose to borrow Goffman’s notion of mixed 
contacts in each case when the so-called less cultivated inhabitants are confronted to 
professionals or to the experienced audience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linda Sandino 
 
 110
Positioned at the intersection of science and art, History has not created for itself any 
distinctive disciplinary jargon or language.  Analysis of terms such as ‘the past’, or ‘memory’ is 
rather evidence of historiographical concerns about the meaning and practice of the discipline, 
which, finally, can only be based on what historians have written (or said).   Engaged at one 
level in an act of translation of the past and of its traces, histories are always produced for a 
reason and for an audience.  It shares with fiction, therefore, a desire to communicate, to 
address a community or individual but notoriously treating ‘language as a transparent vehicle 
of representation that brings no cognitive baggage of its own into the discourse’ (White 1978 
p. 127).  However, as White demonstrates, this conception is itself a legacy of History’s 
empirical, or ‘certaintist’ delusions.   Oral history itself supports this assumption through its 
preoccupation with getting testimony directly from participants ‘in their own words’  (thereby 
also privileging a superior authenticity to speech).  Furthermore, the question and answer 
method is also used to encourage a ‘natural’ setting rather than the rigours of a research 
context.   Nothing should dispel the illusion of an  ‘everyday’ situation in which two people 
meet and talk.  Moreover, the very ‘naturalness’ of oral histories is part of their democratic 
function and appeal; it is the history of everyone for everyone.   Listening to my interviews, I 
can easily be seduced by the sheer delight of listening to the sound of stories.  It is only by 
means of transcription that the material is transformed and stabilized into a research 
document.   
 
The moment oral history testimony becomes research, it ceases to function purely as story 
telling as the narrative is dismantled and analysed either for its content (for historians), or for 
how it functions as a particular type of narrative (for historiographers/ narrative researchers).   
As a researcher, I create another narrative using an appropriate set of conceptual tools (case 
Ricoeur’s concept of mimesis 1,2, and 3) to understand how accounts work in different 
contexts, whether their meaning remains the same, and what the purpose of stories is.   
Prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration are also stages at work in my own reconstruction.   
Figuration is metaphorical work; it always stands for something and is ‘made’ just as 
history/stories are made.  Ricoeur’s terms are functional as well as metaphorical: functional 
because they are able to maintain the gap between language and reality while nevertheless 
creating the possibility of talking about the space between words and things.   Reconfiguring 
oral histories as narrative research makes explicit what happens when documents become 
research although it could be objected that narrative research destroys, or at least takes no 
account of the historical embedded in the account; form is sacrificed to content.    
 
 
 
 
However, if personal testimony is accepted as a legitimate historical trace, it is surely important 
to explore how testimonies function as particular reconstructions and recapitulations about the 
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past.   As White neatly puts it:  The principal difference between history and philosophy of 
history is that the latter brings the conceptual apparatus by which the facts are ordered in the 
discourse to the surface of the text, while history proper (as it is called) buries it in the interior 
of the narrative, where it serves as a hidden or implicit shaping device’ (White 1978, p. 127). 
 
 
 
White, H. (1978). Fictions of Factual Representation, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural 
Criticism. Baltimore MA: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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